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This thesis argues that radical emotional reflexivity – self-examination 
of one’s emotions, ‘radical’ because intentional and rigorous – was a central 
practice in Scottish Protestantism between 1590 and 1640.  It was 
fundamental because Scottish Protestants believed that purposeful 
identification of emotions could mobilise desired emotional change that would 
bring communion with God. They evaluated their emotions within a linguistic-
conceptual framework which led them to identify their emotions as: a spiritual 
journey, directed by God, which involved the experience of various 
‘supernatural’ emotions. They undertook this practice to evoke emotional 
change. Consequently, this process was built into corporate worship and 
motivated zealous Scottish Protestants to write and read personal spiritual 
narratives. 
The thesis takes a fresh approach to familiar source material – 
spiritual diaries, autobiographies, dialogues, poetry, liturgical guides, 
sermons, and theological treatises – by viewing them through the lens of 
radical emotional reflexivity.  Recent historiography has discredited 
stereotypes of the emotionally repressed Scottish Presbyterian by showing 
that early modern Scottish piety had a highly emotional character. However, 
it has not sufficiently appreciated that the emotional intensity of the source 
material was the product of a rigorous self-reflective process used to provoke 
spiritual change. This is because recent writing has not engaged with the 
function of language about emotion built into corporate religious practice and 
personal piety. As a result, this project provides a comprehensive analysis of 
the vocabulary of emotion and its purpose in early modern Scottish 
Protestantism, and consequently explains why the source material was 
created and presented Scottish Protestant piety as highly emotional. 
The argument begins with an outline of the theory of emotion (chapter 
1) and the end-goal against which Scottish Protestants judged their 
emotions: happiness in enjoying God (chapter 2). The next chapter examines 
the language Scots used about their emotions in corporate worship and 
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personal piety. It argues that in both contexts Scottish Protestants evaluated 
their emotions as a spiritual journey under God’s hand, the subjective 
dimension of salvation (chapter 3). Then follows an analysis of what Scottish 
Protestants meant when they identified ‘supernatural’ emotions as feelings 
caused by God and as perceptions of communion with God (chapter 4). 
Finally, the thesis argues that Scottish Protestants engaged in radical 
emotional reflexivity to mobilise desired emotions, which explains why they 
wrote and read narratives of the soul’s spiritual journey (chapter 5). 
In sum, this study examines what judgements Scottish Protestants 
made about their emotions, how they made these judgements, and why they 


























This thesis examines the language Scottish Protestants used about 
their emotions in the early seventeenth century. Despite popular caricatures 
to the contrary, between 1590 and 1640 corporate worship and personal 
piety in Scotland were intensely emotional. What is more, the examination of 
the self, including the emotions, was built into the practice of public ritual and 
private devotion. The diaries, autobiographies, memoirs, spiritual narratives, 
dialogues and other sources historians have used to analyse the emotionality 
of Scottish Protestantism were the result of this process of self-examination; 
they were the written product of an author interpreting a subject’s emotions. 
What this means is that the scholar does not have ‘direct’ access to the 
emotions of historical actors and communities, but rather sources through 
which authors offered an evaluation of a person’s feelings. Thus the study of 
the history of emotions, and by extension Scottish Protestant emotionality, 
consists in analysing the language and concepts authors used about theirs or 
another’s feelings. 
Consequently, this project explores the vocabulary of emotion in early 
seventeenth century Scottish Protestantism and how it was used in public 
religious practice and private devotion. To do this, it engages with the 
philosophical, theological, and contextual assumptions that informed the 
meaning of the language used about emotion by Protestants in Scotland. In 
so doing, the thesis breaks new ground by explaining what Scots meant by 
their language about emotion; how they determined what language they 
should use about their emotions; and why they intentionally examined what 
language they should use about their emotions. The project argues that the 
reason why the examination of emotion – ‘radical emotional reflexivity’ – was 
the emotional spine of corporate worship and personal spirituality was 
because Scots were taught and believed that through this process they could 
evoke desired emotions. In this way, the thesis provides a fresh perspective 
on Scottish Protestant emotionality by analysing the language of emotion 
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 This thesis argues that the rigorous examination of emotion was a 
practice central to Scottish Protestantism in the early modern period. It claims 
that radical emotional reflexivity – the intentional (and thus radical) analysis 
of experience – was important within Scottish Protestant culture because its 
adherents were taught and believed that through the categorisation of one’s 
experiences desired emotions could be mobilised. The focus of this project, 
then, is to analyse the judgements Scottish Protestants made about their 
emotions, why they made those specific determinations about their emotions, 
and why they examined their emotions at all. By its comprehensive 
examination of why the source material presents Scottish Protestant piety as 
intensely emotional, the thesis augments the research already done on the 
experiential dimension of Protestantism in early modern Scotland and takes a 
new methodological approach to the history of emotion. 
 The study offers a fresh perspective on the primary sources that have 
been studied in relation to Scottish Protestant emotionality – spiritual diaries, 
autobiographies, memoirs, dialogues, poetry – with its focus upon these texts 
as the creation of Scottish Protestants who were engaged in radical 
emotional reflexivity. This approach is taken because the project recognises 
that the textual evidence was produced by Scottish Protestants to stimulate 
and evoke certain emotional responses in their reader. Consequently, this 
thesis analyses the source material as a material form of self-examination to 
understand better the judgements Scottish Protestants made about their 
emotions and what they hoped to achieve by making these evaluations. To 
do this, the study is primarily an analysis of the language authors used about 
their emotions and the practice of examining their feelings. By this process, 
the linguistic-conceptual framework authors and readers shared can be 
reconstructed, which can be used to infer the origin, nature, and function of 
these personal writings within their original context.  
 Justification for this methodological approach to the analysis of 
Scottish Protestant emotionality is best explained in two stages; first, an 
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examination of what radical emotional reflexivity is, and the practice’s place 
within the literature on the history of emotions, will outline the object that this 
project analyses; second, a review of the historiography on emotion in early 
modern Scottish and international Protestantism will illuminate the 
significance of this thesis. There will follow a final section which explains how 
this hermeneutical approach will be implemented and a synopsis of the 
study’s argument, with key outcomes identified. 
 
1. Radical Emotional Reflexivity and the History of Emotions 
 Reflexivity, a concept primarily explored in the field of sociology, is a 
purposeful process in which the subject is held as the object of cognition and 
feeling.1 Emotional reflexivity, a concept also developed by sociologists, is 
defined as an intentional activity in which the object of cognition and feeling is 
the subject’s emotions.2 Importantly, it is a deliberate activity. The subject 
engaged in emotional reflexivity does so consciously, fully aware of what they 
are engaged in. The philosopher Charles Taylor has called this focussed 
analysis of the subject as an object ‘radical reflexivity’.3 This distinguishes it 
from concepts such as ‘habitus’, Pierre Bourdieu’s idea that culture shapes 
the actions of the body and mind at an unconscious level as a kind of 
instinctual knowledge imparted through socialisation.4 To make clear that it is 
the intentional self-examination of the emotions that this thesis is concerned 
with, ‘radical’ is prefixed to ‘emotional reflexivity’ throughout this study. 
 The sociologist Morris Rosenburg has identified three modes of radical 
emotional reflexivity, which are analogous to three emotional ‘practices’ 
 
1 Margaret S. Archer, The Reflexive Imperative in Late Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 1; David Farrugia and Dan Woodman, ‘Ultimate Concerns in Late 
Modernity: Archer, Bourdieu and Reflexivity’ in British Journal of Sociology, 66, no.4 (2015), 
627; Mary Holmes, ‘The Emotionalization of Reflexivity’ in Sociology, 44, no.1 (2010), 140; 
Ian Burkitt, ‘Emotional Reflexivity: Feeling, Emotion and Imagination in Reflexive Dialogues’ 
in Sociology, 46, no.3 (2012), 459-460, 462-463. 
2 Mary Holmes, ‘Researching Emotional Reflexivity’ in Emotion Review, 7, no.1 (2015), 61; 
Burkitt, ‘Emotional Reflexivity’, 462-463. 
3 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Gateshead, Tyne 
& Wear: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 177. 
4 Monique Scheer, ‘Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (and is that what makes them have a 
history)? A Bourdieuian Approach to Understanding Emotion’ in History and Theory, 51, no.2 
(2012), 199-201; Farrugia and Woodman, ‘Ultimate Concerns’, 630. 
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Monique Scheer has used in her study of the emotions in history. The first is 
emotional identification or naming.5 Emotions have an interpretative, 
evaluative component. If a person has a feeling without cognition, it is 
unintelligible and lacks meaning.6 It cannot be automatically distinguished 
from other physiological phenomena. Disambiguation takes place when the 
feeling is identified or named. This happens when a person examines their 
emotions and categorises them in relation to socially learned emotion types, 
such as joy, fear, sadness, and so on. An experience’s emotion type can be 
classified by consideration of it as a kind of effect.7 This method focuses 
upon a feeling’s cause. When the factor which caused an experience is 
identified, then the expected emotional effect of that cause, the ‘emotional 
logic’ of the given context, is used to categorise the subject’s experience. For 
example, if somebody hit Jenny, she could plausibly identify her feeling as 
anger, given it is expected within her society that she would be angry when 
punched. Additionally, emotions can be identified by their effects.8 
Experiences can be classified by a subject through comparison of the 
physiological reactions and bodily behaviours their feelings seem to have 
caused with socially learned emotion types. So, when Jenny cries, she can 
reason she does so because she is sad, given that in her society the cause 
of sobbing is identified as sorrow. Thus, a subject can identify their emotions 
through the evaluation of what has caused their feelings and what results 
their feelings have produced. 
 A second mode of radical emotional reflexivity analysed in this thesis 
is emotional display or communication.9 This is when a subject attempts to 
convey to another that they have experienced a particular kind of emotion as 
a means to stimulate an emotion in their audience. It could be characterised 
as an interpersonal variation of emotional identification. Whereas naming an 
emotion can be done by a subject alone, emotional communication requires 
 
5 Morris Rosenburg, ‘Reflexivity and Emotions’ in Social Psychology Quarterly, 53, no.1 
(1990), 4-7; Scheer, ‘Bourdieuian Approach’, 212. 
6 Scheer, ‘Bourdieuian Approach’, 212. 
7 Rosenburg, ‘Reflexivity and Emotions’, 5-6. 
8 Rosenburg, ‘Reflexivity and Emotions’, 6-7. 
9 Rosenburg, ‘Reflexivity and Emotions’, 7-10; Scheer ‘Bourdieuian Approach’, 214-215. 
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two participants. The subject who has identified their own emotion tries to 
communicate their categorisation to another through their language, facial 
expressions, voice pitch, volume, props, costumes, makeup, gestures, bodily 
postures, changes of skin colour, and other socially agreed signs which 
manifest an emotion type.10 Note, this identification can be sincere or an act 
of deception: the subject’s professed identification of their emotions may 
differ from what they really think about their feelings. For example, it may be 
advantageous to Jenny to convey to her boss that she likes them even 
though she finds them repulsive. The other participant is the audience, who 
the subject of an emotion seeks to persuade that the identification of emotion 
they have presented through their body is the correct interpretation of their, 
the subject’s, experience. The success of this communication depends upon 
the subject’s capacity to display and the audience’s ability to interpret 
emotions in relation to socially learned and shared ideas.11 The practice of 
emotional display, then, constitutes a communal negotiation over the 
identification of the subject’s emotions between a subject and their audience. 
The reflexivity is twofold: the subject who communicates their emotion 
examines their emotions when they intentionally identify their feelings 
through their bodily performance; the audience purposefully evaluates the 
subject’s somatic and material expressions through an imagination of the 
feeling which ought to have caused these gestures as if it were their own 
emotion, and then names them in relation to the relevant socially learned 
emotion types. In other words, both the subject and the audience are 
engaged in the practice of radical emotional reflexivity when participating in 
an act of emotional communication. Given that emotional communication is 
fundamentally a variation of emotional identification, for the sake of brevity it 
will be treated throughout the thesis as an interpersonal form of naming an 
emotion, except where explicitly distinguished. 
 
10 Scheer, ‘Bourdieuian Approach’, 215; Rosenburg, ‘Reflexivity and Emotions’, 9-10. 
11 Scheer, ‘Bourdieuian Approach’, 214. 
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 The third mode of radical emotional reflexivity which is examined is 
emotional experience or mobilisation.12 This practice attempts to stimulate a 
desired emotion. This can be done through the control of the stimuli which 
are the causes of feelings.13 An increase in exposure to a phenomenon 
which is believed to cause desired emotions, and a decrease in the influence 
of that which is thought to cause unwanted emotions, is the way to mobilise 
‘right’ emotion. Thus, control over a subject’s thoughts, emotions, and actions 
can all be used to mobilise wanted emotions. Additionally, manipulation of 
the body can also be used to evoke emotion. The key is to regulate and, if 
necessary, intentionally change some psychosomatic factor so that the right 
stimuli cause the right emotions. In this thesis, it is the Scottish Protestant 
assumption that the intentional identification of emotion can mobilise desired 
emotions which is of interest. The reason why is explained below. 
 Historians of emotion have not used the sociological idea of radical 
emotional reflexivity in their research. However, the main methodological 
approaches they have employed engage with concepts which are like radical 
emotional reflexivity. To analyse the emotional identification, communication, 
and mobilisation of an individual or group would require the examination of 
the socially shared and learned linguistic-conceptual framework which 
informed how and why subjects name, display, and evoke emotion in the 
ways that they do. Similarly, those scholars who have pioneered the 
disciplinary study of emotions in history have focused on the cultural values 
which have shaped how people in history have categorised and stimulated 
their emotions. William Reddy’s concept of ‘emotive’, influential within the 
field, emphasises the interpretative dimension of emotional identification. 
Inspired by J. L. Austin’s concept of ‘speech-acts’, Reddy has argued that an 
emotive, an emotion-word, is both constative and performative.14 The phrase 
‘I am sad’ describes both something about the subject and at the same time 
changes the subject, as the phrase situates their psychosomatic experience 
 
12 Rosenburg, ‘Reflexivity and Emotions’, 10-11; Scheer, ‘Bourdieuian Approach’, 209-212. 
13 Rosenburg, ‘Reflexivity and Emotions’, 11. 
14 Jan Plamper, The History of Emotions: An Introduction, trans. Keith Tribe (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 252. 
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within a linguistic-conceptual framework.15 Building on Reddy’s work, 
Barbara Rosenwein has argued that a useful heuristic is the idea of 
‘emotional communities’.16 She has proposed that an emotional community is 
a group of people who share the same valuations of emotion and its 
expression. Thus, the historian of emotions, in her view, analyses the 
‘mindset’ of an emotional community so that they may determine the 
community’s attitudes to emotion, how it should be communicated, and what 
was considered appropriate psychosomatic behaviour. Rosenwein has 
achieved this by studying the language people used about their emotions.17 
The idea of emotion as practice or performance, a flourishing approach within 
the history of emotions, also involves a linguistic-conceptual analysis of the 
source material. This is because it is only in relation to a recognised system 
of socially learned signs that a subject can embody and, thus, perform an 
emotion which is intelligible to the self and others.18 Consequently, historians 
of emotion like Scheer have studied the language used about a gesture’s 
meaning to reconstruct its emotional significance within its original context. 
 Thus, the predominant approaches in the history of emotions argue 
that the historian is not to produce a descriptive account of an individual’s or 
group’s feelings, as if they can be accessed directly through the primary 
evidence. This is impossible, given the necessarily interpretative nature of 
source material relevant to the history of emotions. Rather, the history of 
emotions is, in the main, a study of the language and cultural presuppositions 
 
15 William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 96-111; Plamper, History of Emotions, 252; 
Tania M. Colwell, ‘Emotives and Emotional Regimes’ in Early Modern Emotions: An 
Introduction, ed. Susan Broomhall (New York: Routledge, 2016), 7. 
16 Barbara H. Rosenwein, ‘Worrying About Emotions in History’ in The American Historical 
Review, 107, no.3 (2002), 842; Barbara H. Rosenwein, Generations of Feeling: A History of 
Emotions, 600-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 3-10; Plamper, History 
of Emotions, 67-71; Andrew Lynch, ‘Emotional Community’ in Early Modern Emotions: An 
Introduction, ed. Susan Broomhall (New York: Routledge, 2016). 
17 Barbara H. Rosenwein, ‘Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions’, in Passions in 
Context, 1, no.1 (2010), 10-24. 
18 Scheer, ‘Bourdieuian Approach’,199; Katie Barclay, ‘Performance and Performativity’ in 
Early Modern Emotions: An Introduction, ed. Susan Broomhall (New York: Routledge, 2016), 
14-16; Plamper, History of Emotions, 265-269.  
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which influenced the valuations historical actors made about their emotions.19 
That this thesis focuses on the identification and mobilisation of emotion by 
Scottish Protestants, which necessarily involves a study of the linguistic-
conceptual framework which informed these practices, means that it takes an 
approach which is broadly aligned with the methodologies currently influential 
within the field. However, because a study of radical emotional reflexivity 
focuses upon the author’s intent in their use of language about emotion to 
derive its original meaning, it is open to a post-modern critique that the 
intention of an author is unimportant as there are a multiplicity of 
interpretations readers can discover within the document which are equally 
valid.20 If this allegation is sound, all the methodologies employed to study 
the history of emotions are undermined, as their central focus is the linguistic-
conceptual framework within which an author’s vocabulary and grammar had 
meaning. 
 The decision to take a new approach to the history of emotions by 
examining radical emotional reflexivity, as opposed to emotives, emotional 
communities, or emotional performance, has been made because as a 
method it introduces fewer alien assumptions into the analysis of Scottish 
Protestantism than its alternatives. While the language of ‘radical emotional 
reflexivity’, ‘identification’, ‘communication’, and ‘mobilisation’ may have 
arisen in modern times, the practices they denote were an integral aspect of 
Scottish Protestantism in the early modern period. The quotation in the title of 
this thesis, ‘let everyone examine themselves’, is indicative of the radical 
reflexivity which Protestants in Scotland were taught to embrace.21 The 
emphasis upon self-examination led many Scottish Protestants to create 
sources which represent a material engagement in radical emotional 
 
19 Peter N. Stearns, and Carol Z. Stearns, ‘Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions 
and Emotional Standards’ in The American Historical Review, 90, no.4 (1985), 824-834. 
20 Roland Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’, trans. Richard Howard, in Aspen, no.5-6 
(1967); Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatalogy, trans. Gayatri Spivak (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1967); Michel Foucault, ‘What is an Author’ in Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice (New York: Cornell University Press, 1969). 
21 Robert Bruce, The Mystery of the Lord’s Supper, ed. T. F. Torrance (London: James 
Clarke, 1958), 139. This is a modernised version of Bruce’s quotation to provide clarity for a 
modern audience and to avoid the gendered language in which he expressed the claim. 
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reflexivity. Spiritual narratives, used to identify the emotions, were an 
instrument that could facilitate desired emotions in the reader. To this end, 
authors ‘fashioned’ and ‘presented’ their subject’s in a concerted manner to 
elicit a felt response in the reader.22 Their self-writing was a form of 
emotional communication, the writer’s language intended to persuade their 
audience of the classification they had assigned to their subject’s experience. 
This was to work in the reader (whether they be the author, their family, or a 
wider community) an emotional response, and hence through personal 
writing authors created a material object which functioned as an emotional 
stimulant. Additionally, radical emotional reflexivity permeated Protestant 
worship in early modern Scotland. The communication and evocation of 
emotion was integral to preaching, penitential rituals, psalm singing, and the 
Lord’s Supper. That the whole community was expected to engage in these 
acts of corporate worship meant that most of the populace regularly engaged 
in radical emotional reflexivity. Hence, liturgical guides and eye-witness 
testimony indicate the shared language and concepts which Scottish 
Protestants used when communicating and mobilising emotion in public 
worship.  
 Since this project analyses the history of emotion through the lens of 
radical emotional reflexivity, this means it approaches the extant source 
material in a manner which approximates the way Scottish Protestants read 
these sources. Put another way, by this method the thesis makes explicit the 
assumptions Protestants in Scotland took as a given in their creation and 
reception of these texts. By contrast, to analyse the source material through 
the lens of emotives, emotional communities, or performativity would be alien 
to the linguistic-conceptual framework of early modern Scottish 
 
22 D. Bruce Hindmarsh, Evangelical Conversion Narrative (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 15-16; Kathleen Lynch, Protestant Autobiography in the Seventeenth-Century 
Anglophone World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 10, 13-15; David George Mullan, 
Narratives of the Religious Self in Early-Modern Scotland (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), 
1-8, 21-24; Tom Webster, ‘Writing to Redundancy: Approaches to Spiritual Journals and 
Early Modern Spirituality’ in The Historical Journal, 39, no.1 (1996), 33-56; Margo Todd, 
‘Puritan Self-Fashioning: The Diary of Samuel Ward’ in Journal of British Studies, 31, no.3 
(1992), 236-264: Owen C. Watkins, The Puritan Experience (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1972), 31-32, 226-228. 
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Protestantism. These ideas rely upon a post-modern thought-world for their 
meaning and do not correspond to values, practices, or goals with which 
Scottish Protestants wrote or read the extant sources. They impose a 
hermeneutic upon the evidence which neither author nor reader would have 
embraced. Thus, these approaches introduce into the analysis of the sources 
concepts and aims which do not reflect the priorities of the communities in 
which they were made, and so risk distorting the results. Therefore, the 
project takes a new methodological approach in the history of emotions, 
focusing upon the practice of radical emotional reflexivity in Scottish 
Protestant emotionality, because it will provide the best access to the 
meaning of the language used about emotion in the extant source material. 
 
2. Self-Examination of Emotion and the Historiography of Scottish 
Protestantism 
 To locate the significance that an analysis of radical emotional 
reflexivity in Scottish Protestantism has, the state of historiography on early 
modern Protestant emotionality needs to be considered. Recent research on 
emotion in early modern Protestant Scotland is revisionist, a reaction against 
the common stereotype of the emotionally repressed Presbyterian. This 
caricature was initially put forward by Scottish Episcopalians in the latter half 
of the seventeenth century, who identified Presbyterianism’s theology and 
emphasis upon self-examination as mobilising a suicidal terror in its 
adherents.23 This kind of critique was echoed in James Hogg’s Confessions 
of a Justified Sinner (1824), which parodied the radical emotional reflexivity 
Scottish Presbyterians encouraged. At the end of the confession, the ‘editor’ 
declares that the self-examination of Robert Wringhim reveals that he is 
either ‘the greatest wretch’ or a ‘religious maniac, who wrote and wrote about 
a deluded creature, till he arrived at the height of madness, that he believed 
himself the very object who he had been all along describing’.24 In more 
 
23 Alasdair Raffe, The Culture of Controversy: Religious Arguments in Scotland, 1660-1714 
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2012), 133-134. 
24 James Hogg, The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner, eds. Kate 
Caldwell, Edward Crossan, Jamie Swanson, Michelle Ho, Barry Begg, Megan Kelly, Shanaz 
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recent times Presbyterianism, and in particular its personification in the 
person of John Knox (c.1514-1572), has been blamed for ‘every pathological 
trait in Scottish identity’, such as the perceived tendency for Scots to repress 
their emotions.25 Edwin Muir, who had a profound influence on Scottish 
literary culture in the twentieth century, argued that Knox’s impact on 
Scotland was so corrosive that his ‘religion which outraged the imagination’ 
led to the destruction of Scottish music, painting, sculpture, architecture, 
prose, and poetry.26 Muir gave poetic voice to what he believed was the 
emotional heritage Presbyterianism bequeathed Scotland, due to its 
emphasis on rigorous self-examination in the pursuit of religious purity. 
  But Knox and Melville clapped their preaching palms 
  And bundled all the harvesters away, 
  Hoodocrow Peden in the blighted corn 
  Hacked with his rust beak the starving haulms. 
  Out of that desolation we were born.27 
 
 Modern historiography has argued against this negative caricature of 
early modern Scottish Protestantism. It has claimed that Scottish Protestant 
piety had a powerful experiential dimension. Louise Yeoman’s thesis ‘Heart-
work’ broke new ground when it argued that inner spirituality was integral to 
covenanting devotion.28 The real psychological changes Scottish Protestants 
underwent in conversion, she argued, gave them a sense of empowerment 
and feelings of ecstatic joy. Yeoman’s comprehensive overview has been 
built upon by authors like David Mullan and John Coffey, who have further 
established and analysed the intense emotionality of this religious tradition.29 
This revisionist movement is situated within the reinterpretation of early 
 
Miah, Kinga Acsai, Gillian Swinton, Lisa Fleming, and Jonathan Kaney (Edinburgh: 
Merchiston Publishing, 2009), 279. 
25 William Storrar, Scottish Identity: A Christian Vision (Edinburgh: The Handsell Press, 
1990), 27; ODNB, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020. 
26 Edwin Muir, John Knox: Portrait of a Calvinist (London: Johnathan Cape, 1929), 308-309. 
27 Edwin Muir, ‘1941’ in The Narrow Place (London: Faber, 1943); C. R. A. Gribben, ‘The 
Literary Cultures of the Scottish Reformation’ in The Review of English Studies, 57, no.228 
(2006), 68-70. 
28 Louise Anderson Yeoman, ‘Heart-work: emotion, empowerment and authority in 
covenanting times’ (PhD, The University of St Andrews, 1991), viii. 
29 David George Mullan, Scottish Puritanism, 1590-1638 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000); John Coffey, Politics, Religion and the British Revolutions: The Mind of Samuel 
Rutherford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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modern Reformed Protestantism’s relationship with emotion in current 
historiography. The reorientation of academic literature on this subject has 
highlighted the rich emotional life and the more positive experiential aspects 
cultivated by sixteenth and seventeenth century international Protestantism.30 
That the emotional pattern of conversion typified Reformed experience, as 
has been argued by scholars like Owen Watkins and Charles Cohen, has 
come to dominate the interpretation of international and Scottish Protestant 
emotionality within contemporary literature.31 However, while there is 
consensus that Scottish Protestantism was not ‘emotionally repressed’, there 
is variation as to how positively scholars have assessed this emotional style. 
This is seen in their different emphases: while Yeoman focuses on ‘heart-
work’ or ‘heart-knowledge’, a subjective experience of doctrine which leads to 
emotional growth and intensely satisfying experiences, Michelle Brock has 
examined the ‘darker side’ of emotion in Protestant Scotland, her research 
engaged with attitudes towards experiences of Satan and negative feelings.32 
 Despite these developments, modern historiography of Scottish and 
international Protestant emotionality has not fully appreciated that the extant 
source material it analyses was produced by authors engaged in radical 
emotional reflexivity. This is apparent in the language historians have used to 
define their aims and expound their conclusions about Scottish Protestant 
 
30 Peter Lake, Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), 116-168; Charles E. Hambrick-Stowe, The Practice of Piety: Puritan 
Devotional Disciplines in Seventeenth-Century New England (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1982); Charles Lloyd Cohen, God’s Caress: The 
Psychology of Puritan Religious Experience (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); 
Jean Williams, ‘The Puritan Quest for Enjoyment of God’ (PhD, The University of Melbourne, 
1997); Tom Schwanda, Soul Recreation: the Contemplative-Mystical Piety of Puritanism 
(Eugene, Origen: Pickwick Publications, 2012); Alec Ryrie, Being Protestant in Reformation 
Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 17-95; Abram C. Van Engen, Sympathetic 
Puritans: Calvinist Fellow Feeling in Early New England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015); S. Bryn Roberts, Puritanism and the Pursuit of Happiness: The Ministry and Theology 
of Ralph Venning, c.1621-1674 (Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer, 2015); Alec Ryrie and Tom 
Schwanda, eds., Puritanism and Emotion in the Early Modern World, (Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
31 Watkins, Puritan Experience, 9; Cohen, God’s Caress, 11-14, 104; Yeoman, ‘Heart-work’, 
x-xi; Mullan Scottish Puritanism, 87. 
32 Yeoman, ‘Heart-work’, vi-xii; Michelle D. Brock, ‘Internalizing the Demonic: Satan and the 
Self in Early Modern Scottish Piety’ in Journal of British Studies, 54, no.1 (2015): 23-43; 
Michelle D. Brock, Satan and the Scots: The Devil in Post-Reformation Scotland, c.1560-
1700 (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2016). 
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emotionality. Yeoman’s thesis is an examination of the ‘inner world’ of 
Scottish Protestant spirituality.33 Mullan’s discussion of conversion and 
assurance includes claims like ‘the sense of assurance… guaranteed the 
place of emotion in puritan piety’, and ‘James Mitchell’s religious emotion 
manifested itself so powerfully that his friends worried about him’.34 Brock’s 
work examines ‘demonic experiences’ while Ryrie has analysed the ‘intense 
emotional experiences’ of British Protestants.35 Even Cohen, who 
acknowledges the context in which puritans created their spiritual 
testimonies, considers such documents as ‘unvarnished accounts of personal 
experience… laying bare the development of grace in ordinary folk’.36 In each 
case, the language used by the scholar assumes that the source material is 
descriptive of an emotion open to analysis. Their statements betray a 
presupposition that the sources provide direct access to the experiences of 
Scottish Protestants. This means that they present a relatively ‘flat’ analysis 
of these texts, taking statements as reports of experiential phenomena. What 
is missed by such approaches is the motivations and alien conceptual 
worldview which informed the language Scots used in these documents. In 
other words, they fail to appreciate the medium in which Scottish, English, or 
North American Protestant judgements about emotion come to a historian. 
Thus, while Mullan has recognised the evaluative nature of spiritual self-
writings (an assessment discussed above), even in his work the idea that the 
primary evidence constitutes a material form of radical emotional reflexivity 
has not permeated his analysis of Scottish Protestant emotionality.37 While 
scholars who have paid attention to the genre of spiritual narratives have 
better recognised its evaluative form, those who have made this argument 
have only engaged, in a limited way, with the reasons why authors identified 
their subject’s emotions in the ways that they did.38 This is because the focus 
of these scholars was not the language authors used when they identified 
 
33 Yeoman, ‘Heart-work’, i. 
34 Mullan, Scottish Puritanism, 99-100. 
35 Brock, ‘Internalizing’, 25; Ryrie, Being Protestant, 4. 
36 Cohen, God’s Caress, 21, 
37 Mullan, Narratives, 1-8, 21-24. 
38 See Footnote 21. 
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and mobilised emotion through their texts, but the genre of self-writing in 
early modern Protestantism. Put another way, these scholars did not apply 
their insights about the genre of these texts to the history of emotions. As a 
result, there is a gap in the modern historiography of Scottish Protestant 
emotionality in relation to the evaluative dimension of the source material, 
which has limited its insight into the emotional judgements made by Scottish 
Protestants. 
 Therefore, this thesis offers a fresh perspective on the source material 
because it recognises that the source material was the product of purposeful 
self-examination of the emotions in order to evoke desired emotions in the 
reader. The project acknowledges that the source material conveys the 
author’s interpretation and evaluation of their subject’s feelings as informed 
by their linguistic-conceptual framework. Hence, the thesis focuses on the 
vocabulary and ideas which Scottish Protestants used to make their 
judgements about their subject’s emotions. It explains what Scottish 
Protestants meant by their language, distinguishing their alien concepts from 
modern theories of emotion. Moreover, the project explains why Scottish 
Protestants created texts which were written forms of radical emotional 
reflexivity and why these sources presented Scottish Protestant piety as 
intensely emotional. Thus, the thesis goes beyond description of Protestant 
emotionality in early modern Scotland to the analysis of why Scottish 
Protestants judged it to have an intense emotional style and why they 
evaluated their emotions at all. It integrates into the analysis of Scottish 
Protestant emotion the origin, form, and purpose of the texts historians have 
used to examine the experiential dimension of Scottish Protestantism. 
 
3. Method, Structure, and Outcomes 
 This thesis takes a new approach to Scottish Protestant emotionality 
by its examination of radical emotional reflexivity between 1590 and 1640.39 
 
39 The timescale for the source material has been limited to between 1590 and 1640 for two 
reasons. The start date of 1590 has been selected because this was approximately the time 
when introspective piety blossomed in Protestant Scotland, and so the practice of radical 
emotional reflexivity became central to Scottish Protestant private devotion. 1640, two years 
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Practically, this means the study explores the language Scottish Protestants 
used to identify, and thus mobilise, their emotions. To this end, it explores the 
vocabulary of emotion built into corporate worship. Listening to sermons, 
participation in the Lord’s Supper, penitential rituals, and psalm singing all 
provided opportunities in which Scottish communities could learn and 
practice their use of language in relation to their emotions. Consequently, 
how radical emotional reflexivity was built into the official guidance for, 
clerical commentary on, and eyewitness accounts of Scottish Protestant 
public worship, are examined. The language used in the identification and 
mobilisation of emotion in corporate ritual bled into the private piety of those 
Scottish Protestants who most zealously adhered to the faith. Their 
application of this emotional vocabulary and grammar to their interior lives 
has been preserved through the highly emotional diaries, memoirs, 
autobiographies, confessions, dialogues, and religious poetry they produced. 
Thus, this thesis examines the emotional language Scots were taught in 
public worship, and how some of the most committed and learned Scottish 
Protestants used this linguistic register when they examined their own 
feelings. Notwithstanding the variety Scots had in their comprehension and 
application of the semantic repertoire of emotion they learned in corporate 
worship, analysis of sources related to public and private devotion can 
provide insight into the shared vocabulary and grammar Scottish Protestants 
were educated to use about their emotions. Therefore, this project abstracts 
from the source material the patterns of language taught in religious worship 
and, to varying degrees, used by Scots when engaged in radical emotional 
reflexivity, to recreate the shared vocabulary Scottish Protestants could 
employ in their identification, and consequent mobilisation, of emotion. 
 To understand why the extant material about corporate worship and 
the spirituality of pious Scots followed particular conventions in their use of 
 
after the National Covenant, has been identified as the end date because prior to the 
divisions caused by the wars of the three kingdoms there was, in the main, a common 
theology and piety practiced in Scotland, despite significant political and ecclesiological 
differences. Consequently, there was a shared linguistic-conceptual framework about 
emotion. Thus, ending in 1640 allows the thesis to engage with the language which Scottish 
Protestants engaged with in their piety. See Mullan, Scottish Puritanism, 3-4. 
15 
 
emotional language, the conceptual framework which tacitly justified the 
linguistic expressions Scots were taught to make about their emotions must 
be examined. This is especially important because much of the language 
used in these sources appears familiar to a modern audience. However, this 
similarity is only apparent. The shared vocabulary of emotion employed in 
Scottish Protestant worship and the devotions of the most faithful is radically 
different to a contemporary interpretation of feeling. Consequently, the 
language sources use about emotion must be, in the words of Cohen, 
‘translated’ to reveal an ‘utterance’s pristine connotation’.40 In his study of 
puritan emotionality in New England, he attempted to uncover the original 
linguistic meaning of the phrases puritans used in their spiritual testimonies 
through analysis of the ministry’s teaching, which acts as a hermeneutic for 
his examination of the laity’s language about their emotions. This thesis takes 
a similar approach to a broader range of material. In addition to the internal 
evidence provided by sources related to public worship and the piety of the 
most zealous, sermons, theological treatises, piety manuals, philosophical 
discussions, and physiological studies are analysed to make explicit the 
assumptions Scots made in their use of language about emotion. Put another 
way, the study’s examination of these sources uncovers the ideas and 
attitudes Scots were taught to express when they identified, and in so doing 
mobilised, their emotions. 
 In defence of the main argument, the first two chapters engage 
primarily with theological texts to analyse basic assumptions that were 
foundational to the practice of self-examination in early modern Scotland. 
Chapter one examines the theory of emotion Scottish Protestants 
presupposed in their identification and mobilisation of emotion. It argues that 
Protestants in Scotland assumed a modified Thomist interpretation of the 
emotions, and that each aspect of this theory was integral to the language 
Scottish Protestants used about their emotions. The second chapter 
analyses the stated and socially learned goal of Scottish Protestants – 
 
40 Cohen, God’s Caress, 20-21. 
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communion with God, which they identified as happiness. That Protestants in 
Scotland assumed that fellowship with God was the fulfilment of human 
nature, that this resulted in a desired emotional state, and could only be 
acquired through emotional change, is explored. Thus, chapters one and two 
outline the category which Scottish Protestants focused on in their radical 
emotional reflexivity and the goal against which they judged the significance 
of their experiences. 
 The third chapter examines the ideological spine of public worship and 
private piety: the pilgrimage of the soul from misery to happiness. It argues 
that authors used the language of emotion sustained by communal ritual in 
their personal writings, which led them to categorise their emotions in the 
form of a spiritual journey. The extant narratives mapped the order of 
emotional change which constituted the pilgrimage of the soul. While no two 
spiritual journeys were the same, all authors located their subject’s 
experiences within a sequence of emotion which can be schematized into six 
stages: love for devotion, the apprehension of sin, legal terror, repentance, a 
feeling of mercy, and communion with God. The conversion narrative of 
Mistress Rutherford (fl.1630/70?) is used as a vehicle to analyse the 
language and concepts associated with each phase of the spiritual journey.  
  Chapter four analyses the Scottish Protestant judgement that the 
emotional change experienced in a subject’s spiritual journey was caused by 
God. It considers how Scottish Protestants assumed that God was the cause 
of ‘supernatural emotions’, that as the cause of these emotions God was 
somehow inside the subject’s consciousness, and that particular supernatural 
emotions could be interpreted as perceptions of communion with God. As a 
result, the chapter answers why Scottish Protestants expressed judgements 
in their writings and religious rituals which presupposed that God had caused 
and was, somehow, in their emotions.  
 The fifth chapter analyses the process and purpose of radical 
emotional reflexivity in Scottish Protestant ritual and piety. It is explored how 
in public worship and private devotion there was an emphasis upon testing 
the sincerity of a subject’s emotions. The discussion explores the nature of 
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the somatic evidence, particularly tears and groans, Scots looked for when 
they evaluated whether a subject had experienced supernatural emotions. 
The chapter addresses why the testing of the emotions caused many Scots 
to experience acute anxiety over their spiritual status. It identifies why they 
thought they had failed to have genuine supernatural emotions, and argues 
that, due to doctrinal commitments and the transience of feeling, scepticism 
was embedded into the practice of radical emotional reflexivity. Doubt, 
however, was not so much a problem as a crucial part of evaluating 
emotional sincerity. The purpose of practicing radical emotional reflexivity 
was to stimulate supernatural emotions, the focus of the final section. This 
was achieved either through failure, which moved the subject to repentance, 
or success, which evoked assurance in God’s mercy. Through this process 
the examination of the emotions could evoke desired emotions. Moreover, 
because the activity could stimulate those feelings which advanced the 
spiritual journey, writing and reading narratives about a soul’s pilgrimage was 
considered an experience of a divinely inspired step forward towards 
communion with God. Thus, the chapter explains why Scottish Protestants 
consciously examined their emotions and as a result produced spiritual 
narratives. It explores what self-examination of emotion consisted in, how it 
worked, and why it was undertaken. 
 Therefore, this thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of what 
judgements Scottish Protestants made about their emotions and why they 
made these evaluations.  
 It is important to establish the theory of emotion Scottish Protestants 
assumed from the outset. Without this knowledge, it is impossible to specify 
what aspects of an author’s radical reflexivity were relevant to the claims the 
experiential dimension of Scottish Protestantism. Consequently, the theory of 
emotion Scottish Protestants presupposed must be analysed. This is the 
focus of the first chapter, to which the thesis now proceeds.
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Chapter One: The Scottish Protestant Theory of Emotion 
 
 This chapter argues that Protestants in Scotland assumed that the 
nature of the emotions conformed to a modified Thomist interpretation. This 
meant that they ascribed to every emotion three basic qualities. First, that it 
was a passive experience caused by an external agent. Second, that the 
judgements of the understanding and will are necessary for an emotion to 
occur. Third, that emotions are psychosomatic, and can be distinguished with 
reference to their formal and material manifestations. These three aspects of 
the emotions were assumed by Scottish Protestants when they engaged in 
radical emotional reflexivity and provided the emotional logic that informed 
their identification and communication of emotion. This is because the theory 
of emotion Protestants in Scotland presupposed enabled them to determine 
what aspects of their experience constituted an emotion and, thus, interpret 
how that part of their experience came to be. Their more complicated 
assumptions about emotion were necessarily dependent upon the supposed 
nature of emotion. Consequently, this chapter analyses the basic category of 
emotion as understood by Scottish Protestants, which will establish the 
fundamental emotional logic which influenced important presuppositions, and 
as such the language Protestants in Scotland used about their emotions. 
 The vehicle for the analysis is the theological text The Portraiture of 
the Image of God in Man by John Weemes (c.1579-1636), minister of Duns 
from 1613.1 Weemes’s theory of emotion, expressed within this document, 
was the most comprehensive, sophisticated, and prominent philosophical 
work on the nature of the emotions developed in early seventeenth century 
Protestant Scotland. Its definition and categorisation of emotion was 
representative, though more refined, of the theories of emotions developed 
 
1 John Weemes, The Portraiture of the Image of God in Man, in his Three Estates, of 
Creation, Restauration, Glorification (Published in London unless otherwise stated: 1627; 
2nd ed. 1632; 3rd ed.1636). This thesis uses the 1632 version as its primary source, as it 




by other Scottish Protestants between 1590 and 1640.2 Moreover, Weemes’s 
theory of emotion has been identified as one of the earliest and most 
thorough, and thus formative, treatises on the topic in a British Protestant 
context.3 His ideas about the nature of emotion could have had transatlantic 
influence given that John Bellamie (c.1596-1653), who published The 
Portraiture six times in total, sold many theological texts to those who 
travelled to New England.4 Weemes’s theological thought provided a learned 
and accessible system of thought which expressed many of the basic 
assumptions implicit in Protestant use of language about emotion across the 
anglosphere, even if most could not have articulated their concept of emotion 
as eruditely as Weemes had done. He expressed the values they used in 
their practice of radical emotional reflexivity. The representativeness of 
Weemes’s thought perhaps explains the high demand for his works. All this 
makes Weemes’s theory of emotion an ideal candidate for analysis as 
perhaps the clearest and most complete articulation of the theory of emotion 
that was assumed by Scottish Protestants. 
 Weemes’s theory of emotion was, arguably, representative of Scottish 
Protestant views because it was a modified Thomist, and thus augmented 
Aristotelian, account of the emotions.5 The intellectual thought-world of early 
modern Reformed Protestants has been identified by Richard Muller as 
‘Christian Aristotelianism’; an adherence to principles in Aristotle’s philosophy 
filtered through Thomist, Scotist, Augustinian, Nominalist, and humanist 
debates within the late-medieval and early modern eras.6 This was also the 
 
2 John Abernethy, A Christian and Heavenly Treatise Containing Physicke for the Soule 
(London, 1630), 255-446; Alexander Ross, The Philosophicall Touch-Stone: or Observations 
upon Sir Kenelm Digbie’s Discourses of the Nature of Bodies and of the Reasonable Soule 
(London, 1645), 52-55. 
3 David S. Sytsma, ‘The Logic of the Heart: Analyzing the Affections in Early Reformed 
Orthodoxy’ in Church and School in Early Modern Protestantism: Studies in Honor of 
Richard A. Muller on the Maturation of a Theological Tradition, eds. Jordan J. Ballor, David 
S. Stysma, and Jason Zuidema (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 473-475, 487-88. 
4 Henry R Plomer, A Dictionary of the Booksellers and Printers who were at work in England, 
Scotland and Ireland from 1641-1667 (London: The Bibliographical Society, 1907), 20-21; 
Cohen, God’s Caress, 34-35. 
5 Sytsma, ‘Logic’, 477, 481-483. 
6 Richard A. Muller, ‘Reformation, Orthodoxy, "Christian Aristotelianism," and the Eclecticism 
of Early Modern Philosophy’ in Nederlands Archief Voor Kerkgeschiedenis / Dutch Review of 
Church History, 81, no.3 (2001), 315: See Peter King, ‘Emotions in Medieval Thought’ in The 
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case in Scotland. The texts of Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), including his ethical 
philosophy, stood at the core of the Scottish higher educational system, even 
in humanist quarters.7 Within this Aristotelian intellectual trajectory Thomas 
Aquinas’s (1225-1274) theory of emotion, his so-called ‘Treatise on the 
Passions’ (questions 22-48 of the Summa Theologiae), became the dominant 
influence upon early modern philosophical and theological consideration of 
emotion.8 However, many seventeenth century thinkers did not embrace 
Aristotelianism or Thomism wholesale. They amended the Aristotelian 
paradigm by expulsion of what they considered erroneous and included 
principles developed by other thinkers and traditions to improve their 
philosophical and theological theories. Protestant theologians likewise took 
an ‘eclectic’ approach, their intellectual thought influenced by a variety of 
sources, which helped them to develop new theories within the Christian 
Aristotelian paradigm.9 In Scotland, the widespread influence of Duns 
Scotus’s (1265/66-1308) thought, and how Scottish Protestants integrated it 
into their Aristotelian-Thomist worldview, exemplified the tendency to modify 
and combine ideas from a variety of ancient and medieval sources.10 The 
predisposition to improve established belief through the integration of alien 
 
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, ed. Peter Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 167, for recognition of the multiplicity of competing theories of emotion in a 
Medieval context. 
7 Steven J. Reid, ‘On the Edge of Reason: The Scottish Universities between Reformation 
and Enlightenment, 1560-1660’ in Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century, ed. 
Alexander Broadie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 36, 38; Giovanni Gellera, 
‘Reformed Scholastic Philosophy in the Seventeenth-Century’ in Scottish Philosophy in the 
Seventeenth Century, ed. Alexander Broadie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 95; 
Christian Maurer, ‘Human Nature, the Passions, and the Fall: Theme from Seventeenth-
Century Scottish Moral Philosophy’ in Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century, ed. 
Alexander Broadie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 177. 
8 King, ‘Emotions in Medieval Thought’, 174, 176; Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and 
Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004), 239; Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P., Logic of 
Desire: Aquinas on Emotion (Washington D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 
2011), 1; Susan James, Passion and Action: the Emotions in Seventeenth-Century 
Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 21-25, 47; Robert Miner, Thomas 
Aquinas on the Passions A Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae 22-48 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1. 
9 Richard A. Muller, ‘Christian Aristotelianism’, 308, 323; Richard A. Muller, Divine Will and 
Human Choice: Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in early modern Reformed Thought 
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2017), 77 
10 J.-P. Anfray, ‘Scottish Scotism? The Philosophical Theses in the Scottish Universities, 
1610-1630’ in History of Universities, XXIX, no.2 (2017), 110. 
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ideas also affected early modern theories of emotion. The views of Plato, 
Augustine, Scotus, and the Stoics supplemented Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s 
thought in seventeenth century studies on feeling.11 That Weemes’s account 
of the emotions was a form of modified Thomism was typical of the 
Protestant intellectual Christian and Aristotelian eclecticism of his period. 
Crucially, not only was Weemes’s approach representative, but his 
alterations of Aquinas’s theory with Scotist and Stoic ideas reflected the 
assumptions Scottish Protestants made about emotion when they engaged in 
radical emotional reflexivity. Consequently, Weemes’s theory of emotion was 
situated within an eclectic Christian Aristotelian tradition, and his presentation 
of a modified Thomist interpretation of the emotions articulated the basic 
ideas Scottish Protestants had about the nature of emotion in a scholastic 
form. Thus, Weemes’s theory of emotion was representative in its approach 
and conclusions of the prevalent intellectual attitudes and more popular 
thought about feeling in early modern Scotland. 
 The outline of the chapter follows the logical structure of Weemes’s 
definition of emotion. Part one examines his idea that emotions are the 
effects of external agency. Part two analyses the role of the understanding 
and will in the process which evokes an emotion. Part three looks at the 
psychosomatic phenomena which constitute an emotion. In each section, the 
key concepts will be identified and reconstructed through analysis of 
Weemes’s work and, for greater lucidity, the ideas of other thinkers insofar as 
they influenced or expand upon the ideas in Weemes’s theory of emotion. 
The impact that these three assumed features of emotion, as expressed by 
 
11 Amy Schmitter has identified significant Augustinian, Platonic, Aristotelian, Thomist, Stoic, 
Epicurean, medical and contemporary influences in early modern thinking on the passions. 
Likewise, James has recognised that early modern philosophers had eclectic tendencies, 
drawing upon Aristotle, Aquinas, Augustine, and the Stoics as sources which could be 
‘amalgamated into a single complete and correct system’. In particular, she observes that 
Stoicism formed a significant dimension of the intellectual thought-world of the seventeenth 
century, being an alternative to Aristotelian categories as mediated through the medieval 
schools. Moreover, James has noted the profound effect Augustine had on Puritan writers, 
particularly shaping their ideas concerning the relationship of the emotions and the will. See 
Amy M. Schmitter, ‘Passions and Affections’ in The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy 
in the Seventeenth Century, ed. Peter R. Anstey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
446-452; James, Passion and Action, 24-25. 
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Weemes, had on the language about emotion Scottish Protestants used in 
public worship and private piety will be indicated in each section. Clues will 
also be offered as to how the nature of emotion influenced the identification 
of emotion by Scottish Protestants as a spiritual journey (chapter three), as 
caused by God (chapter four), and in how they inferred the presence of a 
supernatural emotion (chapter five). Thus, this chapter will point out the 
logical foundations of ideas that will be tracked throughout the thesis. 
 
1. An External Agent Causes Emotion 
 Weemes argued that emotions are the experience of a subject that an 
agent has acted upon. This idea was implicit in the task he had set himself, 
which was to define and categorise the ‘passions’.12 ‘Passion’, along with 
‘Affection’ and ‘Perturbation’, are the closest analogues to the modern 
conception of emotion that existed in early modern thought.13 The difference 
in terminology indicates the conceptual differentiation which exists between 
seventeenth and twenty-first century mindsets. While ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ 
both refer to ‘feeling’, they differ in the assumptions they apply to a subject’s 
experience. In the case of Weemes, his decision to define passion (which he 
used synonymously with affection), was important because the concept of a 
passion presupposed an Aristotelian theory of change which, by implication, 
entailed that his topic was an experience caused by an external agent. 
 To understand why ‘passion’ has the tacit connotation of causation by 
external agency, an examination of Aristotle’s account of change, an integral 
dimension of the Christian Aristotelian paradigm taught in Scottish 
universities, will elucidate the connection in the Scottish Protestant 
worldview. Aristotle defined change as the actualisation of that which is 
potential, or the potentialisation of that which is actual.14 The categories of 
potential and actual refer to a substance’s properties. If a substance has an 
attribute potentially, it has the capacity to have the relevant quality. If the 
 
12 Weemes, Portraiture, 139. 
13 Schmitter, ‘Passions’, 442-446. 




substance has the property, it actually possesses that attribute. Change 
takes place when a substance’s status in relation to a quality transforms from 
potentiality to actuality, or actuality to potentiality. Importantly for Weemes’s 
theory of emotion, Aristotle argued that the process of the acquisition or loss 
of a property requires agency: ‘everything that changes must be changed by 
something’.15 Change must either be self-caused or be brought about by an 
external agent. In both cases, the agent of change must have the capacity to 
change the subject in the relevant way.16 When contiguous with the subject 
of change, the agent of change actualises the substance’s property p or not-p 
through the activity of its power to change the subject.17 Importantly, ‘subject’ 
in this context does not refer to only the ‘consciousness’, as is typical of post-
Kantian philosophy, but the substance which experiences change. 
 In the process of change, a ‘passion’ was identified as the 
transformation a subject undergoes when changed by an external agent. 
René Descartes (1596-1650) provided a succinct overview of this point.18 He 
argued that whatever the agent does is called an ‘action’. By contrast, what 
happens to the ‘patient’ of change is labelled a ‘passion’. The terms ‘action’ 
and ‘passion’ refer to the one change but differ in relation to substance they 
denote within the process of change. The use of the words ‘passion’ and 
‘patient’ to describe the substance which is changed is indicative of Aristotle’s 
and Aquinas’s idea that to be changed is to ‘suffer’.19 The idea that one 
suffers when acted upon by an agent characterises potentiality and the 
materiality of substance (that which is capable of change) as passive. 
Passivity is the potential to become, and activity the power to bring into 
being.20 Thus, passive substances suffer change, while agents make 
 
15 Aristotle, Physics, VII.241b34, VII.242a49. 
16 Aristotle, Physics, III.202a13-21. 
17 Aristotle, Physics, VII.243a32. 
18 René Descartes, Passions of the Soul and Other Late Philosophical Writings, trans. 
Michael Moriarty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), I; Aristotle, Physics, III.202a21-
31. 
19 Aristotle, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, trans. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon, 1924), 1019a20; 
James, Passion and Action, 33, 48, 56, 64; Summa, II-I.22.1a; James, Passion and Action, 
56; Knuuttila, Ancient and Medieval, 239; King, ‘Emotions in Medieval Thought’, 177; 
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change. Hence, the identification of a subject’s transformation as a ‘passion’ 
implies that whatever it denotes is the effect of an agent’s action upon a 
passive subject. 
 Therefore, when Weemes took as his topic the definition of the 
passions, he employed a category which applied, in its broadest sense, to a 
subject’s passive experience of change. Thus, implicit in his theory of 
emotion prior to analysis was that whatever the nature of an emotion, it must 
be a passive experience of change caused by an agent. These features of 
change, as derived from Aristotelian metaphysics, delimited Weemes’s 
theory of an emotion to that, at its most basic, of an agent’s action upon a 
passive subject. 
 Whilst ‘passion’ had this general significance, it was more frequently 
used to refer to feeling. This is reflected in Weemes’s definition of his topic: ‘a 
motion of the sensitive appetite, stirred up by the apprehension either of good 
or evil in the imagination, which worketh some outward change in the body’.21 
In this more narrow sense, ‘passion’ denoted a process of change in the 
cognitive and appetitive faculties. Weemes’s use of ‘passion’ in this way was 
not original. While Aquinas did use ‘passion’ to refer to the change which the 
substance suffers, in his ‘Treatise on the Passions’ he focused on 
psychological change.22 Similarly, Descartes constrained his discussion to 
the ‘passions of the soul’, rather than change in general.23 What Weemes, 
Aquinas, and Descartes shared was a basic assumption that ‘passion’ more 
regularly denoted a kind of change in the psychological faculties. 
Consequently, Weemes’s theory of the passions is an attempt to identify the 
agent that actualises potentialities in the subject’s faculties. As this more 
specific sense of the word ‘passion’ is that which Weemes employed in his 
theory of the emotions, the term will be used in this narrower sense from this 
point onwards in the thesis unless otherwise stated. 
 
21 Weemes, Portraiture, 139. 
22 James, Passion and Action, 63-64. 
23 Descartes, Passions, II. 
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 Weemes identified the agent of a passion as ‘a knowne object laid up 
in the imagination, appearing to us either pleasant or hurtfull’.24 To 
understand what Weemes meant by this definition, it needs to be broken 
down into its constituent parts for analysis: ‘imagination’, ‘known object’, and 
‘appearing to us either as pleasant or hurtful’. As Weemes did not define 
these terms formally, Aristotle and Aquinas’s thought, which was the main 
influence on Weemes’s position, will be expounded where necessary to 
make clear what Weemes had asserted. 
 The imagination was, in Weemes’s view, a faculty of the soul which 
had an epistemological function. While he did not formally define 
‘imagination’, his use of the term indicates the assumed significance he 
ascribed to the concept. In a discussion of Adam’s ‘inbred knowledge’, he 
made a key distinction which involved the imagination.25 Weemes argued 
that Adam was created with an innate knowledge of God. However, Adam’s 
knowledge of the ‘other sciences’ was received ‘from the senses’. These 
alternative modes of epistemology regard the understanding’s acquisition of 
‘forms’. Initially, the understanding is void of forms, but can possess them. 
However, only an external agent can actualise the potentiality of the cognition 
to behold forms as its object. The means by which forms are received into 
the understanding is through the senses. Touch, taste, sight, sound, and 
smell, each in their own way, receive an object’s form. They communicate it 
to the ‘imagination’, which makes the form more ‘refined’. The imagination 
then passes the form onto the understanding, so that the subject 
‘understands’ or knows the form. So, the imagination is, for Weemes, a 
mediator between sense perception and the intellect in its reception of forms. 
 Weemes’s concept of ‘imagination’ was inspired by Aristotelian and 
Thomist theories of knowledge. It relied upon the idea that objects have a 
‘form’, a key component of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, though in 
different ways. In Aristotle’s version, which is most relevant to Weemes’s 
thought, every substance is composed of matter, the stuff it is made from, 
 
24 Weemes, Portraiture, 139-140. 
25 Weemes, Portraiture, 62-63. 
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and a form, the properties and qualities it possesses. So, on a crude 
interpretation, the marble of a human statue is its matter, and the statue’s 
human shape is its form. A substantial form is the nature or essential 
qualities of what it means to be a certain kind of thing, whereas accidental 
forms are those attributes which can or cannot be held by the subject without 
the destruction of its substantial form. Crucially, more than one thing can 
possess the same form. For instance, all dogs possess the form of being a 
dog; all tables the form of tableness; all good actions the form of goodness. 
Thus, the identification of a thing’s form enables the knower to categorise 
and classify the substance it has perceived. Importantly for Aristotle each 
form is a reality which, while dependent for its existence upon its possession 
by substances, is nevertheless the same across multiple realities.26 
 Weemes believed that knowledge consists in the reception of a form 
through the senses into the intellect. When he defined ‘experimentall 
knowledge’, Weemes characterised it as a kind of knowledge ‘gotten from 
forms drawne from their singular objects’, like the ‘print in the waxe from the 
seale’.27 Weemes’s conception of knowledge was heavily influenced by 
Aristotle’s epistemology on this point. Aristotle claimed that ‘experimental 
knowledge’ is acquired when a knower receives the form of the object into 
their mind without its matter. The form of dogness is communicated via the 
senses to the intelligence, which holds the form there. By implication, ‘actual 
knowledge is identical with its object’.28 This is because, in Aristotle’s view, 
the form which the object of perception possesses is the same as that 
abstracted in the mind. Thus, knowledge is not ‘representational’, but rather a 
cognition of an object in the understanding. 
 The relevance of Weemes’s theory of knowledge, influenced by 
Aristotle’s epistemology, for the present analysis is this: Weemes argued that 
in the process of a passion the imagination is the faculty which receives the 
form, or ‘known object’ into the mind. It is that ability which can receive forms 
 
26 Aristotle, Physics, II.194b26; Aristotle, Metaphysics, Z.1032b1, Z.1032b14. 
27 Weemes, Portraiture, 85. 




drawn from the senses and retain them, just as wax can retain an image. It is 
to Aquinas that Weemes’s view is indebted.29 Aquinas categorised the 
imagination as an internal power which animals, including humans, possess. 
In his view, the senses take in a form, and these sense perceptions are 
organised by the ‘general root sensitivity’. These forms must then be ‘stored’ 
so that the animal can be aware of what has been sensed when the object is 
either present or absent. This power of retention is, for Aquinas, the 
imagination. It is, thus, distinct from sense perception, as the ability to 
perceive an object via the senses is not identical with the retention of the 
forms perceived. Hence, for Weemes and Aquinas a form is received and 
maintained in the subject’s imagination prior to its entrance into the 
understanding.30 
 The known object received into the imagination, Weemes argued, 
should be distinguished from ‘imaginations and phantasies’ when it is related 
to the passions.31 He defined imaginations and fantasies as an ‘impression 
made in the soule of such forms and shapes as are let in by the senses, or 
by such as are imagined without any sight’.32 Where the fantasy differs from 
the retentive power of the imagination is its ability to ‘adde, divide, and 
compose’. Weemes explained by way of illustration. Just as a painter can 
amalgamate and modify images to create an image, so too can the fantasy 
alter received forms to ‘make up diverse forms’. This is how the mind can 
conceive of mythical creatures which have not been apprehended by the 
senses, such as a ‘Gyant’ or a ‘dwarfe’. Weemes’s clarification assumed a 
Thomist identification of two functions the imagination can perform. First, the 
imaginatio, is an object’s form derived from the senses. Second, the 
imaginarius, is the images stored in the mind, whether originally delivered by 
the senses or composed out of sense perceptions.33 Weemes used 
 
29 Aristotle, On the Soul, 414b33–415a3. 
30 James, Passion and Action, 54. 
31 Weemes, Portraiture, 139. 
32 John Weemes, Observations, Naturall and Morall (London, 1633), 84. 
33 Charles Sullivan, ‘Aquinas on Imagination Part 2’. 
https://charlesasullivan.com/2337/aquinas-on-imagination-part-2/. 
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Aquinas’s distinction to articulate that the imagination functioned retentively, 
not compositionally, in the process of a passion, and thus the known object of 
a passion was not a fiction. 
 Weemes argued that in the process of a passion the form of an object, 
the known object, is received into the imagination with an apprehension of 
whether it is good or evil. He explained that when the object is ‘laid up in the 
imagination’, it does so ‘appearing to us either pleasant or hurtfull’.34 The 
appearance of the object as good or evil is a relational property ascribed to 
the form. It is not whether the object is good or evil in general, but whether it 
is beneficial or dangerous to the subject who apprehends it. Weemes’s 
thought was, on this point, influenced by the Thomist theory of the passions. 
The form that is received into the imagination is, for Aquinas, by the 
‘estimative power’ or what in humans is called the ‘particular intellect’.35 This 
power by ‘some sort of collation’ evaluates the ‘intention’ of an external 
object.36 The intention of the object, whether it is good or evil in relation to the 
subject, is not a sensible quality and thus is not discernible through sense 
perception. Instead, the goodness or evilness of an object, that which helps 
or hinders its existence, maintenance, and perfection, is apprehended by the 
subject through the cogitative power of the sensible soul. This faculty 
critically compares memories about an object’s properties, which then 
determines an appropriate response.37 Through this power, the subject can 
apprehend the intention of the form received into the imagination. 
 The form received into the imagination, apprehended as good or evil 
in relation to the subject, was in Weemes’s view the external agent of a 
passion, its ‘formal object’.38 He was emphatic that it was this ‘knowne object’ 
in the imagination which ‘stirred up’ the motion of the sensitive appetite.39 He 
 
34 Weemes, Portraiture, 140. 
35 Thomas Aquinas, Summae Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas, 22 vols. (London, 1825-
1875), I.78.4a; James, Passion and Action, p.60; Knuuttila, Ancient and Medieval, 239; 
Lombardo, Desire, 24. 
36 Aquinas, Summae, I.78.4a; James, Passion and Action, 54; Lombardo, Desire, 24. 
37 James, Passion and Action, 54; Lombardo, Desire, 24; Miner, Aquinas, 77-79. 
38 Miner, Aquinas, 59; Rosenwein, Generations, 151; Lombardo, Desire, 49; Knuuttila, 
Ancient and Medieval, 242. 
39 Weemes, Portraiture, 139. 
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argued that the formal object of a passion must include an evaluation of its 
intention, for without this knowledge a form in the imagination, retained or 
composed, cannot cause ‘alteration’.40 Whether one could ever apprehend a 
form without its intention was not addressed by Weemes. For Aquinas, 
objects were always perceived under a particular aspect.41 Nevertheless, 
Weemes believed, like Aquinas, that a form received into the imagination, 
with an apprehension of its intention, was the external agent which caused 
the actualisation of the sensitive appetite, the actor which acts upon the 
passive subject.  
 Crucially, because the agent of a passion is a form received into the 
imagination, it follows that for Weemes, emotions were assumed to be 
caused by objects which entered into and existed in the cognitive faculties of 
the subject. The Aristotelian theory of knowledge which Weemes 
presupposed identified that to know is to have received a form into the 
understanding. By implication, this means that ‘actual knowledge is identical 
with its object’, the form of the object and the form in the mind are the same 
thing.42 As Taylor has recognised, this means that for Aristotle knowledge is 
not representational, as it was for René Descartes and John Locke (1632-
1704).43 It involves the entrance of external objects into consciousness, while 
simultaneously they remain existent outside the knower’s subjectivity. The 
relationship between object and subject is permeable and flexible, which 
enables the knower to receive into herself the same property which an object 
possesses. The subject is not an isolated ego: it receives the other into itself. 
Consequently, when Weemes claimed that passions have as their external 
agent a formal object, he affirmed that emotions are caused by forms which 
exist simultaneously inside and outside of the mind. The external agent is 
present within the passive subject as it undergoes a passion. 
 Weemes’s claim expressed important assumptions about emotion 
which were significant for the language and concepts Scottish Protestants 
 
40 Weemes, Observations, 89. 
41 Lombardo, Desire, 25. 
42 Aristotle, On the Soul, 430a20. 
43 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, 186. 
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used about their emotions. It meant, first and foremost, that they believed 
their emotions were caused by realities outside of themselves. This apparent 
feature of emotion provided the conceptual basis for the belief that God (and 
the devil) could be identified as the cause of emotions. God could play the 
role of the external agent who acts upon the passive subject’s sensitive 
appetite. The passive nature of emotion, as it was conceived, was 
foundational for Scottish Protestant claims that those experiences they 
identified as emotions caused by God were fundamentally passive. 
Additionally, given that emotions were assumed to involve the entrance of the 
external agent into the subject’s consciousness, so too Scottish Protestants 
judged that when God caused their emotions, God was inside their 
subjectivity. Therefore, how Weemes, and by extension Scottish Protestants, 
understood the causation of emotion was integral to their judgements about 
how God could cause emotion. This feature of emotion provided the 
emotional logic by which such claims, that God had caused an emotion and 
was inside the subject, could be made coherently. That Scottish Protestants 
identified God as the cause of their emotions is a topic analysed in chapter 
four.44 
 
2. Judgements of the Understanding and Will are Necessary for Emotion 
 A second feature of emotion that Weemes identified was that it 
necessarily involves the action of two faculties: the intellect and volition. He 
argued that: 
the imagination stirreth up the senses, then the understanding faculty, 
judgeth them to be true or false, and the will considereth them as good 
or evill. As the understanding judgeth them to be true or false, it 
stirreth up not the appetite, but as the will judgeth them to be good or 
evil; yet not absolutely, but as good or evill to us, or ours; and these 
faculties are rightly joyned together, for the sensitive faculty of it selfe 
is blind, neither could it follow or decline anything unlesse the 
understanding faculty directed it: so the understanding facultie were 
needlesse, unlesse it had these passions joyned with it, to prosecute 
the truth, and to shun falsehood.45 
 
 
44 Chapter Four, 123-149. 
45 Weemes, Portraiture 140. 
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In this passage, Weemes claimed that passions involve two judgements. In 
his view, the understanding evaluates whether the intention of the formal 
object as held in the imagination is a true or false representation of the 
object’s intention. The will then determines whether to choose, refuse, or 
suspend judgement on the intention of the formal object of a passion. These 
functions correspond to the nature of each faculty as conceived by Weemes.  
The understanding, is an essentiall facultie in the Soule, whereby it 
knoweth, judgeth, and diserneth naturally truth from falsehood. 
The will, is an essentiall facultie in the Soule working freely, having 
liberty to chuse, refuse, or suspend, not determinate to one thing.46 
 
Weemes’s definitions of the understanding and will are almost identical with 
those of Franciscus Junius (1545-1602), Weemes’s teacher in Leiden.47 In 
his 1592 theses, Junius argued that the intellect is free insofar as: 
The choice of the intellect… is a mental act by which a mind-gifted 
nature distinguishes between intelligible objects and after deliberation 
judges which of those objects are true or false.48 
 
Junius then claimed that the will is free in that: 
The choice of the will… is likewise the act, by which the will either 
chooses, because it is good, or rejects, because it is bad, the things 
distinguished, judged and set before the will by the intellect.49 
 
Junius’s claim that the intellect’s function is to judge whether objects are true 
or false and that the will’s role is to choose or to reject objects in relation to 
whether they are good or bad is almost the same as Weemes’s formulation, 
true or false and good or evil.50 This characterisation of the understanding 
 
46 Weemes, Portraiture, 96. Weemes explained the freedom of the will was twofold: ‘the 
liberty of contrariety’, the power to choose good or evil, and ‘the liberty of contradiction’, to do 
or not to do. See Weemes, Portraiture, 128. 
47 Sytsma, forthcoming publication. I am grateful to the author for sharing this information. 
48 Franciscus Junius, Theses Theologicae, quae in inclyta academia Lugduno-batava ad 
exercitia publicarum disputationum, praeside D. Francisco Junio variis temporibus a 
theologiae candidatis adversus oppugnantes propugnatae sunt (Leiden, 1592)., XXII.4. 
Italics added for emphasis. 
49 Junius, Theses, XXII.5. Italics are mine. 
50 Weemes’s threefold model of free choice, to choose, refuse or suspend, is an 
amalgamation of Zacharias Ursinus’s (1534-1583) and Junius’s discussions on the will, 
Junius’s two second order options (to not will p and to not will not-p) integrated under 
Ursinus’s notion of ‘suspending’ action, the-will-to-not-to-will. Weemes’s definition of free will 
was almost identical with that of a fellow student at St Andrews, Jean Masson (fl.1597). In 
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and will can also be found in Aquinas, which suggests his influence on 
Junius’s and Weemes’s consideration of these faculties.51 
 However, Weemes significantly departed from Aquinas in his theory of 
emotion by his claim that it is the understanding and volition which judge the 
formal object of a passion. Inspired by Aristotle, many theologians, including 
Aquinas, divided the soul’s functions into three spheres. The vegetative, 
which belongs to all living beings, contained the powers of growth and 
nutrition. The sensitive part of the soul related to the powers of perception 
and motion, which all animals possess. Finally, the rational part of the soul, 
possessed only by humanity and immaterial beings like angels, consists in 
the powers of the understanding and the will. Aquinas argued that passions 
belong solely to the sensitive part of the soul. The formal object of a passion, 
and its intention, is evaluated by the practical intellect whose judgement 
moves the sensitive appetite.52 The rational part of the soul does not interfere 
at all. By contrast, Weemes, believed that rational cognition and appetition 
are necessarily involved in the passions. Thus the faculties of the 
understanding and will, in Weemes’s theory of emotion, replaced the role of 
the practical intellect in Aquinas’s account of the passions. Through 
integration of the rational cognition and appetition into the processes that 
cause a passion, Weemes collapsed the rigid Thomist distinction between 
the sensitive and rational parts of the soul in his theory of emotion. 
 Weemes’s manoeuvre to integrate the rational and sensitive faculties 
in the processes that make a passion was influenced by John Duns Scotus’s 
philosophy of the passions. For Scotus, the faculties of the soul are only 
‘formally’ distinct, so that they are only distinguished in terms of their formal 
 
his disputation, Masson defined freewill as ‘a faculty of human will which either chooses, or 
rejects, or suspends either way, behind the judgement of the mind’. This suggests the 
possibility that either Masson had studied in Leiden too, or, more likely, that Andrew Melville 
(1545-1622) taught the theology of Ursinus and Junius on the freedom of the will to his 
students. See Zacharias Ursinus, Opera Theologica quibus orthodoxae religionis capita 
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51 Aquinas, Summae, II-I.22.2a. 




objects.53 Consequently, the powers of the rational appetite and the sensitive 
appetite are not distinct in terms of their nature, but only in terms of what 
causes them to be actualised. This is also true for the passions which, in 
Scotus’s view, are produced by acts of the will.54 Rational cognition and 
appetition are, thus, necessary for emotion from a Scotist perspective, just as 
Weemes alleged. The widespread and mostly positive engagement with 
Scotist principles in early seventeenth-century Scotland, and the tendency of 
Protestant divines to modify Thomism with Scotist ideas, support the notion 
that Weemes’s integration of the understanding and the will into his theory of 
the emotions was influenced by an engagement with Scotist faculty 
psychology.55   
 Moreover, Weemes’s identification of the understanding and volition 
as the faculties which evaluate the intentions of formal object was probably 
influenced by Stoic philosophy. Within the Portraiture Weemes engaged with 
Stoic ideas, and significantly for his theory of emotion, with Seneca’s On 
Anger.56 In this text, Seneca (c.4 B.C.- A.D. 65) outlined his view of the 
passions as follows: 
there’s an initial involuntary movement – a preparation for a passion, 
as it were, and a kind of threatening signal; there’s a second 
movement, accompanied by an expression of will not stubbornly 
resolved, to the effect “I should be avenged, since I’ve been harmed” 
or “ this man should be punished, since he’s committed a crime.” The 
third movement’s already out of control, it desires vengeance not if it’s 
appropriate but come what may, having overthrown reason.57 
 
The first and second movements are the most important for understanding 
Weemes’s theory of emotion. The first movement, a pre-passion, is a kind of 
 
53 King, ‘Emotions in Medieval Thought’, 181; Ian Drummond, ‘John Duns Scotus on the 
Passions of the Will’ in Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern 
Philosophy, eds. Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
67. 
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shock or jolt, an involuntary reaction to how things appear to the subject.58 
Seneca argued that this involuntary response is not a passion.59 Rather, a 
passion is an evaluative judgement to accept, rather than reject, an 
impression.60 In Sorabji’s view, this judgement is, for Seneca, twofold. First, 
there is a decision made as to whether there is a good or bad object in 
relation to the subject. Second, there is a determination formed as to the 
appropriate reaction the subject should have in relation to the good or bad 
object.61 Seneca believed these judgements are the product of the mind and 
will: an act of mind judges whether there is a good or bad, present or future 
object, while a subsequent act of will deliberates how to respond.62 The acts 
of mind and will, thus, engage in a syllogistic exercise to determine whether 
to assent, reject, or suspend judgement in relation to a formal object.63 Given 
Weemes’s familiarity with Seneca’s De Ira and their apparently similar notion 
that the understanding and will make judgements which cause emotion, it is 
reasonable to conclude that Seneca’s theory of the passions influenced the 
inclusion of the understanding and will in Weemes’s analysis of emotion. 
Weemes’s integration of Stoic philosophy in his theory of emotion was 
indicative of his humanist education under Andrew Melville (1545-1622) 
throughout his time at the University of St Andrews; an education which 
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emphasised the use of a variety of ancient pagan sources, in their original 
language, as opposed to engagement solely with Aristotelian literature.64  
 The salient feature of Weemes’s theory of emotion, and of Scottish 
Protestants in general, was that they believed the understanding and will 
made judgements which caused a subject’s passions. It meant Protestants in 
Scotland presupposed that radical emotional reflexivity involved self-
examination of the cognitive faculties insofar as they related to the passions. 
Thus, naming the emotions in the form of a spiritual journey involved the 
identification of how the judgements of the understanding and will changed. 
Moreover, Scottish Protestants believed that God altered the judgements of 
their rational cognition and appetition to cause their supernatural emotions. 
The kinds of determinations God caused the intellectual faculties to make 
were used by Scottish Protestants to identify the type of ‘supernatural’ 
emotion they had experienced. Consequently, the identification of the 
understanding and will’s judgements about a formal object were considered 
key indicators, by Scottish Protestants, for the categorisation of experience in 
relation to socially learned emotion types. In other words, Weemes’s 
integration of the understanding and will into his theory of the passions 
expressed a significant assumption integral to the way Scots used language 
about emotion. It provided an important component of the logical structure of 
the Scottish Protestant identification of emotion in the form of a spiritual 
journey, caused by God, which consisted in experiences that could be 
categorised in accordance with supernatural emotion types. The impact of 
this assumption about emotion on Scottish Protestant radical emotional 
reflexivity will be analysed across chapters two, three, four, and five.65 
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3. Emotions are Psychosomatic 
 Weemes argued that a passion is a ‘motion of the sensitive appetite’, 
a kind of psychosomatic change.66 While this alteration in the faculties could 
only take place when an external agent’s intentions were judged by the 
understanding and will, these processes were considered a precondition that 
had to be fulfilled for a passion to take place. They were not the passion 
itself. Rather, their effect, a motion of the sensitive appetite, was what 
Weemes defined as a passion. His identification of a passion’s nature can be 
divided into two parts: ‘the sensitive appetite’ and ‘motion of’. This final 
section analyses these two concepts, and how they relate in Weemes’s 
definition of a passion, to show that in his theory emotion is constituted by a 
combination of psychological and physiological change. 
 The sensitive appetite was, in Weemes’s view, the location of the 
passions because they involved bodily alteration. Weemes explained that the 
passions ‘are placed in the sensitive part, and not in the reasonable’ because 
passions ‘imploy corporall organs’.67 This characterisation of the sensitive 
appetite assumed the medieval psychological framework of the soul inherited 
from Aristotle. The sensitive sphere, which was common to all animals and 
thus was considered corporeal, and rational part of the soul, which is unique 
to humanity and as such immaterial, were both capable of two functions: 
cognition, the power to acquire knowledge, and appetition, the power to act.68 
These distinctions were combined by medieval theologians to categorise four 
fundamental parts of the human soul: the rational cognitive, which is the 
intellect or understanding, which is able to have knowledge of universals and 
abstract objects; the sensitive cognitive, which is the power of sensation, 
which through the particular understanding is able to have knowledge of 
concrete particulars; the rational appetitive, which is the will or intellectual 
appetite, the ability to choose or do; and the sensitive appetite, the faculty of 
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emotion.69 As the passions involved material change they could not belong to 
the rational dimension of the soul, which was considered immaterial. Hence, 
they must be a kind of change in the sensitive faculties. As they are not a 
form of knowledge, they cannot be a change in cognition. By logical 
implication, then, the passions must be the actualisation of the sensitive 
appetite. This categorisation of the passions as the product of the sensitive 
appetite was common among British Protestants. This was probably due to 
the influence of Aristotle and Aquinas, who similarly placed ‘the affections in 
the sensitive appetite’.70 So Weemes was typical in his identification of a 
passion as a change in the sensitive appetite. 
 A passion, Weems argued, is a kind of movement. He did not explain 
how a passion is a motion of the sensitive appetite. However, his idea 
assumed Aristotle’s notion of change and Aquinas’s theory of emotion, 
examination of which will elucidate Weemes’s claim that a passion is a 
motion. Aristotle argued motion is a type of change.71 It is a change of place, 
and it can happen in four ways. A thing can, by an agent, be pulled, pushed, 
carried, or rotated. All motion, Aristotle, claimed, is reducible to these four 
changes of place. Aquinas was the first to adapt this account of movement as 
an explanatory model for the passions. He defined the emotions as motions 
of the sensitive appetite in relation to their formal objects. The agent, Aquinas 
claimed, either inclines the appetite towards or away from itself, just as an 
agent can pull towards or push away an object.72 His claim made sense in 
relation to the ‘appetite’, which for Aquinas was a compound of the Latin ‘ad’ 
(towards) and ‘petere’ (to aim that).73 Thus, implicit in the concept of 
‘appetite’ was the idea that it is a faculty which aims towards an object – it is 
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formally distinguished, as argued by Scotus, medieval scholastics and their early modern 
counterparts inherited and utilised these categories in their accounts of faculty psychology. 
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attracted or repelled by its object.74 Though it is debated whether Aquinas 
meant by these claims that there was an actual motion in the appetite, there 
is a consensus in the literature that Aquinas understood the formal dimension 
of a passion to consist in an alteration in the subject’s proclivity in relation to 
the agent of change.75 Thus, when Weemes defined a passion as a motion, 
he was borrowing a thoroughly Thomistic account of emotion. 
 Though Weemes acknowledged that other taxonomical schemes 
existed, he argued that there are eleven fundamental types of movement the 
sensitive appetite can make in response to a formal object, and the 
identification of these eleven passions constitutes a taxonomy of emotion.76 
These movements are directed by the judgements of the understanding and 
will in relation to whether the formal object is good or bad in relation to the 
subject. He argued that there are six in the ‘concupiscible appetite’ and five in 
the ‘irascible faculties’. The first and most foundational of the concupiscible 
(first order) emotions is love, which is an inclination for good ‘considered 
absolutely’. This is mirrored by hatred, which is a consideration of evil 
absolutely. If a good which is loved is to be obtained and moved towards, 
then it is desired. If an evil which is to be shunned is imminent, then it is an 
‘abomination’, something to pull away from. If the good that is desired is 
acquired, the appetite comes to rest in its formal object, which is joy. If an evil 
formal object is present, then it causes the appetite to rest in sadness.  
 The irascible passions, which are second order, are five in number. If 
there is a formal object apprehended as good which it is possible but difficult 
to obtain, it moves the appetite to hope. If a good object can be easily 
obtained while the subject is in a present state of evil, it evokes audacity, a 
motion to overcome the evil the individual endures. If it is impossible to obtain 
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a good, this moves the soul to desperation. Alternatively, if evil be imminent it 
evokes fear. Finally, if the evil be present and cannot be avoided, it evokes 
anger. These distinctions, which Weemes used to delineate the basic kinds 
of motion the sensitive appetite can make, are identical to those in Aquinas’s 
taxonomy of the passions, a clear demonstration of Thomistic influence on 
Weemes’s thought.77 
 The formal movement of the appetite, Weemes argued, manifested 
itself in bodily change. This does not mean that the motion of the sensitive 
appetite caused physiological alteration. In the early modern worldview, the 
material plane could embody the psychic. The physical had an ‘ontic-logical’ 
relationship with the mind, so that bodily and corporeal processes are not 
merely caused by the psychological: they are the material manifestation of 
the psychological, and vice versa.78 What is important is that the formal and 
material dimensions were considered two dimensions of the same reality; just 
as a change is simultaneously both an action and a passion, the terms are 
distinguished only in relation to the object they refer to in the process of a 
change. Thus, the formal dimension of a passion relates to the directionality 
of the appetite in relation to the passion’s formal object; the material 
dimension is its embodied expression. This idea had a significant influence 
upon how Scottish Protestants identified the presence of an emotion, 
explored in chapter five.79 
 Weemes explained that passions are changes to ‘the spirits in the 
body’ which are located in the blood.80 He argued that the abundance of 
blood in particular organs or the withdrawal of blood to the heart, and thus 
the movement of the spirits, is the ‘occasion’ for passions to be ‘stirred up’.81 
He gave examples: fear is the withdrawal of blood to the heart; the 
abundance of blood in the liver stirs up the passion of love, melancholy in the 
spleen, and anger in the gall.82 Thus, the formal motion of the appetite had a 
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parallel bodily manifestation: just as fear is a formal motion away from an 
object, so the blood recoils towards a person’s centre. By contrast, love and 
joy is the blood rushing through the body, just as they are, formally, an 
inclination towards an object. Weemes’s views would have been influenced, 
directly or indirectly, by two prominent medical practitioners in seventeenth 
century Scotland: Peter Lowe (c.1550-1610), surgeon to Henri IV of France 
and founder of the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow; 
and John Makluire (fl.1630), who petitioned Charles I to establish medical 
education in Edinburgh.83 Both Lowe and Makluire, like Weemes, identified 
the passions as the expansion and contraction of blood within the body, and 
by this passions were the moving of the vital spirits, and thus heat, in the 
body. Joy or mirth was the ‘dilation of the heart’, the blood and spirits 
‘sweetely spread’ around the body, in order to ‘imbrace its object’. Sadness 
was the opposite, as the blood would ‘shoote up or draw together the heart’, 
the natural heat drawn towards ‘the center of the body’.84 The similarity of 
Weemes’s view with Lowe’s and Makluire’s physiological account of the 
passions suggest their influence, or at least the dominance of the Galenic 
theory of the body they articulated in early modern Scotland, on Weemes’s 
definition of the passions.85 
 It was the dispersion or retraction of blood that was considered, by 
theorists of the human body, the cause of those feelings associated with a 
passion. This idea can be seen clearly in early modern views of orgasm.86 In 
Aristotelian, Hippocratic, and Galenic accounts of reproduction, which 
dominated early modern physiological theory, orgasm was the product of 
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excessive heat. In copulation, the emission of semen was only possible if 
there was a build-up of heat in the body, produced through friction of the 
genitals. As heat was stored in the vital spirits contained in the blood, a build-
up of heat was a dilation of the blood throughout the body. When an 
excessive amount of heat had been generated, to rebalance the body’s 
temperature, heat would be transformed into (male or female) semen and 
expelled from the body.87 This increase in the body’s warmth, caused by the 
dilation of the blood, was identified as the feeling of pleasure. Thus, the 
rapturous feelings experienced in orgasm were the subjective experience of 
this intense heat.88 The intriguing parallel of the formal and material 
dimensions, then, had an impact on the kind of feeling the subject 
experienced. If the appetite moved towards the formal object, the blood 
expanded, which raised the temperature of the body. If the appetite recoiled 
from its formal object, the blood contracted, which made the body cooler. 
Thus, the modulation of the body’s temperature caused the subjective 
dimension of the sensitive appetite’s motion. Through it, the subject could 
‘feel’ their inclination, materially manifest in their blood, move towards or 
away from a formal object. Consequently, the physiological dimension was 
considered integral to the psychological experience of a passion. 
 The withdrawal or communication of heat, and by extension of the 
blood, was assumed by early moderns to cause the expression of emotion in 
visible bodily behaviours. For example, the passions of sorrow or fear, 
associated with the cooling of the body, were often believed to manifest in 
the release of tears. While there was no uniform physiological theory of 
crying, Manfred Horstmanshoff and Bernard Capp have shown how some 
physicians believed that, when the appetites are moved to sorrow and fear, 
the vital spirits or pneuma are sent in vaporous form to the brain. In the head 
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these spirits are compressed, changed, and cooled into a serum - a tear - 
which was excreted to relieve the physical tension.89 Alternatively, an 
increase in bodily temperature was thought to cause the subject to groan, an 
expulsion of excess heat to maintain the body’s health while simultaneously 
the breathing in of air, like bellows, sustains the higher and more pleasurable 
warmth.90 Thus, a passion’s physiological dimension, the retraction or dilation 
of blood, was understood as the cause of bodily effects which were the 
unique consequence of an emotion’s material manifestation, and by 
extension its parallel formal dimension. 
 The physiological makeup of a person was thought, in the Galenic 
physiological paradigm, to determine the predisposition of a subject to 
experience certain kinds of passion more frequently. Humoural theory was 
the dominant explanation of emotional predisposition in early modern 
Scotland. For brevity and clarity, Makluire’s Buckler of Bodilie Health (1630) – 
written for a lay audience – provides the framework here. Makluire defined a 
physiological ‘complexion’ as the proportion in which four substances called 
‘humours’, which were located in the blood, related to each other.91 The 
complexion can be temperate, when the humours are perfectly balanced in 
their relationships to one another, or intemperate, when one humour 
excessively dominates the rest.92 Crucially, the preponderance of a humour 
alters the predisposition a subject has towards a passion, so that they are 
more or less likely to have an emotion in relation to a formal object. Makluire 
outlined how humours influenced the emotions in his discussion of the four 
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basic temperaments, which correspond to the dominance of a humour in the 
blood.  
 ‘Sanguineans’ are ‘filled with blood’.93 Created from the element air, 
blood, in this context not the same as that which carries the four humours, is 
hot and wet. Produced in the liver, haima can produce a healthy body ‘mixed 
of red and white’, an optimistic, merry, peaceable, honest, and romantic 
character. Thus, the sanguineans’s exuberant and joyful natures are a direct 
consequence of their higher bodily temperature. However, when blood is 
generated in excessive amounts, it has a detrimental effect on the body and 
soul. Fleshy and ruddy, the sanguinean is a ‘simple spirit’ given to delighting 
in superficial things.94 To cure this, Makluire recommended that sanguineans 
should eat cold and dry things, to offset their excessively hot and wet 
constitutions. 
 ‘Cholericks’ have a predominance of yellow bile within their bodies. 
Created in the spleen, the hot and dry nature of this bile corresponded to and 
was formed from the element of fire. Makluire argued that, as a result of its 
hot and dry quality, people with this temperament tend to be hasty ‘in all their 
actions’, impatient, quick to anger, rash, and unable to endure hardship.95 
The intensity of their bodily heat is directly related to their propensity for 
anger, as this passion is a boiling of the blood. To counteract their hot and 
dry natures, the cholerick should seek cold and wet climates and eat fresh 
meat and fruit.96 
 ‘Melancholicks’ have a dominance of black bile within their blood. 
Stored in the spleen and created in the gallbladder, black bile was 
considered cold and dry, like the earth. Those with this temperament were 
most fit for leadership, because they were diligent, quiet, introspective, 
content in isolation, fearful of danger, constant in their opinions, slow to 
anger, faithful spouses, and courageous in all things.97 However, they tend to 
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be sad, and when they have an excess of black bile in their blood can 
experience suicidal dread and despair; the condition of melancolia.98 The 
cooler temperature of the body made them naturally sorrowful. Makluire 
suggested that melancholics ought to seek hot and wet foods to balance their 
cold and dry dispositions. 
 Finally, ‘Flegmaticks’ have a body predominated by phlegm. This cold 
and wet substance, associated with water, is mainly in the lungs. Makluire 
described those with this disposition as ‘lumpish’, stupid people who are 
cowards, sluggish, those who tend towards a pale and sickly constitution.99 
As heat was that which supplied motion to the body, it was the logical 
implication that those with a cooler physiology would be more slothful. 
Makluire recommended that the phlegmatic needs hot and dry temperatures 
and foods to moderate their cold and wet bodies. 
 Temperament was not static. Makluire argued that the age of the 
subject, their environment, and their sex could impact the balance of their 
humours.100 Sanguineans were associated with spring and childhood, 
cholerics with summer and adolescence, melancholics with autumn and 
maturity, phlegmatics with winter and old age. Thus, temperament changed 
over time, and required different techniques to remain balanced throughout 
life. Biological sex was also thought to have an impact. For Aristotle, whose 
analysis of gender differences was embedded in early modern thought, the 
‘female is a deformed male’, colder and thus weaker than their masculine 
counterparts.101 This view, that women were colder than men, was shared 
across the ancient, medieval, and early modern western world.102 As they are 
colder, women cannot emit the active principle in copulation, as motion relies 
upon an excess of heat.103 Thus, the male, due to his hotter nature, is the 
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active partner who contributes form, while the female, the cooler participant, 
is the passive partner who provides the matter which needs to be acted 
upon.104 Put another way, as heat is the key to agency, women are by default 
passive creatures given their cooler bodies. Their physiology meant, among 
other things, that women were deemed less able to control their emotions, 
and thus were more prone to inappropriate public displays of emotion (like 
crying).105 This was because women were considered more susceptible to 
the effects of an external agent in moving their appetites, which was due to 
their cooler natures making them passive, and so more easily acted upon 
than their male counterparts.106 Consequently, there were a variety of factors 
which early moderns believed could alter the physiology of an individual, and 
as such their predisposition to have emotions. 
 The importance of this section is that Weemes’s theory of emotion, 
and by extension the nature of emotion assumed by early modern Scottish 
Protestants, conceived of passions as psychosomatic. Emotion was a motion 
of the sensitive appetite manifested in formal and material change. It 
produced a psychological feeling which was the subjective experience of the 
appetite’s movement towards or away from its object as translated into the 
dilation or contraction of the body’s blood, and thus modulation of the 
subject’s temperature. The psychosomatic conception of emotion, as 
articulated by Weemes, was integral to the judgements made by Scottish 
Protestants engaged in radical emotional reflexivity. It meant that when they 
attempted to categorise their experiences, they examined the felt and 
physiological changes they had undergone to determine what kind emotion 
they had experienced. In other words, when Scottish Protestants concluded 
that they had experienced a God-caused supernatural emotion, they did so 
because the experience had psychosomatic qualities which corresponded to 
a concept of supernatural emotion they had been taught. Thus, the Scottish 
Protestant conception of an emotion as a motion of the sensitive appetite 
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was crucial for the language and concepts they used about their emotions. 
This psychosomatic conception of emotion provided the fundamental logic 
which characterised the nature of all emotion, and as such delineated the 
characteristics by which all experiences could be identified. This idea will be 
important in chapter five.107 
 
 
 To sum up the argument so far, this chapter has analysed the theory 
of emotion Scottish Protestants assumed in their identification and 
mobilisation of their emotions. It used Weemes’s definition of a passion as 
representative of the modified Thomist account of emotion, which was 
dominant in the early modern anglosphere and, as will be seen later in the 
thesis, assumed in Scottish Protestant judgements about their emotions. 
Three features of emotion were identified as significant for the emotional 
logic which informed the presuppositions Protestants in Scotland used to 
evaluate their emotions. First, that an emotion is caused by an external agent 
who acts upon a passive subject. Second, that emotions require the 
judgements of the understanding and will. Third, that psychological and 
physiological change are the integral features of an emotion. It was 
suggested throughout the chapter that these aspects of emotion provided the 
framework which made coherent Scottish Protestant claims that their 
emotions took the form of a spiritual journey, caused by God, in which they 
experienced supernatural emotions. That is, the presupposed nature of 
emotion was important in the ways Scots used language about their 
emotions. To reinforce the fundamentality of the theory of emotion for the 
practice of radical emotional reflexivity, in future chapters the influence of the 
three features that Weemes ascribed to a passion will be noted. 
 As was argued above Weemes, like Aquinas, believed that the 
apprehension of a formal object was not enough to cause a passion. Its 
intention had to be evaluated by the understanding and will for the 
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actualisation of the sensitive appetite. In a similar way, categorisation of an 
emotion is not enough to mobilise a desired experience. The significance of 
the identification must be evaluated. This can only be done in relation to a 
goal, with the emotion’s value determined by its approximation to the ideal. 
The relative success or failure of the emotion is then a spur for an 
appropriate emotional response for the attainment of the goal. Thus, Scottish 
Protestant attempts to mobilise their emotions through the identification of 
their emotions, a process analysed in chapter five, would not be possible if 
they did not have a goal(s) by which they could judge the significance of their 
emotions.108 Therefore, an examination of what Protestants in Scotland 
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Chapter Two: The Enjoyment of God is the Meaning of Life 
 
 ‘Religion was instituted by God to serve as a pathway to guide us to 
our chief felicity’.1 In this remark, the influential Presbyterian minister Robert 
Bruce of Kinnaird (1554-1631) conveyed to his congregation that the purpose 
of Scottish Protestantism was the pursuit of human happiness.2 The rationale 
behind the doctrine, worship, and discipline of the Kirk was, in Bruce’s view, 
put in place by God in Scotland to facilitate the spiritual fulfilment of the 
nation’s inhabitants. This religious tradition was able to do this because it 
was the means God had appointed for souls to have communion with God, 
and thus, the instrument by which they could have everlasting and infinite joy. 
As it was believed the acquisition of eternal and abundant happiness was the 
goal of human nature, given that this was considered ‘our chief felicity’, it 
followed that the acquisition of fellowship with God was identified by 
ministers, such as Bruce, as the objective of life, which could only be gained 
through adherence to the theology and piety of Scottish Protestantism. 
Defined as the goal which all people should strive for, the pursuit of 
happiness became an important standard by which individuals were 
expected to evaluate, among other things, their emotions. The emotions that 
were identified through the practice of radical emotional reflexivity received 
their significance in relation to their advancement or obstruction of 
communion with God. Through recognition of an emotion’s relationship to the 
pursuit of happiness, its ‘meaning’ could, thus, be identified by the subject. 
This, in turn, could evoke an appropriate emotional response or course of 
action to further the quest for fellowship with God. Consequently, ‘happiness’, 
defined as communion with God, was a central concept in Scottish Protestant 
radical emotional reflexivity. Happiness was the standard used to identify an 
experience’s significance and, through this process, mobilise right emotion. 
 Therefore, this chapter analyses the concept of ‘happiness’ that was 
assumed by Scottish Protestants in their practice of radical emotional 
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reflexivity. It argues that they presupposed that happiness consisted in 
communion with God, which could only be acquired through the possession 
of faith and love, which was impossible to attain by mere human volition. A 
four-stage structure has been adopted to defend this hypothesis. The first 
section argues that Scottish Protestants believed that human nature was 
predisposed to seek happiness, an everlasting and infinite joy. The second, 
that they identified communion with God as that which fulfils the human 
desire for happiness. The third part engages with the Scottish Protestant 
claims that fellowship with God can only be possessed through faith in and 
love of God. The final segment analyses the Scottish Protestant 
consideration of humanity’s natural predisposition in relation to this goal. It is 
claimed that intrinsic to the language Scottish Protestants used about their 
emotions was the notion that all humans are totally depraved, and as such 
they cannot, by their own power, have communion with God. Hence, this 
chapter examines the ideal by which Scottish Protestants judged the 
significance of their emotions, and their presuppositions about how they 
related to this goal prior to their God-caused spiritual journeys (which will be 
analysed in chapter three).3 In this way, it outlines key aspects of the 
linguistic-conceptual framework from which the source material could be 
born. 
 The focus of the chapter, then, is on the assumptions which informed 
the language Scottish Protestants used about their emotions in public 
worship and private piety. Consequently, the source material which is 
examined consists of articulations of these fundamental presuppositions. 
Thus, sermons and theological treatises are a primary form of evidence, as 
happiness was an important theme in the spoken and written teaching of 
ministers. To ensure that the treatment of the topic under review is 
representative of Scottish Protestant beliefs, relevant works produced by an 
ecclesiologically and geographically diverse range of ministers is examined. 
So that it is clear the interpretations of happiness the clergy articulated were 
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resonant with how the concept was used more widely by Scots, or at least 
those who were more zealous in their adherence to the faith, the chapter will 
also interact with Scottish Protestant religious poetry. Scottish Protestants, 
across the ecclesiological and political divide regularly used poetry as a form 
of prayer to God, as a mode of meditation on Christian doctrine, and as a 
means to mobilise in their reader desired emotions through the identification 
of the narrator’s emotions.4 Yet as a work of literature, poems could present 
idealised and fictionalised renditions of radical emotional reflexivity to 
impress upon the reader values prioritised by the author. Poetry, thus, could 
be a form of embellished radical emotional reflexivity that expressed the 
assumptions authors and readers shared when they used language about 
their emotions. Hence an analysis of poetical assertions can indicate that the 
teachings of ministers in the pulpit corresponded to the linguistic-conceptual 
framework Scottish Protestants used when they engaged in radical emotional 
reflexivity. 
 
1. Happiness is the Fulfilment of Human Nature 
 
  I have a heart for love, and love  
  I cannot choose but have,  
  A love that can give full content,  
  The least is I can crave.5 
 
In the opening stanza of True Christian Love, Presbyterian minister David 
Dickson (c.1583-1662), expressed the idea that human nature is compelled 
to love.6 This predisposition is not volitional: one cannot but help have it. 
Moreover, the scope of this love is vast. It craves to be fully contented. Thus, 
in this short extract, Dickson articulated the view that humanity, because of 
its nature, has an innate desire for complete satisfaction, a motivation which 
drives all human activity as an end in itself. His characterisation of the human 
condition was similarly articulated by other Scottish Protestants. The 
 
4 Introduction, 5; Chapter Five, 189-203. 
5 David Dickson, True Christian Love (Glasgow, 1634), Stanza 1. 
6 ODNB, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020. 
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aforementioned Robert Bruce claimed that humans ‘thirst’ for deep 
‘satisfaction and contentment’.7 The Scottish poet William Drummond of 
Hawthornden (1585-1649) lamented that he had an instinctive ‘Desire’ which 
he could not satisfy with temporal pleasure, and was determined to find that 
which ‘canst grant what I doe craue’.8 In a reworked version of Psalm 42, the 
Presbyterian poet Elizabeth Melville (fl.1599-1631) characterised herself as 
one who has a love which made her yearn for its fulfilment.9 
  As hairts full fant 
  Doth braith and pant 
  For rinning rivers cleir… 
  …My hairt doth brist 
  my saull doth thrist 
  for thee the well of lyfe.10 
 
 The idea that humans have an innate propensity to love was intrinsic 
to the taxonomy of the passions assumed by Scottish Protestants, outlined in 
chapter one.11 Love, it was argued, was considered an inclination of the 
appetite towards an object the understanding and will had judged as good for 
the subject. John Weemes recognised that one could reduce all the passions 
as subtypes of ‘love and desire’, which some ‘moralists’ did, because love is 
the orientation one has to an object identified as absolutely good, and desire 
is the means of union with that object. All other passions are derivative. For 
example, hatred is a repulsion against an object apprehended as evil, the 
judgement that it is evil determined by what the subject assumes is its 
absolute good. Put another way, the subject hates what is opposed to that 
which it loves. Consequently, love of that which is judged as absolutely good 
for human nature is the fundamental orientation of the sensitive appetite, 
and, thus, of the human condition.12 Such logic led Bruce to declare that 
 
7 Bruce, Lord’s Supper, 195-196. 
8 William Drummond, Flowers of Sion (Edinburgh, 1623), 4; ODNB, 
https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020. 
9 ODNB, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020. 
10 Elizabeth Melville, Lady Culross, Poems of Elizabeth Melville, Lady Culross, ed. Jamie 
Reid Baxter (Edinburgh: Solsequium, 2010), 8. 
11 Chapter One, 38-39. 
12 Weemes, Portraiture, 143-144. 
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‘there is nothing more profitable, more agreeable, and congruous to nature, 
than to love’.13 
 The absolute good of human nature, to which love is directed, was 
identified by Scottish Protestants as the ‘supreme good’ or ‘summum bonum’. 
This is that which Edinburgh minister William Struther (c.1578-1633) argued 
is the ‘last end’, that which is worth loving as an end in itself.14 While humans 
may love other things, these are only to be loved instrumentally, insofar as 
they facilitate possession of that which is worth loving in its own right. An 
example of instrumental love is money: typically, money is not loved as an 
end in itself, but is only adored insofar as it is an instrument for the purchase 
of some other good. The purchased good may itself be only a means to what 
is considered an absolute good, through its facilitation of some benefit which 
is the true motivation for loving money, such as the experience of pleasure. 
Thus love is only evoked by that which is considered an absolute good, and 
love is extended to other objects insofar as they direct the subject towards 
the determined end. Bruce put the point as follows: whatever one sets up ‘on 
the throne of your heart… you bestow the devotion of your whole heart and 
mind and soul and body’.15 Desire for what is perceived to be the supreme 
good, set on the throne of the heart, was interpreted as the impulse which 
motivates all human thought, emotion, and action. It is this kind of love, the 
unconditional desire for the supreme good, which Dickson lyrically expressed 
when he claimed he had an innate love which made him yearn for 
satisfaction. 
 Scottish Protestants were taught to believe that no created thing could 
satisfy the absolute love of the soul for the supreme good. Put another way, 
no finite or temporal being should be the object of unconditional desire, as its 
possession cannot leave the subject contented; it cannot be the supreme 
good of human nature. Robert Bruce articulated this idea when he argued 
that ‘our affection is so insatiable that no finite being will ever satisfy it’, and 
 
13 Bruce, Lord’s Supper, 197. 
14 William Struther, True Happiness, or, King Davids Choice (Edinburgh, 1633), 2; ODNB, 
https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020. 
15 Bruce, Lord’s Supper, 162. 
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David Dickson likewise contrasted the chief good with creatures that ‘doe 
lacke and cannot have, because they finit be.’16 Because of their finite 
nature, creatures not only are incapable of sating the infinite desire intrinsic 
to human existence; they actually fuel its hunger for the real supreme good.17 
Principal of the University of Edinburgh John Adamson (1576-1651?) made 
this point in relation to thirst: the more one with dropsie drinks water, the 
more thirsty they become so that, far from quenching their thirst, drinking 
water increases their desire for water.18 The constant drive for more of a 
finite thing is indicative of the perceived futility of finite things as a source of 
happiness, as the appetite cannot rest in them. Rather, it is kept in motion, 
inclined towards something which is unqualified and thus provides a 
permanent place of rest. Temporality has a similar effect: even if a substance 
is infinite its being in time means it is subject to change, and thus cannot be a 
stable source of joy. Bruce expressed this idea when he taught that there is 
no ‘permanent contentment with [a] thing that is transitory’.19 Similarly, 
Bruce’s friend Elizabeth Melville articulated this thought in her poem A Call to 
Come to Christ: 
  Should pleasures false posesse thy heart 
  Since thou and they with pain must part 
  Then think upon these pleasures pure 
  That shall for ever more endure.20 
 
Likewise, William Drummond inquired of his audience why they leaned upon 
‘guilted Glories which decay?’, and lamented ‘the strange Endes we toyle for 
heere below’, ‘A Pleasure passing’ and an ‘Honour that more fickle than the 
winde’.21 Melville’s and Drummond’s points, echoing verses in Ecclesiastes 
and the Gospels, was that it is futile to love what is temporal as an end in 
itself because such an object is subject to change and thus can provide a 
 
16 Bruce, Lord’s Supper, 197; Dickson, True Christian Love, Stanza 5. 
17 Struther, Happiness, 9. 
18 John Adamson, The Travellers Joy (London, 1623), 15; ODNB, 
https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020. 
19 Bruce, Lord’s Supper, 197. 
20 Melville, Poems, 36. Italics added for emphasis. 
21 Drummond, Flowers, 20, 2. 
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place of rest for a limited amount of time.22 Consequently, possession of 
anything finite and temporal cannot be the supreme good of the soul, so 
Scottish Protestants thought; because a creature’s finite nature was believed 
to entail that they could not exhaust the inexhaustible desire of the appetite’s 
unconditional love for what the subject believed was an end in itself.  
 By implication, Scottish Protestants were educated to think that an 
object must be infinite and eternal if it is to satisfy the unconditional love and 
desire of the human heart. Minister Ninian Campbell (fl.1630) expressed this 
idea in a sermon when he argued that the supreme good alone could fulfil 
‘our illimited desires, and infinite appetites’.23 He explained that not even ‘ten 
thousand worlds’ could satisfy human nature’s innate love for the supreme 
good because the object of desire would only be finite. Campbell’s idea was 
rooted in the ancient and early modern cosmological, physiological, and 
theological principle that ‘like attracts like’.24 Because the appetite has an 
unconditional love for what is judged by the will to be its absolute good, that 
which it seeks to rest in permanently must be without qualification if it is to 
satisfy the illimited desire of the soul. Consequently, only an eternal and 
infinite being, a reality which exists without any conditionality in its nature (the 
mark of finitude) can be the real supreme good of human nature.  
 John Adamson provided another reason for why the supreme good 
must be ‘eternall and heavenly’.25 He argued, that ‘nothing can rest but in the 
owne place whence it hath its beginning, and on things suitable to its 
nature’.26 In support of this claim, he claimed that stones and metals fall 
towards ‘their originall earth again’, whereas fire continues to rise towards ‘its 
natural place’, both elements tending towards their natural place of rest: a 
location, their place of origin, which consists in what these substances are 
made from. By implication, the human appetite can only rest in something 
like itself, its cause. As humanity was created by God and is made in the 
 
22 Ecclesiastes 3:1-8; Matthew 6:19. 
23 Ninian Campbell, A Treatise Upon Death (Glasgow, 1635), D7r. 
24 Van Engen, Sympathetic Puritans, 27-55. 
25 Adamson, Travellers Joy (London, 1623), 15. 
26 Adamson, Travellers Joy, 15-16. 
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image of God, the appetite can only find rest in ‘things above’. Implicit in 
Adamson’s argument was the Aristotelian notion that every natural motion a 
substance undertakes, that which is unimpeded by an obstacle or external 
agent, is towards its origin and, thus, place of rest.27 As such, given that the 
infinite and eternal reality which is called God created humanity, so humanity 
can only find its rest in the everlasting and illimited object: God. 
 Scottish Protestants assumed that when the love of the sensitive 
appetite rests in the supreme good, the subject is in a state of ‘happiness’. 
Happiness was not, in the early modern Protestant view, just a feeling. 
Rather, it consisted in the ‘perfection’ of the subject’s nature.28 This idea was 
rooted in the eudaimonistic or teleological view of humanity that Scottish and 
other Reformed Protestants embraced.29 ‘Eudaimonia’, a term which 
originated in ancient Greek philosophy, is often translated as ‘happiness’ or 
‘the happy life’, though in Nicholas Wolterstorff’s view it would be more 
appropriate, in relation to Greek thought, to translate it as ‘the estimable 
life’.30 The notion that life could be ‘estimable’ implied that it had a purpose 
and that happiness was the attainment of this goal. For Aristotle, every 
substance has such a function, or telos, which when fulfilled is the perfection 
of that substance. The function of a substance, then is such an end for ‘which 
everything else is done’, as ‘we always choose it for itself and never for any 
other reason’.31 In other words, it is the supreme good of the soul, the 
absolute end for which it exists. Aristotle argued that, for humans, the 
possession of virtue fulfils the purpose of human life; and thus is the state of 
 
27 Helen S. Lang, ‘Why Fire Goes up: An Elementary Problem in Aristotle’s “Physics”’ in The 
Review of Metaphysics, 38, no.1 (1984), 80. 
28 Drummond, Flowers, 66.  
29 Nathaniel Warne, ‘Emotions and the Development of Virtue in Puritan Thought: An 
Investigation of Puritan Friendship’ in Puritanism and Emotion in the Early Modern World, 
eds. Alec Ryrie and Tom Schwanda (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 
195. 
30 Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘Happiness in Augustine’s Confessions1' in Augustine’s 
Confessions: Philosophy in Autobiography, ed. William E. Mann (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 47. 




happiness which is what makes a person good and perform their function.32 
Happiness, then, was primarily an objective state of being which consists in 
the possession of virtue. 
 For the views of early modern Scottish Protestants, Augustine (354-
430) had importantly argued that virtue was not an end in itself, but the 
means by which one could have possession of the supreme good: 
communion with God. Augustine redefined the Platonic, Aristotelian, and 
later Stoic, conceptions of virtue to situate them within a Christian theological 
framework. While he affirmed with his pagan counterparts that virtue was an 
important aspect of happiness, he challenged their view of what a virtue is 
and its exact relationship with the soul’s perfection. He argued that true virtue 
is a love for God, and that its value came through its facilitation of 
communion with God, which is the supreme good of the soul.33 Augustine 
characterised the happiness which came through communion with God in 
two Latin words: beatitudo and felictas.34 First, beatitudo or ‘blessedness’, is 
the perfected state of the soul in communion with God. This is the objective 
rest of the soul in the object of its love: God. The soul at rest no longer needs 
to move, and thus is in a state of perfection: it has reached the end of its 
journey, having returned to its origin. This was the idea Augustine articulated 
powerfully at the beginning of the Confessions:  
The thought of you [God] stirs him [humanity] so deeply that he cannot 
be content unless he praises you, because you made us for yourself 
and our hearts find no peace until they rest in you.35 
 
The second term, felicitas or ‘felicity’, is the episodic attainment of the good, 
and as such the experience of joy. This is a phenomenological state which 
Augustine frequently identified with ‘true happiness’.36 Augustine’s idea of 
 
32 Aristotle Ethics, I.1098a8-27; Christian Tornau, ‘Happiness in this Life?: Augustine on the 
Principle that Virtue is Self-sufficient for Happiness’ in The Quest for the Good Life: Ancient 
Philosophers on Happiness, eds. Øyvind Rabbås, Eyjólfur K. Emilsson, Hallvard Fossheim, 
and Miira Tuominen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 272. 
33 Tornau, ‘Happiness’, 272-273. 
34 James Henry Thomforde, ‘Defending Happiness: Jonathan Edwards’s enduring pursuit of 
a reformed teleology of happiness’ (PhD, The University of Edinburgh, 2018), 29-30. 
35 Augustine, Confessions, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (London: Penguin Books, 1961), I:1. 
36 Wolterstorff, ‘Happiness’, 52-53. 
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happiness, then, corresponded to the Scottish Protestant conception of joy, 
analysed in chapter one, as a resting of the appetite in an object of its love, 
which produces pleasurable feelings.37 It was both an objective state of being 
and a subjective experience of that ontological situation. Thus, when Scottish 
Protestants identified communion with the infinite and eternal as happiness, 
given it was that which would satisfy their desires, they articulated an 
Augustinian interpretation of happiness. Augustine’s influence on their ideas 
about human teleology was so important that some Scottish theologians 
directly cited him as the source of their thought on the matter.38 
 The important point to be drawn out of the analysis here is that 
Scottish Protestants assumed that they had a deep-rooted desire for 
happiness. They believed that all people had an infinite and eternal love 
which could only be satisfied by possession of their supreme good. They 
believed the summum bonum was that in which their appetite could rest, 
accompanied by a subjective experience of elation. Influenced by 
Augustinian eudaimonism, they held that such a condition was the state of 
‘happiness’. Thus, Scottish Protestants were taught that happiness was the 
goal of their life, and this presupposition was supposed to be integral to their 
practice of radical emotional reflexivity.  
 What Protestants in Scotland identified as the supreme good was just 
as fundamental as their belief that there is a summum bonum, as it was the 
thing which they assumed would bring them into a state of rest and 
enjoyment. This is the subject of the next section. 
 
2. Communion with God is Happiness 
 Scottish Protestants were taught and believed that the chief good of 
human nature is communion with God. This was because, in their view, 
God’s infinite and eternal nature can alone bring the appetite to rest and thus 
joy.39 John Adamson explained that ‘we hath good reason to rest on him 
 
37 Chapter One, 38-39. 
38 Struther, Happiness, A3v; Campbell, Treatise, D3v; Mullan, Scottish Puritanism, 51-52. 
39 Chapter One, 38-39. 
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(Christ)’ considering God’s properties: Christ has within himself ‘all perfection 
and beauty’, ‘all sufficiency both for himself and for us’, in him are ‘hid all the 
treasures of wisdom and knowledge’.40 Because of God’s infinite nature, 
William Struther claimed that possession of God is sufficient for ‘all persons, 
of whatsoever sex, qualitie, or condition’, communion with the Almighty 
supplies the ‘necessities both of the soul and bodie’.41 Moreover, as God was 
thought to be eternal, without beginning or end, his attributes exist forever.42 
Thus, the welsh puritan bishop Lewis Bayly (c.1575-1631), whose work was 
popular in Scotland, could claim that the people of God will have an 
‘unspeakable joy’ and this will be ‘for evermore’. God’s attributes were 
understood, then, to be as such that they can satisfy the absolute love of 
human nature.  
 Importantly, it was communion with God which was considered the 
supreme good of human existence. God’s properties, so it was assumed by 
Scottish Protestants, could only sate the innate desire of the human soul if 
the subject, in some sense, possesses or has God. The point was eloquently 
put by a contemporary Scottish Roman Catholic named William Chalmers 
(1596-c.1678) who, it has been indicated in recent scholarship, had an 
influence on some Reformed Protestant thinkers in Scotland.43 Chalmers 
distinguished between the object of happiness, that which needs to be 
possessed to be happy (God), and ‘formal happiness’, in which one 
possesses the object that will make them happy. Formal happiness is 
superior to objective happiness, Chalmers argued, as someone is not 
properly called happy unless they have the object which makes them happy. 
Struther framed the idea in his own way, that ‘God is happinesse in himself 
without us, and wee are miserie in our selves without him’.44 God is the 
object of happiness, but unless one has God, the human soul cannot be 
 
40 Adamson, Travellers Joy, 14. 
41 Struther, Happiness, 5. 
42 Lewis Bayly, The Practice of Pietie (London, 1616), 38, 164-165; ODNB, 
https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020. 
43 Alexander Broadie, ‘William Chalmers (Guliemus Camerarius) (1596-c.1678): A Scottish 
Catholic Voice on the Best and the Worst’ in Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth 
Century, ed. Alexander Broadie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 193. 
44 Struther, Happiness, 120. 
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happy, so the argument goes. Consequently, while God was considered the 
supreme good of the soul, it was communion with God that was thought to 
constitute happiness, as it was only in this relationship that God’s attributes 
could satisfy the deepest desires of the human heart. 
 Scottish Protestants typically used three words to describe the 
experience of happiness produced by fellowship with the divine: contentment, 
rest, and joy. Robert Bruce used such language when he claimed that love of 
God results in ‘permanent contentment’.45 The sight of God’s face, wrote 
William Drummond, ‘It a contentment is, a quiet peace’, while another author 
thought that only God ‘can me content’.46 Likewise, David Dickson described 
Christ’s love as a ‘contenting love’.47 Communion with God was contentment 
(or happiness) because it was, as discussed above, the rest of the appetite in 
its supreme good.48 Thus, Scottish Protestants like Bruce called the 
happiness produced by having God ‘complete rest’, ‘reliefe and rest perfite’, 
‘a constant rest’.49 As this was nothing other than the state of joy, Protestants 
such as Adamson characterised communion with God as an experience in 
which a subject ‘injoyeth the sweetnesse’ of its chief good, ‘perfect joy’, ‘A 
Pleasure voide of griefe… Eternall Joy, which nothing can molest’.50 The 
Presbyterian minister Robert Blair (1593-1666) wrote a hymn which locates 
the Christian’s joy in dwelling (or resting) in God.51 The second and third 
verse read: 
  An orphan to his father’s house 
  Is come, where Christ I see, 
  With arms stretch’d out, as on the cross, 
  Me to embrace sweetly. 
  
  I’m call’d, I run with haste and joy, 
  To thee O Christ I cleave; 
  Such pleasure is thee to enjoy, 
 
45 Bruce, Lord’s Supper, 196. 
46 Drummond, Flowers, 19; Melivlle, A Spirituall Propine of a Pastour to his People 
(Edinburgh, 1589), 52. 
47 Dickson, True Christian Love, Stanza 4. 
48 Chapter Two, 57-60. 
49 Bruce, Lord’s Supper, 197; Melville, Propine, 52; Adamson, Travellers Joy, 13-14; 
Drummond, Flowers, 19. 
50 Adamson, Travellers Joy, 30; Bruce, Lord’s Supper, 197; Drummond, Flowers, 19. 
51 ODNB, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020. 
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  I can thee never leave.52 
 
Communion with God, then, was enjoyment of God: a rest of the appetite in 
the object of its absolute love, and a feeling of unbounded pleasure and 
contentment.  
 The significant point arising from this section for this study of radical 
emotional reflexivity is that Scottish Protestants assumed communion with 
God is the supreme good of human nature. It meant that they identified it as 
the purpose of existence, given that fellowship with God was identical with 
happiness. As the pursuit of happiness was the standard by which the 
meaning of their emotions was judged by Scottish Protestants, it follows that 
this meant that they evaluated their emotions in relation to their obstruction or 
facilitation of communion with God. They assessed whether their emotions 
enabled or got in the way of their everlasting and ecstatic enjoyment of God. 
Thus, the belief that communion with God was the essence of happiness was 
a critical aspect of radical emotional reflexivity as practiced by Scottish 
Protestants. It provided the concrete standard which they used to ascribe 
significance to their emotions. In other words, it gave their experiences 
meaning.  
 The key then, was to have emotions which facilitated communion with 
and enjoyment of God. What Scottish Protestants identified as the desired 
emotions for the attainment of this state is the focus of the next part of the 
chapter. 
 
3. Faith and Love Facilitate Communion with God 
 Scottish Protestants believed that the enjoyment of God was made 
possible by two things: faith and love. The chapter will take each concept in 
turn to understand what they were for Scottish Protestants and why they 
believed faith and love facilitated fellowship with God and, thus, happiness. 
 John Calvin’s (1509-1564) definition of faith as ‘a firm and sure 
knowledge of the divine favour toward us’ was embraced by Scottish 
 
52 Robert Blair, The Life of Robert Blair, with Supplement by William Row, ed. T. M’Crie 
(Edinburgh, 1848), 122-123. 
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Protestants.53 John Craig’s (c.1512-1600) shorter catechism, which replaced 
Calvin’s as the standard for the examination of potential communicants in 
Scotland prior to the Westminster Assembly, defined faith as ‘a sure 
persuasion that He [Jesus] is the only Saviour of the world, but ours in 
particular, who believe in Him’.54 Likewise, a catechism produced by 
Presbyterian minister James Melville (1556-1614) claimed that faith is ‘My 
sure beliefe that God baith may and will saue me in the bloud of Iesus Christ, 
because he is almightie, and hes promised sa to do.’55 The first Principal of 
the University of Edinburgh Robert Rollock (1555-1599) explained the logic of 
these definitions of faith in his examination of faith’s object and subject. He 
identified the object of faith as the gospel.56 He understood the good news to 
consist in ‘Jesus Christ and his benefits’ as presented in the Word and 
Sacraments. This was the propositional content of faith, the idea that the 
death of Jesus Christ is efficacious for the forgiveness of sins and that God is 
favourable towards the elect. The subject of faith, Rollock argued, consisted 
in a judgement of the understanding and a judgement of the will. The Holy 
Spirit, in the creation of faith, first causes the understanding to apprehend the 
proposition of the gospel in the preaching of the Word, so that it apprehends 
the claim, made in the right preaching of the Word and administration of the 
Sacraments, that whoever believes in Christ will be justified and receive 
eternal life.57 In the apprehension of this idea, via the senses of sight 
(sacraments) and hearing (preaching), Rollock believed the rational cognition 
makes two judgements: that the proposition of the gospel is true, and that it is 
good for the subject.58 This is followed by a judgement of the will, made 
possible by the power of the Holy Spirit, to ‘apply’ the gospel’s truth to the 
subject in particular. As a result, the subject is led to affirm the conclusion of 
 
53 Jean Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, (London: James Clarke, 1949). 2:2:7. 
54 Thomas F. Torrance, The School of Faith: The Catechisms of the Reformed Church,  
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the ‘evangelical syllogism’: ‘Whosoever beleeveth, shall be justified and live: 
But I beleeve: therefore, I shall be justified; and live’.59 Hence faith is a 
persuasion, an affirmation of the understanding and will, that the gospel is 
true, good for the subject, and possessed by the subject. Notably, Rollock’s 
analysis of faith corresponds to the processes which were assumed to cause 
a passion, examined in chapter one.60 Faith is the apprehension of the 
gospel, the formal object, received into the imagination via the senses, which 
is then judged by the understanding and the will in the right way. The 
theoretical underpinnings of what a passion’s nature is, thus, made Rollock’s 
analysis of faith plausible, and situated it within a theoretical framework 
assumed in the Scottish Protestant worldview. That the theory of emotion 
outlined in chapter one provided the inner logic of the Scottish Protestant 
conception of faith is further attested by Struther’s identification of faith as a 
‘double perswasion’ of the rational faculties in response to the gospel.61 
 Faith was the means by which the Holy Spirit united the soul with 
God.62 Craig’s catechism claimed that the ‘fruit’ of faith is ‘our inseparable 
union with Christ and His graces’.63 Similarly, in Bruce’s view faith is the only 
‘means’ by which ‘we can apply Christ in our souls’, as ‘faith conjoins us with 
the God of heaven’.64 Struther explained that ‘our happiness is in union with 
God’ which is made possible by faith.65 Many Scottish Protestants used the 
language of the Song of Songs and Ephesians to describe this union as a 
marriage union between a husband and wife.66 The Presbyterian minister 
Samuel Rutherford (c.1600-1661) declared that ‘He [Christ] is my Husband, 
and I am His Wife’, while minister of Logie Alexander Hume (c.1557-1609) 
clarified that ‘Iesus Christ is the bridegrome, and his Church (that is to say, 
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60 Chapter One, 30-35. 
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the number of his elect) is called the bride.’67 The mathematician John Napier 
of Merchiston (1550-1617) stated that marriage symbolises the ‘Sacrament of 
the union of Christ and his Church: whereby the husbande representeth 
Christ, and the Woman espoused representeth the Church’.68 Thus, faith was 
considered an instrument which united the soul to God in Christ, as marriage 
did a husband and wife.  
 While union with God was, in some sense, possession of God, the 
appetite still needed to rest in God for the subject to experience happiness. 
This was achieved by the second instrument for possession of God, which 
was called ‘fruition’. This was defined by Scottish Protestants as the love and 
enjoyment of God. Love of God was, for Struther, the first part of fruition.69 
He claimed that ‘love uniteth us to God’. It does so as it makes the soul ‘rest 
sweetly on a present and eternal good’. Struther’s position was strongly 
influenced by his interpretation of Augustine. When a subject’s appetite rests 
in God, they are moved to joy, the second stage of fruition. The love of God 
satisfied by the possession of God leaves the ‘the soul overjoyed with God’.70 
Joy follows an ‘infusion of his love’ in the soul, ‘the rest of our soule resting 
sweetly in the possession of him whom it loveth’.71 This spiritual joy is called 
by Struther ‘spirituall saitetie’, the ‘inebriation of grace’.72 His understanding 
of fruition corresponds to the definition of love outlined in chapter one.73 Love 
is the orientation of the appetite towards that which the understanding and 
will have identified as absolutely or instrumentally good for the soul. Without 
the motion of the appetite inclined towards God caused by love, fellowship 
would be impossible, as the appetite would not move towards rest in God. 
Love for God causes desire, and thus directs the appetite to rest in God. 
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Hence love is that which brings a subject into communion with God and thus 
is the means to their everlasting and bounteous joy.  
 Scottish Protestants believed faith was that which caused the subject 
to love God, and thus have communion with God. As established earlier in 
the chapter, Robert Rollock believed that faith consisted in a judgement of 
the understanding and a judgement of the will in relation to the gospel.74 He 
argued that faith, a double judegement of the rational part of the soul, moves 
the sensitive appetite (a view based on the theory of emotion outlined in 
chapter one).75 
The knowledge and apprehension of Christ… is effectual also in the 
lower heart, that is, in all the affections: and there is not anie of al the 
affections, but is affected some way or other by this knowledge and 
apprehension, being not only sanctified by it, but also rapt up above 
itself & the nature therof. For as we said of faith, it is a supernatural 
knowledge and apprehension, the same is true also of the functions of 
all the affections: for they are al not onely made holy, but also 
supernatural, by a certaine supernatural facultie put into them by the 
Spirit of Christ.76 
 
As the ‘lower heart’ was a synonym for the motions of the sensitive part of 
the soul, Rollock claimed in this passage that faith, which consists in the 
judgements of the understanding and will, causes emotional change. Once 
Christ was known and apprehended, the sensitive appetite was moved to ‘an 
hope of good to come, & a feare of evill to come, the love of Christ, and the 
desire of him, and joy & gladnesse’. In all, because of faith ‘the whole heart 
burnes to Godward’. Thus, as faith causes love and enjoyment of God it is a 
necessary feature for communion with God. At the same time, love enables 
the subject to ‘feel’ the truth of faith. Robert Bruce put the point eloquently: 
When the heart gets hold of God, and is possessed with the love of 
God, and the mind is occupied with the true knowledge of God, then, 
as soon as the heart and mind are full of God, the heart is quiet, and 
the mind is satisfied… in the infinite God, rightly known and earnestly 
loved, the mind will find complete rest, and the heart will have perfect 
joy.77 
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Faith and love of God, therefore, complemented one another: faith caused 
love of God, while love translates faith into the subject’s emotions. 
 The interpretation of what was required for the acquisition of 
happiness, faith and love, represented an integration of Thomist and Scotist 
positions in the Scottish Protestant mindset. For Aquinas, happiness consists 
in an act of the intellect which facilitates communion with God. For Scotus, it 
is an act of the will which can bring the subject into fellowship with God. A 
third way, represented by Bonaventure, and also Scottish theologians and 
philosophers like John Mair (c.1467-1550), was that happiness was an act of 
both faith and love, the intellect and will.78 The positions of Rollock, Bruce, 
and other Scottish Protestants, was closer to Bonaventure’s than those of 
Aquinas and Scotus. They believed that the rational cognition judged the 
gospel to be genuinely good for the subject, and that the will chose to apply 
the gospel to the subject, a position which integrates the views of Aquinas 
and Scotus. However, Scottish Protestants also added that this moved the 
sensitive appetite to love and joy. Their adaption of Thomist and Scotist ideas 
into their understanding of happiness not only reflected the eclectic nature of 
Protestant intellectual culture, as discussed in chapter one.79 It was also the 
logical consequence of the theory of emotion, analysed in that chapter, which 
they assumed. As the judgements of the understanding and will were 
considered necessary for the motion of the sensitive appetite, and as 
happiness was interpreted as the evocation of joy through communion with 
God, it followed that both rational faculties were integral to the procurement 
of happiness.80  Thus, the integration of Thomist and Scotist ideas in their 
assumptions about the nature of emotion led Scottish Protestants to bring the 
two positions together in their presuppositions about happiness: that through 
love for God, evoked by faith in the gospel, the subject could have 
communion with God. 
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 What is important in the forgoing analysis is that Scottish Protestants 
believed faith and love for God were the means by which one could have 
communion with God. As fellowship with God was the goal by which the 
significance of the emotions was to be judged, as it was considered the 
essence of happiness, so the acquisition of faith and love were the ideal 
Scottish Protestants were to aim for intellectually and emotionally. They 
provided the standard to which the faculties should operate if the subject was 
to have communion with God. Thus, the meaning of an emotion was 
determined by whether the judgements which caused it were those that 
belonged to faith, and whether these evaluations of the formal object resulted 
in love and enjoyment of God. The emotional requirement for communion 
with God, faith and love, was therefore presupposed by Scottish Protestants 
in their attempts to mobilise desired emotions and consequently informed 
their identification of their emotions. The importance of having faith and love 
significantly influenced the practice of radical emotional reflexivity in public 
worship and private piety, a theme which will be fully discussed in chapter 
five.81 
 However, Protestants in Scotland presupposed that the gap between 
ideal emotion - the cognitive and subsequent appetitive states of faith and 
love - and the actual ability of humans to have these emotions, was not so 
much a gap as a chasm. While they assumed that they should have faith and 
love so that they could have communion with God, they believed from the 
outset of their practice of radical emotional reflexivity that this was a far-off 
goal. This feature of their linguistic-conceptual framework is analysed in the 
final part of this chapter. 
 
4. Human Nature’s Inability to Acquire Happiness 
 Scottish Protestants believed that they were incapable, by their natural 
powers, to have faith in and love for God. Thus, they assumed they could 
not, without outside help, be happy. Protestants in Scotland held to this grim 
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view of human nature because of their interpretation of the doctrine of the 
Fall. Robert Rollock represented the Scottish Protestant view in his analysis 
of the subject, inspired by thinkers such as Augustine and Calvin. He argued 
that the original sin of Adam was the first non-conformity with God’s will or 
law.82 This had three principal effects, passed onto every human by their 
creation through sexual intercourse. First, the guilt of Adam’s apostasy had 
been passed onto the whole human race, his descendants. What this meant 
was articulated by the Scots Confession: ‘he and his posteritie of nature 
become enemies to God’.83 The human race, therefore, is guilty of Adam’s 
original sin. Second, Adam’s guilt had led to a defect within human nature, 
whereby human nature lacks its ‘original justice and image of God’. Third, 
human nature had been totally corrupted, with both the operations of the 
body and soul contrary to the justice of God. Original sin had perverted all the 
faculties, so that they do no good and seek only evil. The wrongdoing of the 
faculties, what Rollock called ‘the flesh’, manifests itself in sin.84 Thus, the 
corruption of the faculties resulted, so argued the Scots Confession, in all 
humanity becoming ‘slaves to Sathan, and servandis unto sin’.85 This 
negative view of human nature, that of its ‘total depravity’, was shared by the 
majority of Reformed Protestants, Rollock’s points articulated by the Synod of 
Dort (1619):  
Therefore all men are conceived in sin, and by nature children of 
wrath, incapable of saving good, prone to evil, dead in sin, and in 
bondage thereto, and without the regenerating grace of the Holy Spirit, 
they are neither able nor willing to return to God, to reform the 
depravity of their nature, nor to dispose themselves to reformation.86 
 
 The effect of original sin on the emotions was twofold: it impaired the 
judgements of the rational part of the soul and corrupted the motions of the 
appetite. First, the consequence of Adam’s sin made the understanding and 
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will make wrong judgements.87 Bishop of Caithness John Abernethy, 
(c.1595-1639?) asserted that original sin has made the natural inclination of 
human nature to seek ‘wrong, and unlawful objects’.88 Abernethy’s position 
presupposed the theory of emotion outlined in chapter one.89 As indicated, 
the ‘object’ of an emotion is its formal object, the form received into the 
imagination with its intention. The understanding judges whether the 
apprehension of the object is accurate, while the will evaluates whether it is 
good for the subject or not. Abernethy’s claim is that, due to its natural 
corruption, the understanding and will misjudge a formal object’s intention. 
They frequently misidentify that which is actually good for that which is evil; 
that which is really evil for that which is good. Thus, the rational cognition’s 
judgements of a formal object are not accurate to the actual state of things. 
This consequently moves the appetite in an inappropriate way in relation to 
the real value of the formal object in relation to the subject. 
 Second, the motion of the appetite is itself impaired. Abernethy argued 
that passions are prone to ‘exceed and redound’.90 This meant for him that 
the appetite would often move disproportionately in relation to the actual 
goodness of the formal object. That is, the appetite would be moved either 
too much or too little towards or away from its formal object, in relation to the 
perceived intention of the formal object. Hence the appetite, it was assumed, 
often misinterpreted even the ‘true report of the braine’.91 Thus not only did 
the disjunction between reality and appearance cause the emotions to go 
awry, but also the failure of the appetite to respond appropriately to the 
judgements of rational cognition and volition. Together, the corruption of the 
faculties entailed that human emotion was perverted from its ideal. 
 As a result of the perceived effect of original sin on the psychological 
faculties, Scottish Protestants believed that humans are predisposed to 
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misidentify the supreme good. Finite and temporal creatures are identified as 
ends in themselves; the soul is moved to love that which is not-God 
absolutely. This includes not only a desire for finite and temporal creatures, 
but also the superstitious worship of God, which is nothing other than a love 
for a dream and figment of the imagination.92 This is idolatry, which was 
believed to have a detrimental effect on the emotions by Scottish Protestants. 
A consequence of not loving the supreme good absolutely was that it put the 
passions in a state of ‘contraeitie and contradiction’.93 Weemes described the 
passions in this state as like ‘contrary winds or tides’, the subject ‘drawn by 
two wild horses contrariways’.94 Abernethy gave a list of contrary ‘tides’ or 
‘horses’ that simultaneously pull in contradictory directions: ‘lust and shame, 
pride and parsimony, fury and feare, loue and hate, joy and hope’.95 Weemes 
used the illustration of a covetous adulterer, who at one and the same time 
wants to hold what he has (covetousness), but also wants to spend what he 
has (adulterous).96 This distempered condition was described by William 
Drummond as ‘A shrill tempestuous Winde, Which doth disturbe the Minde’.97 
The inner logic of these claims was that the corrupted individual, whose 
appetite is never satisfied by the finite objects that they love absolutely, have 
their sensitive appetite moved in contradictory ways by mutually exclusive 
formal objects in the search for permanent rest. As such, the subject’s 
appetite is pulled to and away from the objects of its love, a direct result of 
the inadequacy of seeking rest in finite objects (as analysed earlier in this 
chapter).98 Consequently the passions, it was assumed, are in a perpetual 
state of contradiction due to the corrupted appetite’s unqualified desire for the 
wrong objects.  
 A second effect of absolute love for that which is not-God on the 
emotions is that the passions, so it was believed by Scottish Protestants, are 
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made inconstant. Abernethy observed that one passion ‘maketh a way for the 
extremity of another’.99 For example, an excess of joy is often followed by 
excessive sadness when the object of joy is gone. Similarly, excessive desire 
causes excessive sorrow when the desired object is lost. This is because, 
argued Abernethy, the emotions are ‘gunpowdered’ so that when their formal 
object is perceived they explode and pull the appetite in a new direction. Not 
only is this inconstancy due to the disproportionate nature of the appetite’s 
motions, but also the ever-changing state of creation (analysed earlier in the 
chapter).100 Thus, Scottish Protestants blamed original sin for the 
changeability of their emotions. Put another way, the corruption of human 
nature has prevented subjects from resting in God. Consequently, their 
appetites are left in a state of perpetual motion. 
 Due to its contradictory and inconstant nature, the fallen human 
condition was characterised by Scottish Protestants as ‘miserable’ or ‘misery’ 
– the opposite of happiness. For William Drummond, fallen human nature is 
‘a finit piece of reasonable miserie’, while poet William Mure of Rowallan 
(1594-1657) considered ‘the miserie of man by Sinne’ great in magnitude.101 
James Melville implored his readers to ‘remooue and flit from this miserie, to 
that felicitie everlasting’, and so highlighted to his reader that the state of 
misery is the opposite of the state of happiness.102 William Struther thought 
that misery was the privation of happiness, implied by his claim that 
‘Happinesse is the sovereign cure of our miserie’.103 Bishop of Galloway 
William Cowper (1568-1619) argued that the sinner lives in ‘miserable 
servitude’, especially when they ‘enjoy the objects of their sinnes, yet have 
they not their desired joy and contentment’, leaving all wicked people in a 
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perpetually ‘unhappy experience’.104 In other words, ministers taught their 
congregations that the natural state of human nature, due to the Fall, was 
misery: the absence of happiness.  
 Scottish Protestants believed the fallen emotions prevented happiness 
because they obstructed communion with God. As Adamson expressed in 
his Theses, humans are naturally incapable of virtue due to their corrupt 
faculties, and as such cannot have the faith in or love of God necessary for 
fellowship with their supreme good.105 Thus, Scottish Protestants lamented 
their natural state and by implication their perverted emotions. Minister 
Zachary Boyd (1585-1653) decried that ‘in us all there is not a trimmed 
chamber for Christ till God prepare it’.106 Rutherford despaired that ‘these 
who has gotten an ill drink from the Devil, full of lusts, pride, covetousness, 
full of love of the world; such are they that has no stomack for Christ’.107 The 
‘God of heaven cannot have any fellowship with the soul that is always 
unclean, and altogether defiled’, complained Bruce.108 He went onto clarify 
that ‘God cannot make His residence in a soul that is always a stinking 
dunghill’. The message was clear: without significant preparation and 
reformation of the faculties – including those that are involved in the passions 
– the human soul is incapable of having communion with God. However, it 
was out-with the power of human nature to bring about the change required 
for happiness given its inability to do good. Thus, without external 
intervention, humanity was doomed by Adam’s original sin to everlasting 
misery. 
 Scottish Protestants, therefore, assumed that their they were unable to 
have the faith and love necessary for the acquisition of happiness. This belief 
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had a profound effect on their evaluation of the significance of their emotions. 
They were predisposed to conclude that their emotions were in error, given 
the assumed perversion of their faculties. Moreover, as they identified human 
nature as corrupt, their natural inclination was to categorise an experience 
which seemed to obstruct an ideal emotion as sinful. Thus, any passion 
which could be considered a distraction from an absolute love of God was 
deemed the product of original sin. Furthermore, belief in the total depravity 
of human nature meant that Scottish Protestants, when naming and 
mobilising their emotions, entered into these processes with the assumption 
that their subject is naturally corrupt, and as such distant from the ideal 
emotional standard. In this way, the presupposition that human nature is 
fallen informed the categorisation of emotion that Scottish Protestants 
attempted in their practice of radical emotional reflexivity.  
 
 
 This second chapter has analysed the goal by which Scottish 
Protestants evaluated the meaning of their emotions. It has argued that they 
assumed that happiness, understood as communion with and enjoyment of 
God, was the purpose of life, and the standard by which their emotions 
should be judged. As they believed faith and love of God were the means by 
which they could have fellowship with God, Scottish Protestants assumed 
that these were the ideals against which their emotions should be tested. 
However, they also presupposed that human nature was such that it was 
impossible to have faith and love. Thus while Scottish Protestants believed 
life was for happiness, they also held that it was due to original sin pure 
misery. 
 These features of the Scottish Protestant linguistic-conceptual 
framework impacted the practice of radical emotional reflexivity in two ways. 
First, the evaluation of experience in relation to an identified goal was used 
by Scottish Protestants to stimulate an emotional response. Where an 
emotion stood in relation to the acquisition of communion with God via faith 
and love determined its meaning. How this goal impacted the mobilisation of 
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emotion in public worship and private devotion will be discussed in chapter 
five.109 Second, the contrast between the natural state of humanity and the 
ideal emotions provided the rationale for the identification of the emotions in 
the form of a spiritual journey. If the acquisition of happiness is impossible for 
humans to achieve by themselves, and yet ‘religion was instituted by God to 
serve as a pathway to guide us to our chief felicity’, to reiterate the quotation 
from Robert Bruce which opened this chapter, then there must be a change 
in the subject’s emotions through time from the state of misery to 
happiness.110 This meant that the emotional aim of Scottish Protestants, and 
the assessment of their condition they brought to their identification of 
emotion, entailed that they named their emotions in narrative form: a spiritual 
journey from misery to happiness. It is to this feature of their practice of 
radical emotional reflexivity that the next chapter turns.
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Chapter Three: The Language of Emotion 
 
 Scottish Protestants were taught to identify their emotions in the form 
of a spiritual journey. Some of the more zealous evaluated their experiences 
and concluded that their emotions could only be understood by way of a 
narrative. That story consisted in a perceived transformation in the emotions 
from a point of total depravity to the possession of faith and love. As a result, 
it was a plot in which a subject metaphorically ‘travelled’ from misery to 
happiness, idolatry to communion with God, wrong emotion to right emotion. 
It was a narrative built into the language about emotion used in public 
worship and the self-writings some of the more fervent Scots produced.1 
Thus, the widely shared assumption that the soul was on a spiritual journey 
towards communion with God (on which the subject’s faculties and emotions 
would be regenerated) was the linguistic-conceptual and emotional spine of 
communal ritual and private piety.  
 Therefore, the focus of this chapter is to analyse the language of 
emotion used in public worship and in the texts produced by some of the 
most pious Scottish Protestants. It begins with a discussion of the vocabulary 
of emotion built into corporate religious practice in early modern Scotland. 
The investigation shows that most Scots were regularly taught a language of 
emotion through participation in public rituals. Through participation they 
learned terms and how to use these words appropriately about their 
emotions. This lexicon defined the importance of an emotion by situating a 
subject’s experience within a spiritual journey. Importantly, ministers 
encouraged their congregations to engage in radical emotional reflexivity and 
use the linguistic-conceptual framework they had learned in public worship 
when they did so. This meant that the extant personal writings produced by 
some of the more zealous Scots are saturated in the language of emotion 
used in public worship to categorise a subject’s experiences in the form of a 
spiritual journey. 
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 Consequently, the second part of this chapter examines the language 
of emotion found in those texts produced by Scottish Protestants who 
engaged in radical emotional reflexivity. The vehicle for this examination is 
the spiritual conversion narrative of an author entitled ‘Mistress Rutherford’ 
(fl.1630/1670?), a young Presbyterian woman with landed connections who 
grew up near Edinburgh in the first few decades of the seventeenth century 
before travelling to raise a family of her own in Ireland.2 Her text is a 
particularly apt representation of the personal and spiritual writings produced 
by fervent Scots given that it has been an important document in the 
historiography of Scottish Protestant emotionality.3 The discussion in this 
chapter explores her use of emotional language and how this changes as the 
plot progresses. These shifts in Rutherford’s vocabulary are schematised into 
six stages which chart the narrative structure of her spiritual journey: love for 
devotion, the apprehension of sin, legal terror, repentance, a feeling of 
mercy, and communion with God. While there was variation in how strictly 
texts conformed to this schema, it captures the general sequence of 
emotional change presented in Scottish Protestant personal writings. In other 
words, the six stages classify how authors used emotional language to 
convey to a reader the story of their subject’s spiritual journey.  
 Thus, this chapter analyses how the language used in public worship 
and private devotion presented a subject’s emotions in the narrative form of a 
spiritual journey.  
 
1. Emotional Vocabulary in Corporate Worship 
 At the opening of his autobiography Robert Blair, an influential 
Presbyterian minister, recalled the beginning of his spiritual ‘pilgrimage’.4 He 
was aged seven and, as was typical of children his age, had been left at 
home during the corporate religious practice his community engaged in on a 
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Sunday. Alone with his thoughts, the boy started to reflect upon his purpose 
in life. He wondered ‘Wherfore servest thou, unprofitable creature?’ He gazed 
upon his environment and determined that the sun was made to give light to 
the world, while the cows he saw were created to provide Blair with 
nourishing milk. However, he could not work out what he himself had been 
made for. Pacing up and down in an agitated manner, he remembered that 
his family and wider social network were in a building called a church. Blair 
reasoned that whatever people did in there, it must be connected to the 
reason for human existence. A few Sundays later, Blair was in the church, 
and a visiting puritan minister from England was preaching. The first words 
the man spoke in his exhortation were Psalm 73:28: ‘But as to me, it is good 
to me to draw near to God’. This was the text the preacher expounded upon, 
and so he repeated the phrase many times within the sermon. Each 
utterance of the verse arrested Blair. The sentence provoked an emotional 
response in the boy, his heart ‘much affected’ by it. He believed, with great 
confidence and joy, that God had answered his question about the purpose 
of his life. Blair knew that he had been made to have communion with God. 
 This story is indicative of how public worship instructed Scots in a 
vocabulary and grammar of emotion which some, like Blair, used in their 
private practice of radical emotional reflexivity. The biblical citation 
pronounced by the puritan preacher provided a language which the young 
boy identified as his purpose in life. The corporate religious practice taught 
Blair that communion with God is the goal of human and, thus, his existence, 
a topic explored in chapter two.5 He remembered this event vividly when he 
wrote his autobiography at the age of sixty-three, and the language he 
learned that day was implicit in his characterisation of his life as a 
‘pilgrimage’. Many Scottish Protestant ministers, and their puritan 
counterparts in England and North America, used pilgrimage as a metaphor 
for their soul’s sanctification, the thoughts and feelings of a person 
figuratively travelling from their natural corruption to faith in and love for 
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God.6 It represented in an imaginative way the transition from alienation from 
to communion with God. Most famously, Elizabeth Melville allegorised the 
experience of salvation as a journey made by ‘pilgrimes puir’ in her published 
poem Ane Godlie Dreame.7 The representation of the Christian life as a 
pilgrimage made sense in the shared linguistic framework used by Scottish 
Protestants because it presupposed ideas outlined in the previous chapter: 
that human nature is totally depraved, and a person must undergo great 
change if they are to fulfil their fundamental desire for communion with God.8 
Consequently, when Blair told his reader that his autobiography was an 
examination of his ‘pilgrimage’, he used language and ideas he had learned 
as a boy in public worship in his practice of radical emotional reflexivity: that 
his goal in life was to draw near to God.9 
 Through public repentance, public fasting, the Lord’s Supper, 
sermons, and psalm singing, Scots like Blair were provided with both a 
vocabulary of emotion and a model for how to use it. Crucially, the use of 
language in these rituals had a narrative structure: the spiritual journey of an 
individual or community. Thus, in these corporate religious practices Scottish 
Protestants were taught to use a linguistic-conceptual framework which could 
both categorise a feeling and determine its significance in relation to the 
purpose of life: communion with God. 
 Penitential rituals, such as public repentance and the reception of 
excommunicants, focused on the penitent’s ‘conversion’.10 The process 
began when someone was found to have committed a public sin, an act of 
‘wickednes and obstinate rebellion’ caused by Satan’s ‘wenoum & 
deceavable entismentes’.11 Such offences required the guilty party to repent 
in the time of public worship. Kirk sessions were advised by the official 
guidance that only those offenders who could demonstrate that they had a 
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‘feare and terrour of God’s judgementes’, ‘haitrent of sinne and doloure for 
the same’, and a ‘sense and feilling’ of ‘Gods merceys’, should be admitted to 
participate in these rituals.12 In the ceremony, the minister would inform the 
congregation that the penitent had come to ‘witnes and declair his unfained 
repentance’. He was directed to tell them that the penitent had fallen into sin 
due to the total depravity of human nature and the activity of Satan, but that 
there was hope insofar as God has ordained that, through sincere 
repentance, a sinner will be forgiven. The minister would lead the 
congregation in prayer, asking God to ‘effectuallie move’ the sinner to feel 
‘dolour of the heart’ for their sin, and ‘some sense and fealing of thy mercy’.13 
Additionally, the penitent was expected to confess before the congregation 
that they were ‘sory for his sinne’ and that they ‘unfeanedly desyreth God to 
be mercyfull’. Through this verbal exclamation, the offender would identify the 
meaning of their behaviour in the ceremony, which was expected to include: 
the wearing of ‘base & abject apparaill’,14; a willingness to kneel before the 
congregation,15; to sit on the ‘stool’ or ‘pillar of repentance’,16; and the 
emission of tears and groans.17 This would culminate in a ‘trial of 
repentance’, a dialogue in which the minister would interrogate the sinner 
before the entire assembly.18 If the minister was satisfied that the penitent’s 
repentance was sincere, he would then ask the congregation if they would 
absolve the penitent, as in his view the community had witnessed ‘the 
 
12 Knox, Repentance, B1r-B3r. 
13 Knox, Repentance, B3r-B4r. 
14 Knox, Repentance, A5r; Margo Todd, The Culture of Protestantism in Early Modern 
Scotland (London: Yale University Press, 2002), 143-149; Jane Dawson, ‘Discipline and the 
Making of Protestant Scotland’ in Worship and Liturgy in Context: Studies and Case Studies 
in Theology and Practice, eds. Duncan Forrester and Doug Gay (London: SCM Press, 
2009), ‘Discipline’, 127; Nikki Marie Macdonald, ‘Reconciling Performance: the Drama of 
Discipline in Early Modern Scotland, 1560-1610’ (PhD, The University of Edinburgh, 2013), 
64. 
15 Robert Bruce, Sermons by the Rev. Robert Bruce with Collections for his Life by Robert 
Wodrow, ed. W. Cunningham (Edinburgh, 1843), 366; Macdonald, ‘Reconciling’, 112-113; 
Todd, Culture, 150, 160-161. 
16 Bruce, Sermons, 366; Dawson, ‘Discipline’, 128; Macdonald, ‘Reconciling’, 33. 
17 Knox, Repentance, B2v; Blair, Life, 68-69; Macdonald, ‘Reconciling’, 93; Todd, Culture, 
160-161; Chapter Five, 170-175. 




conversion and repentance of this our brother’.19 If the congregation offered a 
‘sign of their consent’, the penitent would be absolved. The minister would 
declare that the penitent’s sins ‘are forgevin not only in earth, but also in the 
heaven’, while the elders and deacons would embrace, kiss, and lead the 
reconciled individual to sit with the community.20  
 Public fasting, whether in response to crisis or in preparation for the 
Lord’s Supper, enabled the whole community to participate as penitents in 
public worship. Apart from the sick, new mothers, and the pregnant, all were 
expected to abstain from food and merriment throughout the fast, which 
usually lasted for at least a week.21 Such hunger was supposed to make 
people feel their need to ‘earnestly to craue of God’ for mercy and 
assistance. In the time of public worship, the people were not allowed to wear 
‘gorgious apparell’. Ministers, like William Struther, explained that a 
humiliating costume, which had biblical precedent in times of public fasting, 
expressed a ‘heart sopped with sorrow and bitternesse for sin’.22 At the start 
of the service, the minister would ask God, on behalf of the congregation, to:  
move our dull heartes, and by the power of thy holy Spirite, that thow 
will write & seale into them that holy feare and revere[n]ce, which thow 
cravest of thy chosen children, and that faithfull obedience to they 
holie will, together with the fealing and sense that our sinnes are fully 
purged.23 
 
In this way, the minister named the God-caused emotions that the abstinence 
and costume of the congregation were supposed to non-verbally express. 
Through this ceremony the community were reconciled to God, and so the 
participants should finish the fast with a feeling of mercy. As William Struther 
explained, as the fast ‘beginneth in sorrow for our felt miseries, so it end in 
ioy,’.24 
 
19 Knox, Repentance, B6r. 
20 FBD, VII; Knox, Repentance, B6v. 
21 John Knox, The Ordour and Doctrine of the Generall Faste (Edinburgh, 1566), E7r-E8v. 
22 William Struther, Scotlands Warning, or a Treatise of Fasting (Edinburgh, 1628), 61-62; 1 
Kings 21:27; Nehemiah 9:1; Jonah 3:5-9. 
23 Knox, Fast, F2v. 
24 Struther, Warning, 76. 
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 The language of emotion in these penitential rituals – an implicit 
narrative structure of repentance and conversion – was explained by 
ministers in their sermons. A fine example is an exhortation delivered by 
Robert Bruce at the public repentance of Francis Stewart (c.1562-1612), the 
Earl of Bothwell.25 Bruce attempted to define the vocabulary associated with 
repentance for the benefit of Stewart and the congregation. He began with 
‘worldly sorrow’.26 This he called a ‘blind terror, vexation, and anxiety of 
conscience’. He labelled it blind because the person who experiences worldly 
sorrow lacks hope that they can escape it, as they do not recognise that their 
emotional torment comes from God for the sin they have committed. Thus, it 
manifests in suicidal ‘desperation’, the subject tempted to ‘put hands in 
themselves’ – to purposefully self-harm – in order to relieve their sorrows. 
However, such dread ‘changeth not the heart’ as it is a reaction to the ‘pain’ 
of feeling ‘the wrath of God’, an emotional ‘fire burning me up as stubble’, as 
a judgement on a subject’s sin.27 As soon as their ‘dolour and torment’ 
disappear, the subject returns to their sins.28 Consequently, Bruce taught his 
congregation that worldly sorrow is not repentance, but a deep anguish 
caused by the presence of a guilty conscience and the wrath of God. 
 Bruce then moved onto true repentance: ‘godly sorrow’.29 He called 
this emotion an ‘earnest sorrow, a true sorrow, not feigned or counterfeit’. 
Such sadness was not caused by the presence of emotional pain or torment. 
Rather, it arises because the subject had ‘offended so gracious a God’. It is a 
sorrow which is moved by the evilness of sin, not by the presence of God’s 
wrath for such sin. This godly dolour, Bruce argued, has a lasting impact 
upon the subject. It causes them to hate ‘that quhilk God hateth’.30 Godly 
sorrow moves a person to hate their sin and try to flee from their offences 
 
25 ODNB, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020. Other examples of 
sermons preached on repentance include: Boyd, Sermons, 175-187; Archibald Simson, A 
Sacred Septenarie (London, 1638); William Cowper, A Mirrour of Mercie or The 
Prodigals Conuersion (London, 1614). 
26 Bruce, Sermons, 356-357. See also Rollock, Effectual Calling, 204-207. 
27 Bruce, Sermons, 361. 
28 Bruce, Sermons, 357. 
29 Bruce, Sermons, 357-359. See also Rollock, Effectual Calling, 206, 208. 
30 Bruce, Sermons, 359-360. See also Rollock, Effectual Calling, 207. 
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against God. This hatred, Bruce explained, was the Holy Spirit’s work, 
weakening the ‘lusts and affections that are in me’ while also taking away ‘the 
strength and power of sin within me’. This was what Bruce called 
‘mortification’ or ‘contrition’, what in the liturgy for baptism the minister would 
define as ‘a resisting of the rebellious lusts of the flesh’.31 
 The second effect of godly sorrow, Bruce taught his congregation, was 
that it makes the subject ‘turn our hearts’ and ‘apply the mercy of God to 
ourselves’.32 This ‘turning’ presupposed a ‘feeling of mercy’. This was a 
‘feeling of his peace, a feeling of his sweetness’, whereby the anguish of a 
guilty conscience is ‘pacified’. The feeling of mercy set the heart at ease 
because it was a kind of confidence or assurance that God’s mercy applies in 
‘particular to myself’, what was examined in chapter two as the idea of faith 
pedalled by Scottish Protestant ministers.33 Only such a feeling, Bruce 
explained to his congregation, could turn the soul towards God, as the soul 
terrified by the feeling of God’s wrath would never dare to approach the 
divine for mercy. The ‘terrors of the conscience quieted’ by a ‘taste of his 
mercy’ convinces the soul it can turn to God, which in turn brings forth ‘joy’ 
and a ‘love towards him’. This love ‘endueth our hearts with new affections… 
and bringeth forth in us living motions, actions, and cogitations’ which ‘carry 
us to life everlasting’. The birth of this new love for God, identified in chapter 
two as that which brings God and soul into communion, was what Bruce 
called ‘vivification’ and ‘conversion’, or what the baptismal liturgy named a 
‘newnes of life’.34 
 Bruce’s preaching on repentance made explicit the emotional terms 
and narrative of conversion built into the language of penitential rituals. It 
 
31 The Forme of Prayers and Ministration of the Sacraments Used in the English church 
at Geneua (Edinburgh, 1564), 65. Though Rollock agreed that godly sorrow causes the 
subject to hate sin, he did not believe this was, strictly speaking, mortification, which he 
identified as a resistance to sin which emerges later in the process of regeneration. See 
Rollock, Effectual Calling, 207-208. 
32 Bruce, Sermons, 360-362. See also Rollock, Effectual Calling, 207-208. 
33 Chapter Two, 60-63.  
34 Forme, 65. Again, though Rollock agreed godly sorrow was the origin of conversion, he 
believed ‘vivification’ was a later stage in the process of regeneration. See Rollock, Effectual 
Calling, 204, 207-208. 
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begins with an act of sin. This arouses in the individual whose faculties are 
corrupted worldly sorrow, a fear of God’s judgements. By itself, this is not 
genuine repentance. Godly sorrow, a sorrow for sin, is also needed. This 
emotion breeds a hatred of sin and a desire for God’s mercy. The process is 
brought to a climax when an individual experiences a feeling of mercy. Love 
for God, or conversion, is born from the peace and tranquillity this passion 
births in the soul. Repentance and conversion, then, were considered a 
sequence of emotional changes that reconcile the alienated sinner with God. 
That participants were expected to display of sorrow for sin and a feeling of 
mercy indicates that the pilgrimage of the soul was a fundamental dimension 
of these corporate religious practices.35 In other words, the spiritual journey 
from misery to happiness was embedded in the linguistic-conceptual 
framework of penitential rituals: they told the story of conversion.36 
 The Lord’s Supper augmented the narrative structure of the spiritual 
journey presented in penitence rituals. The community prepared for the 
Sacrament by participation in a public fast.37 Hence they were expected to 
have undergone the sequence of emotions associated with conversion prior 
to the corporate religious practice. This meant that the Lord’s Supper was the 
climax of the spiritual journey: it was a ritualised form of communion with 
God. This idea was reflected in the language used in and about the 
ceremony. The Scots Confession (1560) established that in the Lord’s 
Supper the Christ is ‘joined with us’ by the ‘operatioun of the haly Ghaist, who 
by trew faith carryis us above al things that are visible, carnal, and earthly, 
and makes us feede upon the body and blude of Christ Jesus’.38 Through 
this ‘spiritual eating’, Christ ‘remaines in them’, the faithful, and ‘they in him’. 
This ‘communion’ was not mediated through the consumption of bread and 
wine transformed into the body and blood of Christ, but a spiritual eating 
 
35 The meaning of ‘display’ in this context is analysed in Chapter Five, 166-179. 
36 Yeoman, ‘Heart-work’, 177; Marilyn J. Westerkamp, Triumph of the Laity: Scots-Irish Piety 
and the Great Awakening, 1625-1760 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 34. 
37 Leigh Eric Schmidt, Holy Fairs: Scottish Communions and American Revivals in the Early 
Modern Period (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989),19; Westerkamp, Triumph of 
the Laity, 31. 
38 Scots Confession, 85. 
83 
 
which was conjoined with the physical intake of the elements.39 Ministers 
were expected to explain this to their congregations prior to participation in 
the ritual. Thus, the directions for the ceremony encourage the minister to 
declare that in the Sacrament a person can feed on the flesh and blood of 
Christ when the Spirit lifts ‘up our minds by faith above all things worldlies 
and sensible, and thereby to entre into heaven, that we may find and receive 
Christ, where he dwelleth’.40 Robert Bruce, whose sermons on the Lord’s 
Supper were widely read, argued that when in the ritual Christ was ‘in your 
soul’, the subject can ‘feel a blessed life’, as this conjunction is the ‘fountain 
of all your joy and felicity’.41 The minister had identified the communion with 
Christ that takes place in the Sacrament as the ‘perfection and blessedness’ 
of human nature which was analysed in chapter two.42 The language used in 
and about the Lord’s Supper, thus, positioned it as an experience of 
happiness.43 Put another way, holy communion was a ritual that had at its 
essence the narrative climax of the spiritual journey: communion with God. 
Thus, the linguistic-conceptual framework built into the Sacrament 
complemented the story of conversion embedded in the language of 
penitential ceremonies. 
 A language of emotion was built into corporate religious practices. 
Through public repentance, corporate fasting, the Lord’s Supper, and 
listening to sermons, congregations were taught this vocabulary of emotion 
and how to use these words and phrases. They were educated into this 
linguistic and conceptual framework by what they saw, heard, and 
experienced in liturgical action. Frequent participation in these rituals, in 
some instances more than once a week, repeated these multi-sensory 
 
39 Bruce, Lord’s Supper, 43-44, 77-79; Scots Confession XXI; Stephen Mark Holmes, Sacred 
Signs in Reformation Scotland: Interpreting Worship, 1488-1590 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 199-203; Mark W. Elliott, ‘Spiritual Theology in Bruce, Howie, Johnston, Boyd, 
and Leighton’ in The History of Scottish Theology, Volume I: Celtic Origins to Reformed 
Orthodoxy, eds. David Fergusson and Mark W. Elliott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2019), 211. 
40 Forme, 87-88. 
41 Bruce, Lord’s Supper, 90-91. 
42 Chapter Two, 50-57. 
43 Yeoman, ‘Heart-work’, 180-184. 
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lessons. It meant that Scots were regularly exposed in public worship to a 
stable and dominant language of emotion. This language was secure insofar 
as the vocabulary of emotion in religious ritual was subject to little, if any, 
change between 1590-1640. As Scots (except for the excommunicated) were 
required and forced to attend public worship, most people had to learn the 
language of emotion built into corporate religious practice. Ecclesial authority 
had managed to foster a shared awareness across Scotland, from the miller 
to the nobleman, about how to use this vocabulary to express and identify 
emotion in public worship. There was, thus, a largely unchanging reservoir of 
phrases and ideas that Scots could draw upon to name and categorise their 
emotions in the form of a spiritual journey. 
 Importantly, those who participated in corporate religious practices 
were expected to practice radical emotional reflexivity using the language of 
emotion they had learned. In public repentance, the minister was meant to 
teach that the hatred of sin, godly sorrow, and feeling of mercy the penitent 
was supposed to display – through their costume, choreography, posture, 
demeanour, and dialogue – was a resource from which the congregation 
could learn a vocabulary and grammar of emotion. He would tell his listeners 
that if ‘we considder his [the penitent’s] fall and sinne in him only, without 
having consideration of our selfes and of our owen corruption, we sall proffeit 
nothing’.44 Rather, taking ‘exemple of this our penitent brother’, the 
congregation was charged to ‘be unfeanedly displeased’ with their sin, ask 
God for ‘grace and mercy for your offences committed’, and to ‘satisfie the 
Church of God’ if they ever commit a public offence.45 Similarly, at the end of 
public fasting the minister petitioned the Holy Spirit to:  
worke into our stubburne heartes, an unfeaned dolour for our former 
offences, with some sense and fealing of thy grace and mercy, 
together with an earnest desyre of Justice and righteousness, in the 
which we are bound continually walk.46 
 
 
44 Knox, Repentance, B2r. 
45 Knox, Repentance, B5v. 
46 Knox, Fast, F4r. 
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As the minister had asked God to give the congregation these emotions, 
there was an implicit expectation that they would attempt to cultivate these 
passions in their ordinary lives. By extension, they would need to use the 
language and concepts used in public repentance and fasting to recognise 
when God had worked these emotions in their hearts. 
 Congregations were also expected to adapt the language of emotion 
used in sermons to their own experiences. Robert Bruce was clear that his 
analysis of repentance was for the benefit of the whole congregation. He 
explained that he had defined these terms not only so that Stewart could 
display his contrition with aplomb, but also that ‘every one of you that are in 
inferior ranks, that every one of you may confess your own sins’.47 He 
conveyed that the confession of sin, public or private, was the eruption of a 
vivified soul into the ‘praise of God’ for the mercy the Lord has showered on 
the sinner. A profession that one had experienced godly sorrow, mortification, 
a feeling of mercy, and vivification, glorifies God, as the ‘Spirit of Christ’ is the 
‘worker of true dolour and conversion’. Yet, because confession magnifies 
the mercy of God, it is opposed by Satan. The devil attempts to persuade the 
sinner that the confession of their sin is ‘inconvenient’ and the most ‘shameful 
turn that ever’ a person did. Determined to make sure that his congregation 
knew that through confession ‘God may be glorified’ and others may be 
‘moved through their [the penitent’s] example to do the like’, Bruce taught his 
congregation the meaning of the words they used about emotion in public 
repentance. Thus, through his sermon Bruce attempted to educate his 
listeners as to the meaning of the vocabulary of emotion they heard and used 
in public repentance, and thus enable them to use this language to confess 
their sins in private. He wanted his congregation to use the linguistic-
conceptual framework embedded in corporate repentance in their personal 
piety.  
 The most powerful and effective activity by which Scots engaged with 
the language of emotion in public worship was the practice of psalm singing. 
 
47 Bruce, Sermons, 362-363. 
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Listening to sermons and watching public repentance required concentration, 
while in public fasting and the Lord’s Supper the vocabulary of emotion was 
spoken by the minister about the congregation’s actions. By contrast, psalm 
singing was the main opportunity for the whole congregation to use the 
language of emotion built into corporate religious practice, with their own 
tongues. In a non-literate culture where people’s memories were 
exceptionally good, the singing of psalms, in the vernacular and by heart, 
was a widespread practice in Scotland by the seventeenth century.48 A 
significant factor which propelled the memorisation of the psalms was their 
musicality. Like many of his puritan counterparts in England and North 
America, the Presbyterian minister James Melville was fully aware of the 
power music had to unleash emotion.49 In a preface to a devotional guide 
written for his congregation, he explained that: 
the measures of poesie & harmonie of music… delytes the mind, and 
sa helps the memoire very meikle, to embrace and keip fast the 
matter, and stirres up and sets the force of the soules affectiones 
towards God.50 
 
Music’s power to evoke emotion could be abused, Melville concerned that his 
community were singing profane songs which served to ‘sop the saule in 
sinne and uncleannes, and steir up the corrupt and filthy affectiones’.51 
However, when the Word of God is sung to edifying tunes, it raises the soul 
to ‘atteine to that happines that is in the presence of his face’. Through this 
powerful joy, it is possible to leave ‘Christian doctrine imprinted in your 
memorie’, of which the Psalms are the ‘maist pretious treasure of instruction 
and comfort’ for the ‘saule and inward man’. Psalm singing, when joined with 
rapturous emotion, was the singing of faith: it taught the congregation how to 
use biblical language by empowering people to experience the meaning of 
 
48 McCallum, Reforming, 88-89; Timothy Duguid, Metrical Psalmody in Print and Practice: 
English 'singing Psalms' and Scottish 'psalm Buiks', c.1547-1640 (Farnham, Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2014). 
49 Melville, Propine, A2r-A4v; Glenda Goodman, ‘“The Tears I Shed at the Songs of Thy 
Church”: Seventeenth-Century Musical Piety in the English Atlantic World’ in Journal of the 
American Musicological Society, 65, no.3 (2012), 695, 702-703. 
50 Melville, Propine, A2v. 
51 Melville, Propine, A2r; Goodman, ‘Musical Piety’, 695, 707. 
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what they sang.52 Put another way, the sounds produced by psalm singing 
were the mode in which their subject matter was ‘effectively present in the 
subject’.53  
 When Scots sang the psalms communally, they voiced and 
experienced the Psalmists’s radical emotional reflexivity for themselves. This 
idea was best expressed by Mistress Rutherford, who at one time sang the 
Psalmists’s words ‘wishing in my heart to be as was there expressed’.54 That 
she desired to feel what she sang indicates that the assumed purpose of 
corporate psalm singing, at least in her view, was to know and experience 
what the language of emotion, embedded into the bible and public ritual, was 
meant to express about the singer’s emotionality. When this was achieved, a 
primary lesson the singing of psalms taught was that the significance of a 
feeling was determined by how that emotion changes one’s relationship with 
God. In the Scottish Psalter, Psalm 27 began ‘The Loard my licht an’ hailth 
will be, For quhat than suld I be dismayt’.55 Similarly, Psalm 42’s opening line 
was ‘Like at the hairt dis braith an’ bray, the wallsprings till obtain, sae dis my 
Saull desyre away wi’ Thee, Loard, tae remaine’.56 In these and other 
examples, the Psalmists identified the importance of their emotions insofar as 
they related to their fellowship with God. They claimed that their souls should 
not be sad because they have God; they recognise that they have an infinite 
and eternal desire that can only be satisfied by rest in God. In other words, 
they expressed in lyrical language that the goal of life was communion with 
God.  
 Psalm singing could also expand and enrich the lexicon of emotion 
Scots could use about the process of conversion. Penitential psalms could 
teach the language and experience of repentance. Psalm 51, frequently 
sung, opened as follows: 
  Lord consider my distresse,  
 
52 Watkins, Puritan Experience, 211. 
53 Rowan Williams, The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2014), 100. 
54 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 174. 
55 ‘Psalmes of David’ in Forme, 67. 
56 ‘Psalmes’ in Forme, 116. 
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  And now w[ith] speede some pitie take: 
  My sinnes deface, my fautes redresse,  
  Good Lord, for thy great mercies sake. 
  Washe me o Lord & make me cleane,  
  Fro[m] t[h]is unjust & sinful act,  
And purifie yet once againe my haynous crime  
and bloodie fact.57 
 
In this verse David, and thus the singer, identified their disobedience as an 
‘unjust and sinful act’. This called forth a two-pronged emotional response. 
The first is sorrow for the sin done, the sinner in ‘distresse’. The second was 
a desire for mercy, the penitent singer forced to petition God so that their sins 
would be purified for ‘mercies sake’. Thus, in this one verse the two 
emotional pillars of genuine repentance in public worship (godly sorrow and a 
hope of mercy) were expressed in poetic and musical form.58  
 Psalm singing also allowed Scots to use a richer language about the 
enjoyment of God. A good example is found in the first four verses of Psalm 
103, which was the recommended congregational response to the absolution 
of a penitent in public repentance. The text read: 
 My soule give laude unto the Lord, my sprit do the same: 
 And all the secretes of myne heart praise ye his holy name: 
 Give thankes to God for all his giftes, shewe not thy selfe unkinde: 
 And suffer not his benefites to slippe out of thy minde. 
 That gave thee pardone for thy fautes, and thee restorde againe: 
 For all they weake and fraile disease, and healde thee of thy paine. 
 That did redeme thy lyfe from death, from which thou couldst not flee: 
 His mercy and compassion both, he did extend to thee.59 
 
In these verses, the singer acknowledged that God had shown them mercy 
through the forgiveness of their sins. These mercies, experienced as the 
feeling of God’s mercy, should be remembered, and consequently move the 
subject to ‘laud’ and ‘praise’ God. The singing of this psalm in the context of 
public repentance, then, provided a richer language to express the feeling of 
mercy. In other words, psalm-singing provided a biblical vocabulary for the 
 
57 ‘Psalmes’ in Forme, 141-142. 
58 Bruce made this connection in a sermon at the public repentance of Francis Stewart. See 
Bruce, Sermons, 363. 
59 ‘Psalmes’ in Forme, 300-301. 
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articulation of experiences felt on the spiritual journey towards communion 
with God.  
 Some Scottish Protestants, like their puritan counterparts in England 
and North America, responded positively to the encouragements of ministers 
to use the language they had learned in public worship to categorise, and 
thus mobilise, their emotions in the form of a private spiritual journey. The 
same terms and phrases used in public worship to represent feelings 
appeared in the autobiographies, diaries, memoirs, confessions, dialogues, 
and poetry that some of the most zealous adherents to the faith produced. 
This was because corporate religious practice provided a shared frame of 
reference for author and reader, sometimes the same individual, which 
meant that feelings could be categorised using a vocabulary which both 
author and reader could understand due to their own participation in public 
worship. In other words, it made their emotions, and those of others, 
intelligible. By implication, the highly emotional literature those with an 
enthusiasm for their faith produced provides a partial insight into the linguistic 
and conceptual framework of emotion which the majority of Scots engaged 
with in corporate rituals. Such sources present how many of the most 
committed received, interpreted, and applied this language to their 
experiences. In so doing, they may indicate the ways in which the majority of 
Scots, to varying degrees, understood and engaged with the language of 
emotion built into corporate religious practices. Therefore, the causal 
connection between the language of emotion learned in public worship and 
the vocabulary of emotion used in private practice of radical emotional 
reflexivity means that the two should only be understood in tandem, analysis 
of one informing the interpretation of the other. Consequently, the chapter 
now turns to the language some of the more ardent Scottish Protestants 
used to name and identify their emotions in the form of a spiritual journey. 
 
2. The Six Stages of the Personal Spiritual Journey 
 The pilgrimage of the soul was not a uniform sequence of 
experiences. The narratives produced by fervent Scottish Protestants varied 
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in structure. It is reasonable to suppose that this was also the case more 
broadly among those who experienced the spiritual journey. This feature of 
Scottish Protestant emotionality was explored by William Struther, minister in 
Edinburgh. He argued that the experience of the soul’s pilgrimage was 
unique to each individual.60 He suggested that it could differ in duration: for 
some people short, like the conversion of the criminal on the cross next to 
Christ; while others required a longer preparation of their emotions for 
communion with God.61 In terms of content, some are but ‘lightly touched 
with griefe for sinne and feare of Wrath’. Perhaps Struther had in mind 
someone like Jean Kincaid née Livingston (d.1600) when he made this 
statement.62 Others - like a parishioner in Lanark named Bessie Clarkson 
(d.1625) – ‘are oppressed with the terrours of God, and in the way of Heaven 
are in a sort drawne through Hell’.63 Thus, some ‘scarccely taste anie Joy all 
their lifetime’, while others ‘passe over their days in some Joy, and in respect 
of the former have a constant prosperitie’. Beyond God’s secret will, Struther 
identified three factors that cause this emotional variation. First, the 
dispositions of the subject influence their experience of emotional change. 
 
60 William Struther, Christian Observations and Resolutions, II (Edinburgh, 1629) 204-210. 
61 An example of a spiritual journey which progressed in a short space of time (a couple of 
days) was that of Jean Kincaid’s. See, James Balfour, A Memorial of the Conversion of Jean 
Livingston, Lady Waristoun, with an Account of her Carriage at her Execution, July 1600, in 
Margaret Cunningham, Lady Magaret Cunninghame, Lady Waristoun, ed. C. K. Sharpe 
(Edinburgh, 1827). However, most spiritual pilgrimages took place over many years. 
Examples include, but are not limited to: William Cowper, The Life and Death of the 
Reverend Father, and Faithfull Servant of God, Mr William Cowper, Bishop of Galloway 
(London, 1619); James Mitchell of Dykes, Memoirs of the Life of James Mitchell of Dykes, in 
the Parish of Ardrossan. Containing, his own spiritual exercises, and some of the spiritual 
exercises of his two sons, that died before him, and many singular instances of divine 
providence, towards himself and family. Written by himself (Glasgow, 1759); David 
Calderwood, The History of the Kirk of Scotland, 8 vols. (Edinburgh, 1842-9), IV, 635-637; 
Archibald, Porteous The Spiritual Exercise of Soul and Blessed Departure of Dame Mary 
Rutherford Lady Hundaly, and Mary M’Konnel, Cousin to the said Lady; which fell out in the 
Year 1640; both died in London (Edinburgh, 1699); John Forbes of Corse, Diary, National 
Archives of Scotland, CH 12/18/6. 
62 In general, Kincaid’s journey was characterised by a feeling of mercy and communion with 
God. Only for a short time did she exhibit any behaviour which could be interpreted as 
worldly sorrow, and after her conversion she never experienced anything close to dread or 
despair. See Balfour, Conversion, II-VI. 
63 Bessie Clarkson’s experience was, for three years, characterised by terror, anguish, and 
near suicidal torment. She even claimed her emotional trauma was akin to being in hell. See 
William Livingston, The Conflict in the Conscience of a deare Christian, named Bessie 
Clarksone (Edinburgh, 1631). 
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Though God, through the spiritual journey, destroys the natural corruption of 
the faculties, God does not damage ‘his workmanship in us’, God tempers 
the transformation of the emotions in accord with the natural inclinations of 
the subject. Thus, a person predisposed to be continually grieved (a 
melancholic) like the Edinburgh lawyer and Presbyterian Archibald Johnston 
of Wariston (bap. 1611, d.1663), will most likely experience prolonged worldly 
sorrow and godly sorrow; while an optimist (a sanguinean) may pass mostly 
unscathed by these passions, such as minister John Livingston (1603-
1672).64 Second, the way a person behaves, their ‘conversation’, influences 
their emotional progression. If a person sins, they will be ‘aflicted in 
conscience’, as was Robert Bruce when he resisted his calling to the 
ministry.65 However, if they are obedient, Struther argued that they will have 
‘a joyfull heart’. Third, the instrument God uses to change the sinner has an 
impact. If the spiritual journey takes place in private, it may be a pleasanter 
experience than in public, where God wishes to use the transformation of the 
sinner as an example to others. Struther concluded his discussion when he 
reminded his reader that: 
it is a great presumption to tye Gods working to one manner… where 
wee see true Godlinesse and righteousness, there God had wrought 
in mercie, what ever bee the manner of his working.66 
 
The spiritual journey was not a rigid emotional sequence, but a pluriform 
experiential process. 
 However, the narratives zealous Scots produced shared a common 
linguistic-conceptual framework which made them recognisable as spiritual 
journeys. Despite their idiosyncratic differences, each text had a common 
core: the subject’s transition from misery to happiness, the state of nature to 
communion with God. Typically, the structure of these plots borrowed from a 
 
64 Archibald Johnston of Wariston, Diary 1632-1639, ed. G. M. Paul (Edinburgh: Scottish 
History Society, 1911); John Livingston, A Brief Historical Relation of the Life of Mr John 
Livingstone, Minister of the Gospel (Glasgow, 1754), 61; ODNB, https://www.oxforddnb.com. 
Date accessed 20/05/2020. For discussion on the effect humoural temperament was thought 
to have on a person’s emotional disposition, see Chapter One, 42-45. 
65 Calderwood, History, IV, 635-636. 
66 Struther, Observations, II, 209-210. 
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pattern of emotional shifts embedded in the language of public worship. The 
basic sequence of emotions can be schematised as: love for devotion, the 
apprehension of sin, legal terror, repentance, a feeling of mercy, and 
communion with God.67 Authors played with how the phases of the spiritual 
journey built into public worship (analysed above) applied to their subject’s 
experience.68 Occasionally, narratives did not mention a stage in the spiritual 
journey, changed the order in which they were experienced, or made them 
overlap. Nevertheless, all the extant material used the language and 
concepts of emotion associated with at least two of the phases of the 
schema. This meant that the plots of these sources constituted an emotional 
sequence which was characterised by a vocabulary of emotion used in public 
worship about the spiritual journey of the soul. Put another way, what united 
these texts was the conviction that their story of emotional change was best 
told using the language and concepts of the six stages that constitute the 
soul’s pilgrimage. 
 The conversion narrative of Mistress Rutherford has been chosen as a 
case-study because its narrative contains the six stages of the spiritual 
journey. As a result, it provides an invaluable resource for analysing the 
vocabulary and ideas associated with each phase of the soul’s pilgrimage. By 
extension, discussion of Rutherford’s story makes explicit the linguistic-
conceptual framework used in those texts that charted a person’s spiritual 
 
67 This classification of the spiritual journey has a degree of similarity with the essential 
framework of the ‘affective cycle of conversion’ Cohen has identified was laid out in the 
preaching of puritan ministers: knowledge of the law and gospel, a sight of sin, sorrow for 
sin, holy desperation, vocation or calling, empowerment and perseverance. It is also similar 
to the ‘dynamic of conversion’ he has discerned in lay accounts: conviction of sin, contrition, 
conversion, empowerment, assurance. Both this thesis’s scheme and those produced by 
Cohen attempt to examine how Reformed Protestants used language in their practice of 
radical emotional reflexivity in their respective contexts. To this end, they both utilise 
personal writings and the theology of ministers to identify what authors meant by their words. 
However, Protestant Scotland and puritan New England had different, albeit similar, linguistic 
conceptual frameworks built into their worship and piety. This may explain why Cohen’s 
schemes, given their respective source material, use different terminology to demarcate the 
stages of the conversion cycle than is used here. Moreover, it may explain why Cohen 
conceives of the sequence of emotions experienced by New English puritans in cyclical 
terms, while this thesis considers it more appropriate to ascribe a more linear structure to the 
spiritual journey of Scottish Protestants to reflect the linguistic shifts present within the extant 
source material they produced. See Cohen, God’s Caress, 21, 75-110, 202-212.  
68 Chapter Three, 75-89. 
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journey. Put another way, the narrative written by Rutherford reveals most of 
the common language built into the Scottish Protestant practice of radical 
emotional reflexivity. 
 
a. Love for Devotion 
 Rutherford presented the first phase of her narrative as her initial 
experiences of religious piety. She decided that her spiritual journey began 
when she prayed for the first time. At the age of ten her grandmother, whom 
she was living with, ‘took great pains in bringing [Rutherford] up in the fear of 
God’, to participate in private devotions twice a day. Rutherford was initially 
bewildered by the experience for she ‘knew not what it was to pray more than 
a beast’.69 This was because, it is implied, she had not formerly engaged in 
the frequent practice of religious exercises. This was a common experience 
for many children in early modern Scotland. The ecclesiastical authorities 
expected the guardians of children, usually the master of the household, to 
instruct children in the articles of faith, the Ten Commandments, how to pray, 
and in what righteousness consists.70 However, that ministers lamented the 
paucity of the spiritual education children received in the home is an 
indication that this was not done to a sufficiently high standard. Clergy like 
David Dickson decried the little attention many paid to the religious 
instruction of their children.71 It is plausible that in Rutherford’s case she had 
not, prior to living with her grandmother, been educated in the rudiments of 
religion, and as such it was only at the age of ten that she began to pray. 
 In the years following the start of Rutherford’s spiritual journey – the 
‘founding event’ of her story – her love for devotion intensified.72 At the age of 
 
69 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 152. 
70 The First Book of Discipline, ed. J. K. Cameron (Edinburgh, 1972), IX. 
71 David Dickson, Select Practical Writings (Edinburgh, 1845), 82. 
72 Kathleen Lynch has argued that puritan conversion narratives presupposed that the author 
had apprehended what Paul Ricoeur has called a ‘founding event’, that which begins a new 
era or calendar by which the self is mapped. Only once they had assurance that they had 
experienced some axiomatic moment would Protestants write spiritual autobiographies. 
Thus, in Lynch’s view, the creation of a conversion narrative assumed the subject had been 
converted. See Lynch, Protestant Autobiography, 14-15; Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 




eleven she had her first experience of communion with God. One Sabbath 
night, while the rest of her family played in the fields, Rutherford was in her 
room, on her knees, praying to God. She had barely spoken three words 
before she was, in her words, ‘ravished and taken up with joy that I cannot 
express, so that at that time I may say I tasted the powers of the world to 
come’.73 Her claim that the intense joy encountered in her prayer was the 
subjective dimension of the next world’s powers implied that she identified 
her religious ecstasy as her first experience of communion with God.74 
Though the experience was only temporary, it left a mark on Rutherford’s 
soul. She no longer swore, and she began to love the godly community, 
especially zealous ministers.75 Between eleven and fifteen, Rutherford 
gradually became acclimatised to the practice of prayer, taking ‘great delight’ 
and ‘sweetness’ in the service of God. She found that in her devotions it 
‘pleased the Lord to blow upon me with his Spirit’ so that she experienced 
‘great contentment’. She also began to enjoy listening to sermons and, after 
reading Isaiah 58, resolved to spend the Sabbath in prayer, bible study, and 
meditation.76 Thus, Rutherford identified that between the ages of ten to 
fifteen, she had travelled from little more than a beast who did not understand 
how to pray, to someone who enjoyed communion with God in prayer, 
delighted in the Word preached and read, loved the community of God’s 
people, and practiced behaviour -  such as abstinence from swearing and 
playing on the Sabbath - which was obedient to God’s will.77 
 Rutherford’s characterisation of her initial steps in her spiritual journey 
drew on a socially learned conception of how the pilgrimage of the soul 
begins. This idea was clearly articulated by the Aberdeen Episcopalian 
Robert Baron (c.1596-1639) in a sermon delivered on the death of one of his 
students named William Michel (d.1634).78 In an effort to comfort the boy’s 
 
73 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 153. 
74 Chapter Four, 150-156. 
75 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 153. 
76 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 157. 
77 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion’, 153-158. 
78 Robert Baron, Epitaphs upon the Untymelie Death of that Hopefull, Learned, and Religious 
youth, Mr William Michel (Aberdeen, 1634), F1r-F2v; ODNB, https://www.oxforddnb.com. 
Date accessed 20/05/2020. 
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grieving parents, Baron outlined Michel’s spiritual journey so that they could 
be assured he was in heaven. He argued that when Michel was a boy God 
had ‘possessed his heart, making him to finde heavenlie delight, in all 
spirituall exercyses’.  He was known to have frequently participated in 
religious exercises, which was considered by his godly friends as an edifying 
example for the community. Baron claimed the boy ‘found nothing, then, but 
sweetnesse, and delight, and heavenlie ravishmentes in serving of God’. This 
was, Baron explained, the ordinary way in which the spiritual journey should 
begin. He outlined that God first makes those he ‘hath converted’ to ‘finde 
heavenlie delight and joye’, so that the soul ‘may be the more enamoured 
with it [religious devotion], and that hee may the more easily with-drawe his 
heart from those carnall pleasures, with which before his conversion he was 
enamoured’. This effect of love for devotion can be seen in Rutherford’s 
spiritual progression: she played less on Sundays and resisted the urge to 
swear. Thus the first phase of the spiritual journey, as presented by Baron, 
was a growth in love and enjoyment of religious exercises. In other words, 
this stage of the spiritual journey was a period when change began, not only 
in the inclinations of the appetite but also, by extension, in the judgements of 
the faculties.  
 Love for devotion acquainted a subject with instruments which would 
enable them to apprehend their sins. Through religious exercises, particularly 
the reading and hearing of the Word, the idolatry endemic to the human heart 
could be identified by the sinner: the second stage of the spiritual journey. It 
provided the tools which could shine a light on the soul’s wickedness. Hence, 
love of devotion provided a context from which the necessary emotional 
changes for the cultivation of faith and love in the soul could be achieved. 
 
b. The Apprehension of Sin 
 Rutherford’s love for devotion was interrupted by her experiences of 
temptation and sin. She encountered three primary challenges to her love of 
piety: Sabbath breaking, suicidal inclinations, and atheistic doubts. As 
mentioned above, after reading Isaiah 58 Rutherford was convinced that she 
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should spend the Sabbath exclusively in prayer, bible study, and 
meditation.79 Her arrival at this conclusion was consistent with the 
perspective on the Sabbath she would have been taught by the ecclesiastical 
authorities in her community. Reformed divines argued that one should 
observe religious ordinances in private and public on a Sunday as a form of 
proper obedience to the Fourth Commandment.80 This belief is what 
Rutherford had internalised after her engagement with Isaiah 58. However, 
she regularly failed to live up to this ideal. Rutherford identified, through her 
practice of radical emotional reflexivity, that she frequently acquiesced to her 
sister’s encouragements to play in the fields on the Sabbath.81 Another time, 
Rutherford decided to ‘bide’ (not attend) church because she thought that 
she ‘got more good’ from private devotion than through listening to 
sermons.82 Later, she abandoned altogether religious exercises on the 
Sabbath. Instead, she prioritised household tasks, such as going to get milk, 
travelling to buy a ribbon, or picking berries.83 Rutherford identified that each 
time she broke the Sabbath, she experienced weariness and guilt, her 
‘conscience’ checking the decisions she made to go against what she knew 
was the will of God.84 
 Rutherford also identified suicidal thoughts and feelings as 
disturbances in her love for devotion. She judged that she was ‘tempted’ to 
put what she called ‘violent hands’ ‘into’ herself, and that this experience was 
frequent.85 The feelings these desires aroused in Rutherford were 
categorised as a form of fear, evoked by the possibility that she would injure 
or kill herself, and by so doing be damned to hell. Rutherford determined that 
she had used a variety of strategies to fight these urges. She sent up 
petitions to God for deliverance, but she attained no relief. She felt 
completely ‘deserted’ by God.86 Reason was her next port of call. Rutherford 
 
79 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 157. 
80 Mullan, Narratives, 171-172. 
81 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 157-158. 
82 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 158. 
83 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 160-161. 
84 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 160.  
85 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 155. 
86 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 156. 
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tried to persuade herself that suicide would lead to her damnation, and thus 
she should not do it. This line of attack drew on the common belief that 
suicide was an act which indicated the reprobation of the person who had 
died.87 In desperation, she even turned to a fortune teller, who told 
Rutherford she would live a long life, which did provide her with a modicum of 
peace. However, the temptation reemerged, so much so that Rutherford had 
to hide her knives out of ‘fear’ she would end her life.88 Relief eventually 
came: the temptations vanished, and Rutherford judged that she was not 
afflicted by these temptations ever again.89 
 Doubt, specifically about the existence of God, was a third 
phenomenon Rutherford identified as a disruption of her love for devotion. 
She associated the origin of doubt with her neglect of prayer, bible study, and 
religious exercises, as she mentioned these directly before her discussion of 
her atheism. Listening to a sermon while in this state of perceived spiritual 
laxity, a doubt ‘was casten in her mind that ther was not a God’.90 The idea 
‘molested’ her, so that she was in a state of perpetual anxiety. She judged 
that it was the ‘enimie’, Satan, who had planted this evil thought in her mind. 
Every time she petitioned God for a persuasion that God exists, she found, in 
her evaluation, the devil taunting her, inquiring in a mocking tone: ‘Quhat is 
thou doing? Thou is praying to God; there is no God’.91 Initially, this doubt 
afflicted Rutherford for, in her view, about eight days. However, it resurfaced 
with vengeance. She implied its reemergence was connected to her Sabbath 
breaking, as this was what directly preceded her scepticism. These fresh 
doubts terrified Rutherford. She was concerned that if she believed there was 
no God when she died, she would be sent to hell.92 Rutherford connected her 
anguish with her loss of appetite. Though in prayer she occasionally found 
relief, her situation continued to escalate.93 Afraid she would doubt the 
 
87 Mullan, Narratives, 261-264. 
88 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 156. 
89 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 156-157. 
90 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 154. 
91 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 155. 
92 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 160. 
93 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 161-162. 
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existence of God while at prayer and engaged in study of the bible, she no 
longer practiced religious exercises. This, she judged, precipitated new 
doubts: Rutherford was tempted to believe the scriptures were not the Word 
of God and that the soul did not exist after death. Aware that what she was 
inclined to doubt what she ought to profess wholeheartedly, as taught by the 
ecclesiastical authorities, her stress increased to the point that she nearly 
fainted. However, she concluded that at that moment, when all hope was 
lost, ‘it pleased the Lord to remove them from me immediately and cleared 
me of it’.94 
 The temptations Rutherford encountered were not unique to her. In 
their own practice of radical emotional reflexivity other Scots judged that they 
had also faced suicidal temptations and doubts. A contemporary example of 
Rutherford’s was that of Lady Hundaly, Mary Rutherford (d.1640). Archibald 
Porteous (fl.1640), the man who wrote an account of a dialogue the two had, 
conveyed to his readers that she identified that she was tempted by the devil 
to self-harm.95 Moreover, Mistress Rutherford’s scepticism was a common 
experience. James Mitchell of Dykes (fl.1619-1646), like Rutherford, doubted 
the existence of God, which he associated with a decline in his religious 
devotion.96 More commonly, Protestants in Scotland and elsewhere were 
moved to question the veracity of biblical promises.97 On the 25th August 
1624, John Forbes of Corse (1593-1648) judged that he was ‘overwhelmed’ 
and ‘greatly troubled’ by a ‘dangerous tentation concerning the divine true of 
the scriptures’.98 William Cowper was afflicted with a lack of certainty in the 
Word.99 Rutherford’s doubts about the immortality of the soul were also 
common experiences for Reformed Protestants in Britain.100 An example is 
that of Dykes, who questioned whether there was ‘another life’, which like 
 
94 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 162; Chapter Five, 200-202. 
95 Porteous, Exercise, 16-17. 
96 Dykes, Memoirs, 14-15. 
97 Alec Ryrie, Unbelievers: An Emotional History of Doubt (London: William Collins, 2019), 
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Rutherford he connected with his lack of participation in religious 
exercises.101  
 Mischief on the Sabbath, suicidal thoughts, and atheistic doubts were 
all experiences Rutherford identified as sinful emotions. She believed that 
they were wrong, given her socially learned concepts of what was right. That 
is, they were judged by Rutherford, in her practice of radical emotional 
reflexivity, as emotions which obstructed her spiritual journey. They stunted, 
and even reversed, her love of devotion, and consequently her transition 
from idolatry to communion with God. She implied that this was her 
assessment by the way she named her emotions and responses to these 
experiences. She communicated that she felt guilty for breaking the Sabbath; 
she was afraid she would be damned for her suicidal and atheistic 
inclinations; she asked God to remove her temptations and tried as hard as 
she could to escape them. Occasionally, Rutherford recorded that in these 
trials she remembered her former love for devotion fondly, and was ashamed 
that her actions, thoughts, and feelings had led her so far astray.102 Thus, 
these experiences were not presented by Rutherford in a positive manner. 
She did not deviate from her initial judgement that these were evil, except 
only to further reinforce the fact that they had a Satanic origin. Rather, she 
identified her Sabbath breaking, suicidal desires, and atheistic beliefs as 
examples of sin, something that should be avoided and fought in the spiritual 
journey from misery to happiness. In this way, she not only identified what 
kinds of thing she had experienced (Sabbath breaking, suicidal desires, 
atheistic doubts) but also their significance in her soul’s pilgrimage. 
 To understand why Rutherford would identify these aspects of her 
history as a form of sin, it would be useful to analyse the conception of sin 
embedded in the Scottish Protestant linguistic-conceptual framework. Robert 
Rollock provided the clearest examination of this category.103 There are, he 
argued, four types of sin. The first two are ‘internal’, a kind of emotion, while 
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the latter two are ‘external’, embodied actions. Both the internal and external 
sins can be divided into those of ‘omission’ and those of ‘comission’. The 
internal sin of omission, Rollock claimed, was the lack ‘of a good motion’ of 
the soul, which proceeds from a lack of ‘original justice’ – original sin. This is 
joined with the internal sin of commission, which is a ‘perverse and evil 
motion’ of the soul. Rollock identified these internal sins as ‘affections or 
motions’: they were passions. Thus, the idea of internal sins of omission and 
commission was built upon the theory of emotion that Scottish Protestants 
presupposed (outlined in chapter one) and their assumption that the 
psychological faculties are corrupted (analysed in chapter two).104 Rutherford 
implicitly identified her suicidal inclinations as internal sins of commission, 
given that they constituted an evil desire which would lead to eternal misery. 
Likewise, she categorised her doubts about the existence of God as internal 
sins of omission, as they were a lack of faith in and love for God, the 
instruments of happiness. The internal sins cause, Rollock argued, external 
sin: actions of the body. External sins of omission are sins committed when 
what ought to be done is not done, which proceed from the internal sin of 
omission. The external sins of commission, which are motivated by the 
internal sins of commission, are twofold: those violations of God’s law which 
are done in negligence, and those done with the knowledge that they are 
wrong. Rutherford tacitly judged her Sabbath breaking and neglect of her 
devotions as both an external sin of omission, a failure to render to God what 
is God’s due, and a sin of commission, as she knew that she had violated the 
Fourth Commandment. 
 Rutherford judged that her suicidal and atheistic experiences (internal 
sins of omission and commission) were caused by Satan. She claimed that 
Satan planted in her mind the thought that ‘ther was not a God’.105 Rutherford 
interpreted her resistance to this temptation as a combat with Satan in her 
soul, the devil usually victorious in the fight.106 Moreover, Rutherford 
 
104 Chapter One, 18-47; Chapter Two, 67-72. 
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identified her suicidal thoughts and feelings as the work of Satan. Though at 
the time she interpreted her suicidal inclinations as a product of a ‘naturall 
desert in the blood’, when she created her narrative she had concluded that 
her emotions were in fact caused by ‘Satan’.107 It was widely assumed in 
Reformed Protestant circles that it was Satan who lured people to self-harm 
and die by suicide, which rationalises why Rutherford changed her 
judgement (analysed more fully in chapter five).108 
 The idea that Satan could cause internal sins of omission and 
commission was a feature of the linguistic-conceptual framework of the 
spiritual journey that explains why Rutherford could identify her sinful 
emotions as his work. Presbyterian minister Robert Bruce warned his 
congregation that ‘the devil hath spued into our hearts’ the ‘deceit and false 
pleasure of sin’. He encouraged his listeners to always ‘examine your 
affections’, for ‘the devil is in them’.109 Bishop William Cowper reflected that 
his doubts, fears, and sins were ‘not so much actions done by mee’, but are 
‘spirituall oppressions of mine enemie’, motions ‘making invasion upon my 
soule’.110 ‘God worketh no more mightily in the elect, than Sathan doth in the 
reprobate’, declared William Struther, while David Dickson cautioned his 
congregation to ‘suffer not Satan so to blind your mind’.111 Similar views of 
Satan’s agency were also espoused by contemporaneous English 
protestants.112 Brock has called this identification of negative emotions as the 
product of Satan’s activity within the soul by Scottish Protestants 
‘internalization of the demonic’.113 Her analysis of this idea will be examined 
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more fully in chapter four.114 For the present purpose, what matters is that 
Protestants in Scotland identified Satan as an actor ‘actually within men and 
women’, the cause of their internal, and by extension external, sins.115 The 
devil played the role of the formal object that moves the appetites. This claim 
was plausible from the Scottish Protestant perspective because of the 
emotional logic they presupposed (analysed in chapter one) which 
demanded that an external agent, which enters the subject’s consciousness, 
moves the sensitive appetite.116 This process, whereby the supernatural 
effects and resides inside the soul, will be explored further in the next 
chapter.117 
 Rutherford’s sins overlapped and subsumed her love of devotion. This 
was because the first phase of her spiritual journey was a growth in 
enjoyment of religious exercises rather than of God. This is why the person in 
this stage could easily be overwhelmed by their experience of sin. While it 
marked a change of the subject’s appetites, insofar as they were moved to 
love good things, it had not ascertained an absolute desire for God. Rather, it 
was moved to love piety. While prayer, bible study, meditation, listening to 
sermons, and right behaviour could all be instruments which facilitated 
communion with God, they were not themselves fellowship with God. They 
were finite, temporal creatures created by God. An absolute love for devotion 
was still both a state of misery and idolatry. It was a form of emotion 
produced by the corruption of the faculties, as it was not an unqualified love 
or enjoyment of God. Thus, love of devotion, as a finite and temporal reality, 
could not satisfy the illimited desire of the soul (as analysed in chapter 
two).118 Unable to provide permanent rest, the appetite wandered back to its 
love of that which it should not have desired unconditionally, which produces 
internal sins of omission and commission. This can be seen in Rutherford’s 
temptations: she desired to return to her Sabbath breaking; she was inclined 
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to reject the joy she had and die; she was even tempted to deny that there 
was in fact a God, and consequently to abandon her piety. Mere love of 
devotion, hence, allowed sin to flourish because, at its core, it was a form of 
sin, and as such was unable to satisfy the absolute love of the soul.  
 Simultaneously, Rutherford’s engagement in religious exercises made 
her aware that her emotions and actions were sinful.119 Prayer, bible reading, 
and listening to sermons taught her to differentiate godliness and idolatry. As 
a consequence, she learned to perceive that she was a sinner. For example, 
it was through reading Isaiah 58 that Rutherford learned that Sabbath 
breaking was a sin, which meant that when she did violate the Fourth 
Commandment she recognised that what she had done was wrong.120 
Crucially, Rutherford had committed sin before this stage in the spiritual 
journey due to the effects of original sin on her faculties. What mattered here 
was that she had become aware of her wrongdoing through her love for 
devotion. Thus, though she had sinned before and would do so again, a 
participation in religious exercises taught Rutherford to apprehend her sins, a 
decisive stage in the spiritual journey. 
 
c. Legal Terror 
 The third phase of Rutherford’s spiritual journey can be identified with 
when she underwent ‘the exercise of conscience and had legal terror’.121 
While in the previous phase Rutherford had become aware of the fact that in 
some instances she had sinned, in this stage she understood the extent of 
the sin in her life and the consequences she faced for her wrongdoing. 
Through reflection upon her childhood, Rutherford judged that she had 
sinned through her unruly passions, her neglect of the Sabbath, her ‘worldly’ 
thoughts, the lack of feeling she experienced in prayer, and that she had 
received the Lord’s Supper unworthily. For these sins, Rutherford concluded 
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that ‘wrath and damnation’ were her lot, as she had offended God. 
Identification of her sins as an insult to God which deserved an eternity in hell 
stimulated, in Rutherford’s judgement at the time of writing, a ‘torment as is 
inexpressible’ in her former self.122 Even when, in time, the ‘fear of hell left’ 
Rutherford, she judged that she was in a state of despair for ‘the offence I 
had done to God’.123 It meant that she did not pray, as she was too afraid and 
ashamed to seek help from God. Rutherford’s legal terror, thus, was 
presented by her as an experience of intense dread and despair evoked by a 
recognition she had sinned and consequently was a reprobate. 
 Rutherford’s presentation of her experience as a fear and sorrow 
motivated by an awareness of one’s own depravity was a categorisation of 
her emotions which drew upon the ideas of ‘law-work’ and ‘legal terror’, which 
was conveyed to her by ‘legal preaching’.124 This idea was set forth with 
clarity by Robert Rollock in the form of a ‘legal syllogism’. First, the subject is 
made, through the activity of the Holy Spirit, to believe that everyone is 
damned who does not fulfil the God’s law in its entirety. Second, the Spirit 
persuades the subject that they have not perfectly obeyed God’s Law. 
Consequently, they believe that they are damned.125 Analysis of each step in 
the argument will elucidate the experience and language of law-work as 
presented in narratives of the spiritual journey. 
 The first premise, that all who disobey God are damned, drew upon 
the Scottish Protestant conception of the covenant of works, also called a 
legal or natural covenant. Rollock argued that the covenant of works was a 
promise made by God to Adam in the Garden of Eden prior to the Fall. God 
stipulated that if Adam and his posterity performed good works, then they 
would receive eternal life – communion with God. However, if they failed in 
this, sinners would receive their just reward: eternal punishment. Thus, the 
covenant of works was bilateral. It constituted a contract between God and 
humanity, in which God offers eternal life to the one who satisfies the 
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obligation to perform good works.126 As this covenant was offered to all 
humanity, it was not an optional bargain: all people were born into this 
relationship with God. Hence, it could be called the ‘natural’ covenant.127   
 Fulfilment of the covenant’s condition, Rollock argued, required 
‘perfect obedience to his law’. By one’s natural capacities one was expected 
to be obedient to the will of God, which was later put into concrete form in the 
Ten Commandments – ‘the law’. Reformed Protestants believed that the 
stipulations of the law applied not only to external behaviour, but also the 
inner life. John Dod’s (1550-1645) popular exegesis of the Ten 
Commandments, read and used by Scottish Protestants like Archibald 
Johnston of Wariston, made this point.128 When he analysed the 
commandment against adultery, Dod interpreted the injunction to prohibit not 
only certain kinds of sexual act, but also wrongful desires and lusts.129 
Similarly, Dod extended the command against theft as a prohibition against 
the desire to steal.130 Dod’s approach was not novel: it followed Jesus’s 
reinterpretation of what constitutes adultery and murder in the Sermon on the 
Mount.131 The law understood in this way entailed that absolute moral 
perfection in thought, emotion, and action was necessary to fulfil the 
covenant of works.132 This demand cultivated a culture of exactness in 
Reformed Protestantism, an incessant demand for perfection: what has been 
called the ‘nomist dimension’ (by Jerald Brauer), the ‘precisianist strand’ (by 
Theodore Bozeman) and the ‘voluntarist’ aspect (by Peter Lake) of puritan 
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piety in English and North American contexts.133 This emphasis in Scottish 
Protestantism will be explored more fully in chapter five.134 For the present 
purposes, what is important is that for many Reformed Protestants the 
fulfilment of the law, in the covenant of works, required (but was not limited 
too) emotional perfection. 
 The second premise of the legal syllogism, that the subject has not 
perfectly obeyed God’s law, required the subject to identify past thoughts, 
emotions, and actions as sins. It was facilitated by engagement in radical 
emotional reflexivity, through which the subject compared their performance 
with God’s law and concluded that they had disobeyed. Theological treatises, 
like Dod’s exegesis on the Ten Commandments, were used by Scottish 
Protestants to facilitate this process, as they provided a clear exposition of 
what constituted sin.135 This evaluative process, which will be analysed more 
fully in chapter five as a mobilising practice, was expected to produce the 
result that the subject recognised they had failed their part in the covenant of 
works.136 In chapter two, it was argued that Protestants in Scotland believed 
that original sin had left human nature totally depraved, so that it consistently 
committed internal and external sins of omission and commission.137 As sin 
was considered a violation of God’s law, it meant that humanity was 
predisposed, by the Fall, to constantly think, feel, and act in ways which 
disobeyed God’s will. Thus the inner logic of the theological scheme that 
Scottish Protestants were socially taught entailed that no one could fulfil the 
condition of the covenant of works.138 Hence comparison of one’s 
performance with the law should, as Rollock argued, lead to an identification 
of sin, and as such of imperfect obedience to the will of God.139 Taken to its 
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logical extreme, the process should produce the result that the subject has 
never obeyed God, as all their thoughts, feelings, and actions are evil due to 
their orientation towards idolatrous ends.  
 The syllogism was complete when the subject believed and felt that, 
because of their disobedience, they were damned. They experienced this 
conclusion in the emotion of worldly sorrow (discussed earlier in this 
chapter).140 What matters here is that legal terror was a kind of emotional 
knowledge. The nature of such knowing was defined by Robert Blair. It is not 
a ‘brain, frothy, foamy knowledge’. Instead, it is ‘true and spiritual knowledge’ 
which is ‘affectionate and practical’.141 Yeoman has coined this ‘heart-work’ 
or ‘heart-knowledge’, a kind of understanding which involves emotional 
change.142 It has also been characterised by Lake as the translation of 
objective doctrine into subjective experience.143 In the vocabulary used by 
Scottish Protestants, analysed in chapter one, heart-knowledge differed from 
brain-knowledge insofar as the latter involved and evaluation of the intention 
of the known object in relation to the subject, which moved the appetite in the 
appropriate way.144 In the case of worldly sorrow, the subject does not merely 
understand that they are damned in a disinterested manner. In the language 
Scottish Protestants would have used, the understanding and will judged that 
damnation was not good for the subject and, if the appetite were moved 
rightly, they would experience passions appropriate to these judgements: 
fear and despair. Heart-knowledge, thus, was a passion which indicated the 
subject had correctly judged the significance of what a doctrine described in 
relation to their own wellbeing, manifested in a person’s consequent 
psychosomatic experience. Hence, legal terror was considered a passion 
that was moved by a correct judgement by the rational cognition and volition, 
and thus was a kind of heart-knowledge.  
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 Therefore, when Rutherford conveyed that she had experienced legal 
terror in the third act of her soul’s journey, she told her reader that she had 
experiences of dread and despair caused by her engagement with the legal 
syllogism. She had tested her prior thoughts, emotions, and actions against 
the perfect obedience that the covenant of works required and recognised 
that she had come up short. She had concluded that she was damned, and 
this aroused, in her judgement at the time of writing, terrible fear and 
anguish. This was a form of heart-knowledge, an emotion which was 
motivated by a proper judgement of what the reality of sin meant for her 
eternal future. As she judged these features of law-work matched her 
experience, Rutherford identified these experiences as an example of legal 
terror. 
 Scottish Protestants considered law-work an important stage in the 
spiritual journey towards happiness because they believed it prepared the 
subject to have faith. They assumed that, because of the soul’s propensity to 
love absolutely what is not God (explored in chapter two), their faculties 
required reformation to facilitate communion with God.145 Consequently, 
ministers like Samuel Rutherford reaffirmed this point when he argued that 
what is needed is for Christ to ‘give you a Vomite-Drink, that you may grow 
Wholseome and Hungry again for Christ’.146 Similarly, David Dickson 
compared the preparation of the sinner to ‘the drying of timber to make it 
sooner take fire, when it is casten into it’.147 Law-work was the vomit-drink 
and the drying of timber in these metaphors. It persuaded the subject that 
what they loved most was not worth their unconditional desire, as its 
consequence was eternal damnation. Like the vomit-drink mentioned by 
Rutherford, law-work could lead to the expulsion of idolatry, which would 
provide an opportunity for the appetite to find its rest in some other object. 
Legal terror, thus, was a stage where the subject’s absolute love for idols 
was weakened through the exposure to where such worship leads – hell – 
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which prepared the soul for a new love to be placed within it. Hence, a 
fundamental goal of Scottish Protestants ministers was to stimulate worldly 
sorrow in their congregations through their preaching.148 As an important way 
of mobilising emotion, this will be analysed further in chapter five.149  
 
d. Repentance 
 Rutherford’s worldly sorrow was alleviated by her experience of a 
hope of mercy and godly sorrow.150 Both emotions were expected of 
participants in penitential rituals, as they were considered the emotional 
dimension of sincere repentance (as explored earlier in the chapter).151 
Rutherford’s hope emerged when she got ‘liberty to read’ Hezekiah’s 
sickness.152 Through this text, ‘the Lord was pleased to work some hope of 
mercy in me’. ‘Hope’, as analysed in chapter one, was considered an 
inclination towards a good object which was not present and difficult to 
obtain.153 In Rutherford’s case, the formal object of her hope was God’s 
mercy. Whereas before she was in a state of despair, defined as a 
resignation that the good formal object is impossible to obtain, now she 
believed that she could get mercy. Her hope meant that while before she had 
believed God’s mercy was something she could never get, and thus would be 
futile to desire, now she could have it, as there was a chance she could 
receive it. 
 Emboldened with a hope of mercy, Rutherford was then moved to 
godly sorrow. She ‘was led to mourn for sin in generall’, sometimes ‘in great 
bitternes for offending a mercifull and loving God’.154 She judged that 
occasionally she had a ‘fear of reprobation’, but never a ‘fear of hell’. Instead, 
Rutherford had an ‘exceeding longing for Christ on any condition, and it had 
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been to have endured all the torture of the damned’.155 Her language 
corresponded to the socially learned emotion type of godly sorrow, which 
Robert Bruce (as discussed above) defined as a sorrow ‘for God’s own 
cause’ and by Robert Rollock as ‘sorrow for sinne itselfe’.156 Put another way, 
Rutherford was aggrieved not by the consequence of her sin – damnation – 
but by an apprehension that she had wronged the God ‘who was so loving, 
so merciful, and had such pity and compassion upon’ sinners.157 Thus she 
had repented of and hated her sin. Having experienced mortification, she 
was ready to undergo vivification.158  
 
e. A Feeling of Mercy 
 Predisposed to believe God’s mercy was in reach and that God is the 
supreme good of human nature, Rutherford was ready to receive the gift of 
faith. This happened, she identified, at the Lord’s Supper in the West Kirk, 
Edinburgh. Rutherford judged that when she attended the table, she ‘gat 
bleeding Christ apprehended, and his merit applyed for pardon’.159 
Rutherford’s interpretation of her acquisition of faith relied upon what Robert 
Rollock called the ‘evangelicall syllogisme’ (mentioned briefly in chapter 
two).160 First, the subject holds that whoever has faith is justified. Rollock, like 
many Scottish Protestants, believed that after the Fall, God made a new 
covenant with Adam which provided the only feasible route for fallen 
humanity to acquire communion with God. This covenant of grace, the 
gospel, was a promise that if the subject had faith in Christ, they would be 
forgiven of their sins, have Christ’s righteousness imputed to them, and have 
their emotions changed so that they could have happiness. Thus this 
covenant was considered both unilateral and bilateral. Communion with God 
is still conditional on human performance. However, unlike the covenant of 
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works, which can only be fulfilled by a human’s natural powers, in the 
covenant of grace the Holy Spirit creates effectual faith in the recipient of 
grace. Consequently, the covenant of grace is both a free offer of grace and 
conditional upon the performance of faith.161  
 The second step in the evangelical syllogism is that the subject 
believes they have faith. As analysed in chapter two, Scottish Protestants 
believed that faith was a double judgement of the understanding and will that 
God’s mercy in the person and work of Jesus Christ is true and good for the 
subject.162 It is, then, a persuasion that the gospel is both trustworthy and 
applies specifically to the subject. It is Christ and his benefits as applied to 
the self. Thus, when Rutherford judged that she had ‘gat’ Christ and mercy 
‘applyed’ for the forgiveness of her sins, she conveyed to the reader that this 
was an experience of faith. 
 Finally, the subject who has identified they have faith can conclude 
they are justified. This is exactly what Rutherford did when she argued that 
through this apprehension of Christ she had become a recipient of 
‘justification’. This she experienced as ‘inexpressible joy’, and she felt ‘eased 
and joyfull’ for the rest of the day. Such an emotional response was called by 
Robert Bruce ‘a feeling of mercy’, essential for admittance to the ritual of 
public repentance (as discussed earlier in this chapter).163 Put another way, 
the feeling of mercy was heart-knowledge, a rest of the appetite in Christ and 
his benefits, as presented in the gospel. It was more than an intellectual 
belief that God’s mercy saves. A feeling of mercy was the movement of the 
appetite to love and joy by the judgement that the gospel applied to the 
subject in particular. Thus Rutherford’s presentation of this experience was 
indicative of a change, at this stage in the narrative, in which concept she 
used to interpret her emotions: from the nomist dimension to what Brauer 
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called the ‘evangelical’ strain of Reformed Protestant piety.164 In other words, 
she had experienced conversion.165 
 Having acquired faith and a feeling of mercy, Rutherford’s emotions in 
her judgement continued to progress towards absolute love for God. She felt 
reassured in her faith when she learned that, though her apprehension of 
God’s presence fluctuated in the feeling of mercy, ‘he would carry me 
through’.166 Moreover, Rutherford’s faith was augmented when she 
understood that she had to take Christ with God as the ‘object of my faith and 
obedience’.167 Previously, she had only faith in God the Father and ‘not mine 
eye on Christ’. She was, ‘lovingly… reproved’, and her experience was a 
‘sweet blyth day’, which she interpreted as heart-knowledge of this truth. This 
was confirmed by the fact that, in her view, they were not a set of ‘flitting 
thoughts’, but remained a ‘continiouing light of truth’. Rutherford was also 
taught that her love for the godly and her fear of God’s wrath were signs of 
election, the truth of which she felt as a ‘greater sweetnes and promises of 
performance’, which had a prolonged effect.168 All in all, Rutherford’s 
emotions underwent significant change. Her joy, and by implication love, was 
stimulated by an ever more refined comprehension of the gospel as she 
applied it to herself. She had an increasingly clear idea and experience of 
what the covenant of grace demanded of her and what it entailed in every 
situation. Thus Rutherford presented her judgements of the understanding 
and will, in relation to the gospel, as undergoing a process of change where 
they became more accurate. As such her heart-knowledge grew so that her 
appetite was moved, in the right ways in more situations than before, to the 
love and enjoyment of Christ and his benefits. Desire for the gospel gradually 
replaced the love of not-God in her life.169 
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 Rutherford’s increase in love for and enjoyment of Christ did not mean 
that she never sinned. She identified that she frequently had to deal with 
internal sins in this fifth phase of her spiritual journey. However, they differed 
in kind from those she had encountered in the earlier phases her love for 
devotion, apprehension of sin, and legal terror. Rutherford’s internal sins 
consisted in her doubts about the reality of her spiritual journey. She was 
tempted to question whether the emotional changes she had undergone 
were real, or simply a figment of her imagination. She was sceptical about ‘if I 
had faith or repentance or love or fear of God… the reality of my grace, 
thinking my faith a temporary faith and repentance temporary and obedience 
a temporary obedience’.170 This was because, through her practice of self-
examination, Rutherford came to believe that she did not have a godly 
sorrow and feeling of mercy ‘as I would measure to myself’ – as she 
expected from somebody who was on a spiritual pilgrimage.171 Thus, she 
believed she was a hypocrite, which stimulated ‘great bitterness’ in 
Rutherford’s mind.172 Her anguish was so strong that at that time that 
Rutherford claimed, ‘if I had 1000d worlds I would have given them for 
God’.173 She attributed these doubts and scepticism to Satan’s malicious 
activity. This reinforced her presentation of these doubts as sins, for they 
questioned the reality of what God had done. Note that her identification of 
these experiences as sinful presupposed that she was wrong to doubt the 
genuineness of her faith. But by the time she wrote down her experiences, 
she must have believed that her faith was real, and so interpreted her doubts 
as wrong about her spiritual estate. Thus her evaluation of these experiences 
as sins reinforced Rutherford’s message to the reader: she was on a spiritual 
journey, even if Satan had tried to derail her persuasion that she was on a 
pilgrimage towards happiness. 
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 The biggest difference, however, was that due to her faith and 
increasing heart-knowledge, Rutherford handled her sins better than before. 
In the phases of love for devotion and an apprehension of sin, faced with 
atheism and suicide, Rutherford did not pray often.174 While at the stage of 
legal terror, she was too terrified to pray. By contrast, Rutherford regularly 
prayed to God when she suffered temptations after she had felt God’s 
mercy.175 Many of her doubts were overcome, in her judgement, through the 
acquisition of heart-knowledge is answer to these prayers. Sometimes this 
was through God’s speech directly into her soul or through the study of the 
bible, while at other points it came through words from her friends.176 
Whatever the case, these phrases – what Yeoman has called ‘text-getting’ – 
reinforced Rutherford’s assurance that she was a member of the elect.177 For 
example, it was the words of Rutherford’s mentor Betty Aird which persuaded 
her that she had a genuine godly sorrow.178 Similarly, John Gillon (fl.1619) 
taught Rutherford that feeling fear was a divine gift, and this gave her the 
confidence that she was saved.179 Her doubts, thus, were overcome by 
growth in her feeling of God’s mercy.180 Rutherford’s presentation of her 
experience in this part of the narrative as one where she was better able to 
overcome her doubts with divine assistance was intended to emphasise that 
she had received faith. This contrasted with the previous stages, where she 
was unable to triumph over sin because she lacked an assurance that she 
was loved by God. 
 Thus the fifth part of Rutherford’s narrative was the acquisition of 
feeling God’s mercy, and its growth. It was judged as a period of emotional 
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development, an increase in right emotion in many situations. Although it was 
imperfect, Rutherford pointedly emphasised that she was, unlike in prior 
stages, able to overcome many of the challenges she faced. Ultimately, it 
was an empowerment of the subject to love, and thus enjoy, Christ and his 
benefits. However, this stage did not culminate in communion with God. 
Rutherford had not reached continual happiness. Rather, her appetite could 
not rest in the supreme good because the residue of corruption remained in 
her faculties; thus she was prone to the sins of internal omission and 
commission, manifested in her doubts. Idolatry was still a feature of her life, 
and the journey needed to enter its sixth stage to reach its climax. 
 
f. Communion with God 
 The last part of the narrative Rutherford presented as a stage where 
she came to love absolutely and had a lasting communion with God. It was 
precipitated by a marriage proposal. Unsure of whether to accept, ‘with great 
earnestnes and a loosed heart’ she begged God for guidance in prayer.181 
Asked to give her verdict on the proposal, she entered the room where others 
gathered to hear her answer. In a ‘suddain the Lord filled the heart with such 
a sense of himself that cannot be expressed with assurance of his leading 
me’.182 She interpreted this experience as a sign that she should accept, and 
she did so. Further confirmation arose when, for the next few days, her ‘heart 
was filled with peace, I may say which passeth understanding’. She could not 
‘make language of it’, only able to call it ‘the power of God’ within her. 
Rutherford judged that from that time on, ‘all the passages of my particular’ 
were lived ‘without breaking of my communion with God’.183 In other words, 
she was persuaded that she had a constant possession of God.184 And, as 
established in chapter two, this meant she had happiness: the peace of the 
appetite at rest in the object of its desire.185 
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 However, as Rutherford’s faculties were still corrupted, her 
communion with God could grow, as her love and enjoyment of God could 
become all-encompassing.186 She and her husband travelled to Ireland, and 
on this physical journey Rutherford ‘fand the Lord’, feeling ‘his presence’ 
when they landed.187 Though she had doubts, they were ‘fully loosed’ at 
Robert Cunningham’s (fl.1608-1636) administration of the Lord’s Supper, 
where she ‘gote Christ taken to be my life and head’.188 This brought ‘such 
fulnes with it my narrow heart could hold no more’. At Robert Blair’s 
communion, Rutherford judged that her experience of Christ went even 
further. She ‘got Christ taken for sanctification with much comfort’. At another 
of Blair’s Lord’s Suppers, it was ‘cast into’ Rutherford’s mind to ‘take Christ to 
be all’, for strength and as an escape from all troubles. She received the 
elements as a promise that ‘Christ shall be all unto me, and I gat him taken 
so’. The Wednesday after, in Rutherford’s evaluation, the Lord gave ‘a 
measure of presence in prayer and sense of himself that I was not able to 
endure my narrow heart’. Rutherford presented this period as filled with 
ecstatic experiences of communion with God, intense joy interpreted as a 
perception of God’s presence (an idea which will be explored further in 
chapter four).189 Moreover, it was a further augmentation of Rutherford’s 
faith, an increase in her heart-knowledge. She learned to apply Christ not 
only for her justification, but also for her sanctification. He became her ‘all’, 
her ‘head’. In other words, her understanding and will judged that Christ and 
his benefits were the absolute good of her soul, and this moved her appetite 
to brilliant feelings of communion with God. It was an advanced form of heart-
work, which radically increased Rutherford’s comprehension of the gospel, 
and as such powerfully improved her enjoyment of God. 
 Yet, Rutherford conveyed to the reader that there were a few 
significant challenges that she had to triumph over before her love for God 
 
186 Cohen, God’s Caress, 211-212. 
187 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 182. 
188 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 183; W. D. Baillie, The Six Mile Water 
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could be unconditional. This was acquired through acceptance of her 
husband’s and son’s deaths. Throughout her husband’s fatal illness, 
Rutherford was ‘tortured with fear of his death’.190 She was afraid that he 
would be damned, and so sought the ‘sense of God’s love and presence to 
him [her husband]’. Likewise, she prayed for her son’s eternal destiny 
fervently, asking God to pardon him for the original sin he had inherited 
through her. However, what distressed Rutherford most, at the time she 
created her narrative, was that she was tempted to dishonour God with an 
‘exceeding grief’ at the loss of her husband and son. She judged that when 
her spouse died, the Lord was pleased ‘to give me a sweet blink of the joy he 
was entered in’, so that she praised Him. However, after she gave in to the 
temptation to mourn, she was left in ‘confusion and much greif all that night’. 
Her grief was overcome at a communion in Holywood: Rutherford heard 
‘Take God to be thy God’, and she identified that her ‘heart was well content 
to do so’.191 It was suggested to her, she claimed, within her religious 
experience at the table that God must be her ‘fear, love, delight, and portion’ 
above ‘thy child, nor no created thing’. This was, she judged, ‘made clear to 
the heart’. For a while she had ‘sweet rejoicing in God for himself’.192 She 
enjoyed God as the unqualified good to such an extent that she said in 
prayer to the divine that if her son were damned to hell for all eternity, she 
would ‘gladly rejoice in God executing justice’. When her son’s breathing 
became faint, ‘it was spoken lovingly to’ her in her heart that ‘I have pardoned 
according to thy word’, which she believed with joy. Yet she was moved to 
grieve for the loss of her son. She began to doubt whether he was truly a 
member of the elect. Rutherford judged, however, that the Lord ‘made my 
heart to answer, If my Lord hath decreed, what is that to me?’ This released 
her from the grief she had for her son’s death and eternal fate. This is the 
point at which Rutherford’s narrative ends.193 
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 It is impossible to know whether Rutherford intentionally closed her 
spiritual narrative at this point. However, it did make sense in the context of 
her spiritual pilgrimage, as there was no further development she could reach 
within mortal life. Rutherford had, in her view, embraced God with an 
absolute love, her desire for God firmly established as unconditional in 
comparison to any creature. This meant that she loved God more than even 
those she loved dearly, like her husband and son. Her initial grief was 
motivated by her loss of those she loved, her appetite resting in a present 
evil. However, she judged this experience to be a form of sin, as it was a 
manifestation of ingratitude and rebellion against God’s decision to end a 
person’s life. It was, thus, emotional disobedience against God’s law, 
motivated by idolatry, an overzealous love for what is not-God. When she 
took God as her supreme good, loved and enjoyed God more than her child, 
and accepted God’s determination of her child’s future, Rutherford’s 
emotions had ascended to a place where she had an unqualified love for 
God. She had reached unblemished happiness. 
 The language Rutherford used to convey that she had reached an 
absolute love for God echoed that used between God and Abraham. In the 
covenant of grace, reaffirmed between God and Abraham, God made a 
promise to Abraham and all his posterity. He declared that ‘I will establish my 
covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, 
for an everlasting covenant, to be God unto thee, and to thy seed after 
thee’.194 This was the essence of communion with God: God would be the 
supreme good of the subject, and the subject would take God as their 
supreme good – as their God. Thus, when Rutherford heard in her 
consciousness that she should take God as her God, she understood that 
she was being implored to reaffirm the covenant of grace in its fullest sense. 
This she did, and the result was a contentment which (as analysed in chapter 
two) was considered the enjoyment of God.195 Moreover, Abraham was 
commanded by God to sacrifice his son Isaac. Abraham complied, and was 
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prepared to offer his son, whom he loved, as a burnt offering for God’s sake. 
As he was about to kill his son, God stopped him. The Lord took Abraham’s 
willingness to sacrifice as evidence that ‘thou fearest God, seeing for my 
sake thou has not spared thine only son’.196 The binding of Isaac, thus, was 
the fulfilment of the covenant on Abraham’s part: he took God to be his God, 
even if that meant he had to love God above his precious son. Rutherford’s 
situation was similar. She was told to embrace God as her delight above her 
child. She did this when she was moved to think that God’s judgement of his 
life was worthy of praise. Consequently, Rutherford demonstrated that she 
enjoyed God just for God’s sake. She took God to be her God: she had given 
the greatest evidence of her election. She had achieved her goal, which was 
to love God as her supreme good.  
 Strikingly, the beginning of Robert Blair’s spiritual pilgrimage and the 
end of Mistress Rutherford’s demonstrate that the narrative structure of the 
spiritual journey was the same in public worship and private piety. Blair’s 
sequence of religious emotions was triggered by a preacher telling the 
congregation to draw near to God.197 Rutherford’s communion with God was 
precipitated by a minister teaching his congregation to take God as their 
God.198 By the end of her narrative Rutherford had an emotional 
understanding of what it meant to draw near to God: to take God as your God 
and to love God above all else. Put another way, the spiritual journey was a 
sequence of emotions which led to a heart-knowledge of what ministers had 
preached and corporate rituals had ceremonialised: that happiness consists 
in communion with God. The story of emotional change in public worship and 
in private spirituality, thus, was one and the same.199 The narrative in public 
worship (apprehension of sin, worldly sorrow, godly sorrow, a feeling of 
mercy, communion with God) was near identical to the plot authors used, 
modified, and augmented to characterise their subject’s spiritual journey (love 
 
196 Genesis 22:12. 
197 Chapter Three, 75-77. 
198 Chapter Three, 115-117. 
199 Cohen has made a similar point about how the conversion stories of lay puritans 
resembled the ideal laid out by preachers. See Cohen, God’s Caress, 212. 
120 
 
for devotion, apprehension of sin, legal terror, repentance, a feeling of mercy, 
communion with God). The sequences of emotion built into communal 
religious practice and private piety only differed in duration, a point made by 
William Struther. 
Since Repentance then is nothing but Sanctification contracted: And 
sanctification all our life is nothing, but Repentance inlarged and 
continued, it will follow that if sanctification doe not kyth constant after 
our Fasting, there hath beene no true Repentance in it.200 
 
Corporate ritual was a microcosm of the spiritual journey experienced in 
personal devotion, while private piety was meant to be the experience of 
emotional change in public worship extended over the course of an entire 
lifetime. Thus, ministers and congregations interpreted corporate communal 
ritual as a form of ‘corporate conversion’, while personal devotion was, at 
least for the most pious, the experience of public worship replicated in an 
individual’s life.201 Consequently, the spiritual journey towards communion 
with God, and as such the practice of radical emotional reflexivity, was built 
into the language and concepts of public worship and private piety. Why the 
pilgrimage of the soul was important in both contexts will be discussed further 
in chapter five.202 
 
 
 This chapter has analysed the language of emotion used by Scottish 
Protestants. It has argued that the pilgrimage of the soul was the emotional 
spine of both public ritual and private devotion. Through participation in 
penitential rituals, the Lord’s Supper, sermons, and psalm-singing, Scots 
were taught and used a language of emotional change associated with the 
pilgrimage of the soul from misery to happiness. The expectation of ministers 
was that their congregations would use this vocabulary in their private 
practice of radical emotional reflexivity. Some of the more zealous Scots took 
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up this task and produced narratives of their own or of another’s spiritual 
journey. Though every text was idiosyncratic, they all used the linguistic-
conceptual framework built into public worship which made them 
recognisable as telling the story of a soul’s pilgrimage. Thus, their plots were 
variations of a sequence of emotions, conveyed through linguistic shifts that 
this thesis schematized into six stages: love for devotion, apprehension of 
sin, legal terror, repentance, a feeling of mercy, and communion with God. 
The conversion narrative of Mistress Rutherford was used to explore the 
language and concepts associated with each phase. In so doing, the chapter 
has presented the basic narrative structure authors modified and rearranged 
in their personal writings. Why they would want to identify their emotions in 
the form of a spiritual journey will be examined in chapter five.203 
 God was considered by Scottish Protestants the principal agent in the 
spiritual journey of the emotions. It was divine agency which caused the 
emotions to change. God altered the emotions to facilitate the subject’s 
communion with God. God was, thus, the reality Protestants in Scotland 
understood as the main factor in the trajectory of their emotions from misery 
to happiness. Divine agency was crucial at each stage of the spiritual 
journey. As such, to understand the narrative form in which Scottish 
Protestants identified their emotions, an analysis of God’s role within this plot 
needs to be undertaken. This is the task of the next chapter.
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Chapter Four: God and the Emotions 
 
 Protestants in Scotland identified, through the practice of radical 
emotional reflexivity, that God was both the cause and end of desired 
emotion in the spiritual journey towards happiness. They judged that God 
was the external agent who moved the appetite towards love of God, and as 
a result the cause of their transition from misery to happiness. This meant 
that they considered God the formal object of passions which facilitated 
communion with God. Thus, God’s activity, like that of any external agent, 
was assumed to enact change upon a passive subject. Moreover, like any 
formal object, God was assumed to operate inside the subject’s 
consciousness. The theory of emotion that Scottish Protestants presupposed 
(analysed in chapter one) entailed that God engaged with the subject in this 
way if God was an emotion’s cause.1 
 Moreover, Scottish Protestants judged that their experiences of 
ecstatic joy were the subjective experience of communion with God. When 
their love for God was consummated, their feelings were, in some sense, a 
perception of God’s presence in the soul. As the phenomenological 
dimension of happiness, a rest of the appetite in God, this ‘feeling’ of God 
was the experience of the supreme good of the soul and as such was a 
desired end in itself (analysed in chapter two).2 In other words, to perceive 
God’s presence in the soul through the emotions was the essence of 
happiness: the end point of the spiritual journey (explored in chapter three).3  
 To flesh out the implications of the Scottish Protestant identification of 
God as the cause and end of desired emotions, this chapter analyses more 
closely the language used in public worship and private devotion. It argues 
that the emotional shifts which constituted the spiritual journey – what are 
called here ‘supernatural emotions’ – were the effect of God’s agency. 
Moreover, the language of communal ritual and personal writings 
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characterised the climax of the soul’s pilgrimage as a subjective experience 
of communion with God. As such, the identification of God’s association with 
the emotions was fundamental to the practice of radical emotional reflexivity 
for Protestant communities in early modern Scotland. Thus this chapter 
moves beyond the discussion of the spiritual journey in chapter three to 
examine the ideas that God was the cause of the soul’s pilgrimage and could 
be experienced through the emotions, ideas which were built into the 
linguistic-conceptual framework of Scottish Protestant worship and piety.  
 This analysis is done in three sections. Part one examines the claim 
made by Protestants in early modern Scotland that God was the cause of 
desired emotions, those experiences critical to advancement on the spiritual 
journey. The second section analyses the implication of Scottish Protestant 
claims that God was the formal object of some passions: that God acted 
within a subject’s consciousness to create supernatural emotions. Finally, 
there is an exploration of the idea that ecstatic joy was the subjective 
dimension of communion with God, and as such that ‘right emotion’ was a 
perception of God’s presence.  
 
1. God as the External Agent of a Passion 
 The Holy Spirit in particular, and God more generally, was frequently 
identified as the agent who caused the ‘supernatural emotions’ identified as 
part of the spiritual journey. Many named God as the cause of their spiritual 
‘motions’.4 The Episcopalian John Forbes of Corse judged that it was God 
who ‘pleased… by his H.[Holy] Spirit w[i]t[h] groans unutterable’ to lift up his 
heart.5 God, Forbes observed, decided to ‘give me his abundant Grace, 
mercie, & peace’.6 It was God who ‘maid’ the Edinburgh lawyer Archibald 
Johnston of Wariston, in his view, ‘sensible of his present particular 
presence’; and the Presbyterian Mistress Rutherford believed she was ‘filled’ 
by the Lord with ‘a sense of himself that cannot be expressed with assurance 
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5 Forbes, Diary, 127-130. 
6 Forbes, Diary, 130-131. 
124 
 
of his leading me’.7 Ministers petitioned God in the ritual of public repentance 
to ‘so effectuallie moue his [the penitent’s] hart & oures also’ that they may 
‘atteane some sense and fealing of they mercy’, and in the Lord’s Supper to 
‘imprint and fasten [His benefits] sure in our hearts, that we may growe and 
increase daily in true faith… and good workes’.8 They did so because they 
assumed that God was the cause of desired emotion. 
 Exceptional episodes of emotional release were also attributed to the 
agency of the Holy Spirit. At a renewal of the covenant of grace in 1596 in 
Fife, those gathered were reminded of their unthankfulness and failure to 
reform Scotland. James Melville judged that suddenly the ‘Lord steirit up sic a 
motioun of hart, that all war forcit to fall down before the Lord, with sobbes 
and teares in aboundance, everie man mightelie commovit with the 
affectionnes of their conscience in the presence of their conscience’, so that 
they were in private meditation upon their sins, ‘craving ernestlie grace for 
amendiment’.9 Similarly, at the swearing of the National Covenant in 1638 at 
Currie Kirk, near Edinburgh, Wariston reported that in the ‘tuinkling of ane 
eye their fell sutch ane extraordinarie influence of Gods Sprit upon the whol 
congregation, melting their frozen hearts, waltering their dry cheeks… it was 
a wonder to seie so visible, sensible, momentaneal a chainge upon al, man 
and woman, lasse and ladde’.10 Why these unique experiences of emotional 
discharge were considered God-caused will be examined in chapter five.11 
 Contemporaneous episodes from the spiritual diaries of John Forbes 
of Corse and Archibald Johnston of Wariston exemplify how Scottish 
Protestants identified God as the cause of emotional preparation for and the 
reception of happiness: they will be outlined and then analysed. On 7 April 
1634, Forbes’s was extremely downcast. He was ‘afflicted with a great & 
grievous tenta[tio]un’. He sought the Lord with ‘humble supplicatiouns, & 
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groans & tears’. He ‘received mercie, strength, & unspeakable comfort’.12 A 
month later, on 26 May 1634, Wariston felt the Lord’s ‘wonderful presence 
with me, yea evin as present as if visibly and audibly he had bein speaken 
with me and I with him’. As a response, the ‘Lord maid me put up petitions to 
him’. Wariston’s ‘libertie greu ever the greater’, accompanied by the 
‘wonderful pouer of the sprit, floods of tears, and multitude of strong cryes 
and groans’. His heart ‘spak to God’, his tears ‘the only outward expression 
of my meaning to God or to myself’, and he was left ‘drunken with rivers of 
pleasure in the assurance of his tenderest mercies’. The Lord had ‘opened 
the eies of thy mynd to seie Gods faice schyning presently on thy saule with 
sutch amiable beams flouing from his reconiled countenance as almost 
transported the[e] out of thyselth’. The ‘sensible possession of God’ and 
‘sight of my happiness’ made his eyes ‘stand amazed in my head’, stomach 
‘to turn upsyd doune’ with fear, which he blamed on this mischievous activity 
of Satan. Wariston praised God for this possession of happiness, which he 
judged an ‘unspeakable favour’.13 
 Forbes and Wariston believed that God was the cause of both the 
means and experience of their experiences of happiness. Forbes presented 
his supplications for relief from his depressed feelings as the product of 
God’s agency. Similarly, Wariston attributed to the Holy Spirit his ‘petitions’. 
These prayers were the instruments to which God responded and satisfied 
Forbes and Wariston’s requests. Thus, both men believed their experience 
after their petitions were also caused by God. Forbes identified that he 
‘received’ comfort, the subjective experience of mercy and grace. Wariston 
interpreted his experience as one where the Lord ‘opened’ his mind to 
apprehend God’s mercy. They both claimed their joy was the product of 
God’s action. Thus, like puritans in New England, zealous Protestants in 
Scotland argued that those emotional changes directed towards happiness, 
communion with God, were the solely the work of God.14 Put another way, 
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the Holy Spirit was named by fervent Scots as the external agent who causes 
those emotional shifts which lead to happiness: a love for devotion, an 
apprehension of sin, legal terror, repentance, a feeling of mercy, and 
communion with God.15 They never intimated that one’s fellowship with the 
divine was ever the product of their own merit, or of a joint effort with God. 
This finding militates against Yeoman’s notion that though God was 
responsible for most of the process, humans were still required to ‘initiate the 
purging process of repentance’.16 Preparation for happiness was not 
considered the result of human activity. Rather, Forbes and Wariston 
illustrate that the instruments for the reception of happiness were interpreted 
as the work of the Holy Spirit, insofar as they evaluated the petitions and 
supplications they spoke to God as the effect of God’s agency. 
 The transformation of the emotions in the form of the spiritual journey, 
therefore, was presented as an entirely passive experience from the subject’s 
point of view. This belief of theirs was supported by two presuppositions 
embedded in the language Scots used in public worship and their private 
writings: their theory of emotion and adherence to the doctrine of total 
depravity. In chapter one, the nature of emotions was explored.17 It was 
argued that Scots considered a passion a change of the appetite 
experienced passively by the subject, caused by an action of an external 
agent. In the course of the spiritual journey, Scottish Protestants identified 
the external agent who acts upon the passive subject to create supernatural 
emotions as the Holy Spirit. 
 The identification the pilgrimage of the soul as a passive experience 
was also supported by the view that humanity is totally depraved (explored in 
chapter two).18 Protestants in Scotland believed that, due to Adam’s original 
sin, human nature has been entirely corrupted. This meant that humans have 
no power to contribute to their preparation for happiness, and thus they all fail 
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to obey the covenant of works (as examined in chapter three).19 Given that 
they assumed a subject cannot have faith or love of God of their own volition, 
Scottish Protestants were forced to conclude that only an external agent can 
produce desired emotion in a sinner. In other words, because humanity is 
intrinsically evil due to the Fall, it cannot contribute to its own sanctification; 
rather, God is the only agent of the spiritual journey, and the subject 
undergoes the process passively. The Scots Confession expressed this point 
clearly. Its authors and subscribers affirmed that: 
for of nature we are so dead, so blind, and so perverse, that nether 
can we feill when we are pricked, see the licht when it shines, nor 
assent to the will of God when it is reveiled, unles the Spirit of the Lord 
Jesus quicken that quhilk is dead, remove the darknesse from our 
myndes, and bowe our stubburne hearts to the obedience of his 
blessed will.20 
 
The theory of emotion and theological anthropology that Scottish Protestants 
assumed, therefore, provided the logic which made intelligible the judgement 
that the Holy Spirit was the cause of those emotions, presented in the form of 
a spiritual journey, directed towards communion with God.  
 The perceived femaleness of passivity was a fundamental aspect of 
the language some of the more zealous Scottish Protestants used in their 
personal writings.21 As analysed in chapter one, Aristotle’s theory of 
reproduction identified women as the cooler, weaker, and more passive 
member of the sexes.22 In the early modern period, Aristotle’s classification 
of femininity with passivity was extended to the nature of the material order 
by developments in alchemical theory, so that the passive dimension of all 
things was considered female.23 This intellectual advancement reinforced the 
connection between femininity and passivity.24 Moreover, the legal 
 
19 Chapter Three, 103-109; Yeoman, ‘Heart-work’, 11-12.  
20 Scots Confession, XII. 
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relationship between husbands and wives in early modern Scotland 
strengthened the association between femaleness and passivity. Drawing 
from scripture, early modern thinkers argued that every society requires a 
government and that the superior should rule the weaker. Marriage, a 
fundamental unit of economic, legal, and social standing, was therefore 
interpreted as a relationship where the male leads or rules over the female, 
given the female’s weaker, passive nature.25 Although in Scotland women 
tended to have more economic and legal freedom than in England – given 
that the notion that marriage is a ‘communion of goods’ was integral to Scots 
law – coverture still permeated the relationship between the sexes. Women 
still needed implicit or tacit consent for economic transactions, and men were 
held legally responsible for the behaviour of their wives.26 Though exceptions 
were common, these legal and economic structures of female subordination 
were a constant reminder in everyday interactions of female physiological 
inferiority, rooted fundamentally in their coldness, and as such they 
concretised the association between passivity and femininity in the early 
modern Protestant linguistic-conceptual framework. 
 As passivity was characterised by Scottish Protestants as a feminine 
form of experience, they were inclined to identify their experience of God’s 
action upon their appetites as having a female quality: they were akin to the 
passive female in their relationship with the divine. This attitude, in part, 
explains why Scottish Protestants believed it was appropriate to characterise 
their communion with God in the ‘marriage metaphor’.27 This was a point of 
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reference often cited in sermons, treatises, and devotional guides.28 With 
reference to divinely inspired scripture – in particular the Song of Songs and 
Ephesians – zealous Scots allegorically interpreted the love between the 
husband and wife as an allegory for the fellowship that exists between Christ 
and the regenerate soul.29 For example, Helen Livingston née Hay (c.1552-
1627), Countess of Linlithgow, when repenting for her former adherence to 
Roman Catholicism expressed that she had ‘setled peace and comfort’ in her 
‘spirituall marriage with my head and husband the Lord Jesus Christ, who 
hath marryed mee to himselfe’.30 Lady Hundaly, Mary Rutherford (d.1640), 
encountered Christ in a similar way, praising God for ‘the unspeakable love 
of the Bridegroom to his dear spouse… the spouse may rejoice in the honour 
of her bridegroom... she may rejoice in his love, which found us when we 
were lost… the spouse may rejoice in the beauty of the bridegroom’.31 In a 
hymn authored by Robert Blair, he presented Christ as declaring to the soul:  
  Now follow me and thou shalt see 
  The nuptials of my bride, 
  The spouse which I purchas’d to me, 
  With blood shed from my side.32 
 
 However, the appropriateness of the marriage metaphor was justified 
not only by the mutual love judged to have been experienced between Christ 
 
28 Though the extant material which takes the Song of Songs as a primary text of analysis is 
far less than in England, Richard has provided a compelling case why this should not be 
taken to suggest the text was not important in early modern Scotland. Moreover, in support 
of Richard it can be argued that while it may not have been the focus of many texts, it was 
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Guy M. Richard, ‘Clavis Cantici: A “Key” to the Reformation in early modern Scotland?’ in 
Reformed Orthodoxy in Scotland: Essays on Scottish Theology, 1560-1775 (London: 
Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015), 158. 
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and the believer.33 Scottish Protestants, like their counterparts in England 
and North America, adapted the language of the text to express God’s 
agency and their passivity in relation to their emotions. Samuel Rutherford 
has been described as the key influence on Scottish employment of the 
language in the Song of Songs, and his use of these metaphors illustrate the 
point best.34 Comforting Jane Gordon née Campbell (d.1675), Lady 
Kenmure, he encouraged her to not fear if she had no strong feelings of 
God’s presence, for ‘Christ soweth His living seed, and He will not lose His 
seed. If He have the guiding of my flock and state, it shall not miscarry. Our 
spilled works, losses, deadness, coldness, wretchedness, are the ground 
upon which the Good Husbandman laboureth’.35 Playing with two metaphors 
at once, that ‘living seed’ is both like human semen (indicated in the 
reference to miscarriage), and that the seeds farmers sow to grow crops, 
Rutherford sought to convey that the grace of Christ, inseminated in the 
womb of the soul, cannot fail but to produce new life. In this instance, 
Rutherford’s language relied upon the Aristotelian theory of reproduction 
(outlined in chapter one) to present Christ as the one who acts upon, or 
inseminates, the passive subject, to propel her spiritual journey, the growth of 
the living seed.36 
 The association of femininity and passivity in the Scottish Protestant 
worldview also underpinned the pervasive notion that women were more 
receptive to God’s action than men. Due to their cooler, weaker constitutions, 
women were thought to be less rational than men, and as such less able to 
control their emotions.37 This meant that they were supposed to be more 
easily influenced by the supernatural. Edward Raban (d.1658) extolled the 
many ‘perfectious Excellencies and virtuous Qualities’ that women had, 
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‘excelling the grosse, and churlish conditions of men’. He argued that women 
are the ‘formost part-taker of every Heavenlie gift and grace… composed 
both the more excellent substance, and qualities’. In woman, he argued, ‘doe 
shyne the beams of Beautie, Comelinesse, Constancie, Vertue, Prudencie, 
Pietie, Charities, and practice of good manners’, far ‘exceeding grosse 
man’.38 These ‘wifely traits’ were those which the Christian should seek in 
relation to God, and as such reinforced the femininity of the spiritual 
journey.39 Moreover, women were considered more appropriate vessels of 
divine inspiration due to their inherent passivity.40 Jean Kincaid’s words to 
those gathered to hear her were interpreted as the direct speech of the Holy 
Spirit – they were not her own words.41 Wariston encountered a woman 
similarly possessed of the Holy Spirit, Margaret Mitchelson (fl.1638), who 
being ‘transported in heavinly raptures’ spoke to thousands of people 
‘strainge things for the happy succes of Gods cause and Chryst croune in 
this kingdome quhilk was already inacted in heavin’.42 The perceived 
passiveness of Kincaid and Mitchelson, due to their sex, lent credence in the 
minds of their audience to their claims that their messages were from God.43  
 Thus, the identification of passivity with femininity by Scottish 
Protestants, in relation to the Holy Spirit’s action upon their appetites, 
presupposed a rigid concept of gender. Support for this position is provided 
by Susan Hardman Moore’s argument that it was ‘precisely from the male 
understanding of what it meant to be a woman’ that ‘feminized imagery for 
men’ in puritanism gained its power.44 It was the rigid definition of the gender 
assumed by Reformed Protestants, Hardman Moore has claimed, which 
allowed men and women to use femaleness as an allegory for their status in 
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religious experience. The identification of passivity with the female in the 
writings of early modern Scottish Protestants challenges ideas in modern 
historiography that seventeenth century Reformed Protestants employed any 
kind of ‘alternative masculinity’, ‘role ambiguity’, or ‘gender fluidity’ in their 
use of the marriage metaphor.45 It was precisely the rigid identification of 
femaleness with passivity which made it appropriate to categorise the 
subject’s experience of the Holy Spirit’s action as feminine. It only worked if 
the feminine was attributed to the passive, and vice versa. Hence, Scottish 
Protestant characterisation of their God-caused emotions with feminised 
language assumed the rigid concept of gender embedded in the Scottish 
Protestant worldview. Put another way, it was the experience of change by 
the subject acted upon by God which was perceived as feminine. 
 Protestants in early modern Scotland believed God acted upon the 
passive, feminine, subject to create emotion both directly and indirectly. John 
Weemes provided a clear explanation of how God acts directly upon the 
passive subject. Through the agency of the Holy Spirit, Christ directly fixes 
the fallen faculties of the elect, and thus creates in them desired emotions. 
He does so, Weemes argued, in four main ways. First, Christ ‘subdueth the 
passions that they arise not inordinately’.46 That is, the appetite is moved in 
‘moderation’, in an appropriate degree in relation to its formal object. This 
fixes the tendency of the appetite to move disproportionately due to original 
sin, analysed in chapter two. Second, Christ ‘reconciles the passions, which 
strive so one against another’.47 They no longer contradict one another. In 
this way, Christ corrects the ‘contraeity’ of the passions, caused by the 
subject’s absolute love for creatures (also examined in chapter two).48 Third, 
Christ ‘setts the passions upon their right objects, whereas before they were 
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set upon the wrong objects’.49 Christ changes the judgements of the rational 
cognition and appetition so that the sensitive appetite is moved in the right 
way in response to formal objects. Through this, Christ corrects the error-
strewn judgements of the mind and will, the consequence of original sin 
(which was discussed in chapter two).50 Thus, humans recognise what is 
their supreme good, God. Fourth, the passions are moved by Christ so ‘that 
they cannot bee mooved’.51 Christ fixes the inconstancy of the emotions, as 
the appetite is moved to rest in an eternal and infinite formal object: God. 
Thus, Weemes argued that Christ directly restores the faculties, which 
retunes the judgements of the formal object and the motion of the appetite so 
that the inconstancy and contradictory nature of the passions is removed. 
Christ, Weemes claimed, reorients the emotions away from idolatry towards 
love for God through these changes, and thus moves the subject from misery 
to happiness. 
 Scottish Protestants identified God directly acting upon their passive 
selves when they prayed, petitioned, and confessed. This appears clearly in 
Archibald Johnston of Wariston’s diary, in his claim that through his prayers, 
tears, and groans, the ‘Sprit of God, with inenarrable expressions, spak in my 
saule to God’.52 This claim was influenced by a passage from Romans 8: 
Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmities: for we know not what to 
pray as we ought: but the Spirit itself maketh request for us with sighs, 
which cannot be expressed. But he that searcheth the hearts, knoweth 
what is the meaning of the Spirit: for he maketh request for the 
Saints, according to the will of God.53 
 
Wariston judged, in light of this verse, that his prayers, tears, and groans 
were the speech of the Holy Spirit to God on Wariston’s behalf, using 
Wariston’s voice as a mouthpiece. His emotions were the medium God’s 
Spirit used to communicate, and the product of God’s direct action upon the 
appetite. Other zealous Scottish Protestants shared a similar view of their 
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prayers. Forbes frequently claimed that it was the Lord who had caused him 
to pray.54 No intermediary was cited: it was just God’s action which made 
Forbes petition and confess. Similarly, Hundaly, Kincaid, and others identified 
God as the cause of their prayers, while Clarkson acknowledged that her 
inability to pray was due to God’s not moving her appetite to confession and 
petition.55 God’s direct action was crucial for the practice of prayer; or at 
least, of those prayers which were answered.56 
 In addition to the correction of the faculties, Scottish Protestants 
believed that sometimes God used indirect means to create emotion in a 
passive subject. The most frequent context this happened was through what 
Yeoman has called ‘text-getting’ (discussed briefly in chapter three).57 She 
has argued that this was an experience where an individual found ‘a 
convincing Biblical text came to mind with an extraordinary feeling attached 
to it, which was considered to be a direct communication from God’.58 Often 
experienced within the context of prayer or bible reading, text-getting was an 
internal apprehension of the Word. Mistress Rutherford reported that bible 
verses ‘lovingly spoken’ into her heart by God, brought her comfort in times 
of doubt and anxiety.59 In prayer, Robert Blair heard audibly ‘The just shall 
live by his faith’, which moved him to use faith as a means of sanctification.60 
Sometimes, however, God spoke words particular to the subject’s situation, 
using extra-biblical language. Blair heard within his soul ‘as if one standing by 
me had audibly said, “Thou fool… thou must either preach the Gospel in 
Ireland, or nowhere at all”’.61 This experience made Blair go to Ireland, rather 
than France, to preach the gospel. Wariston occasionally felt God’s 
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‘wonderful presence with me, yea evin as present as if visibly and audibly he 
had bein speaken with me and I with him’.62 John Livingston, with ‘a terror of 
wrath of God’ in his sleep, ‘thought it was said to me within my heart, “See 
what a fool thou art to desire the thing thou couldst not endure”’.63 Ever after, 
he was content with his experience of God’s action in his soul. The lawyer 
Thomas Hope of Craighall (1573-1646), when he petitioned the Lord to pity 
the Kirk, heard a voice saying ‘I will pitie it’.64 The experience convinced him 
God had spoken to him. Text-getting, then, was a form of direct revelation to 
the passive subject which God used to stimulate emotion and action. In other 
words, God supplied the formal object which evoked heart-knowledge and so 
through this instrument indirectly moved the sensitive appetite in the desired 
manner.65 
 While text-getting was the implantation of a formal object in the mind 
to mobilise desired emotion, ministers taught that God could also use 
external instruments to evoke passions indirectly. Bishop of Caithness John 
Abernethy proposed that one such method was meditation on the crucifixion. 
He argued that the most ‘excellent remedy against all passions, is true 
mortification’.66 In this context, mortification was a practice which 
reconfigured the passions through the ‘inward practice’ of ‘a sound 
meditation’.67 Meditation on Christ’s death, argued Abernethy, enables the 
subject to apprehend ‘thy infinite guiltinesse, thy endlesse misery, and that 
inestimable redeeming counterpiece’. This, he reasoned, moves the sensitive 
appetite to ‘hatred of thy selfe & sorrow for thy sinnes.’68 It was, thus, a 
practice to mobilise the emotions which constituted sincere repentance 
(discussed in chapters three and five).69 The poet William Drummond of 
 
62 Wariston, Diary, 218-219. 
63 Livingston, Brief, 61. 
64 Thomas Hope of Craighall, A Diary of the Public Correspondence of Sir Thomas Hope of 
Craighall, Bart., 1633-1645 (Edinburgh, 1843), 96; ODNB, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date 
accessed 20/05/2020. 
65 Chapter Three, 107, 114. 
66 Abernethy, Physicke, 268. 
67 Abernethy, Physicke, 268; Yeoman, ‘Heart-work’, 178-180. 
68 Abernethy, Physicke, 269-270; John Abernethy, The Dignity and Duty of a Christian 
(London, 1620), 110. 
69 Chapter Three, 80-81, 109-110; Chapter Five, 170-175, 189-293. 
136 
 
Hawthornden used poetry as a medium of mortification to evoke godly sorrow 
in his audience: 
  A King who fix’d the Poles, made Spheares to moue, 
  All Wisedome, Purenesse, Excellencie, Might, 
  All Goodnesse, Greatnesse, Iustice, Beautie, Loue; 
  With feare and wonder hither turne your Sight, 
  See, see (alas) Him now, not in that State 
  Though could fore-cast Him into Reasons light. 
  Now Eyes with teares, now Hearts with griefe make great, 
  Bemoane this cruell Death and drearie case, 
  If ever Plaints iust Woe could aggrauate? 
  From Sinne and Hell to saue us humaine Race, 
  See this great King naill’d to an abject Tree, 
  An object of reproach and sad disgrace. 
  O unheard Pittie! Loue in strange degree! 
  Hee his owne Life doth giue, his Blood doth shed, 
  Por Wormelings base such Worthinesse to see. 
  Poore Wights, behold His Visage pale as Lead, 
  His Head bow’d to His Brest, Lockes sadlie rent, 
  Like a cropt Rose that languishing doth fade. 
  Weake Nature weepe, astonish’d World lament, 
  Lament, you Windes, you Heauen that all containes, 
  And thou (my Soule) let nouht thy Griefes relent.70 
 
Contrasting Christ’s glory and beauty with his suffering on the cross, 
Drummond sought to move his reader to sorrow. Similarly, for David Dickson 
contemplation of the cross ‘Woes mee for all my sinne, woes me for rootes of 
sinne so strong’.71 Yet meditation on the crucifixion, argued Abernethy, 
should also lead the subject to reflect upon the love of God, which it 
revealed, a ‘great poynt of thankfulnesse’.72 Observance of the ‘greatest 
beneficence of the greatest Benefactor’ will, Abernethy argued, ‘force us to 
love him’.73 Dickson’s adulation encapsulated how mortification could 
stimulate love for God. 
 To see my love for love of mee, on bloddie shoulders beare: 
That crosse, that curse that growing wrath and trembling thus for 
feare. 
 To see almightie God so weake lifes fountaine thus to die, 
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With shame and paine ou’rchargde till heaven wondred: and all for 
me… 
 
 …Fond lovers tell mee now if you have any love like this: 
 Come take a share with mee, my love wholly spirituall is. 
 Come change your loves, & love with me, or else you perish shall: 
 Goe charge your loves to doe the same, or perish shall you all.74 
  
 Sermons were also identified by Scottish Protestants as a means the 
Holy Spirit used to establish a formal object in the mind and thereby mobilise 
emotion. Bessie Clarkson attributed her worldly sorrow and legal terror to the 
preaching of William Livingston.75 Likewise, it was when Dickson preached 
on Jeremiah that the Ayrshire farmer James Mitchell of Dykes was powerfully 
moved to a sense of his sin and a feeling of God’s mercy.76 Instruction from 
others could also be interpreted as a means used by the Holy Spirit to cause 
emotion in a subject. When John Gillon reminded Mistress Rutherford of 
Jeremiah 31:33 and 32:40, the phrase ‘I will put my fear in their heart’ 
comforted her. She identified this experience as God making her ‘apply’ this 
verse to herself, and this ‘rejoiced the heart much’.77 The role of preaching as 
a tool for mobilising emotion will be analysed more fully in chapter five.78 
What is important for the present argument is that zealous Scottish 
Protestants identified listening to sermons and exhortations as tools by which 
God could indirectly move the appetite by fixing in the mind a formal object. 
 Crucially, sermons, bible reading, and meditation were considered 
only able to stimulate desired emotion if used by the Holy Spirit as an 
instrument to act on the passive subject.79 Out of divine hands, they had no 
effectual power and were unable to facilitate progress along the spiritual 
journey. In other words, instruments like meditation and the preaching of the 
Word were, in the view of Scottish Protestants, only effective if conjoined with 
the direct action of God on the faculties to produce the right emotional 
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response. Thus, while all were exposed to the indirect means of the Holy 
Spirit’s action in Sunday worship through the preaching of the Word, this did 
not guarantee that it would stimulate desired emotion. The direct activity of 
the Holy Spirit on the faculties was considered necessary for the creation of 
heart-knowledge, or ‘supernatural emotion’, and thus for the spiritual journey 
of the emotions. 
 That zealous Scottish Protestants judged God was the external agent 
of certain emotions was paralleled by their belief that Satan was a cause of 
internal sins of commission and omission. As analysed in chapter three, 
authors regularly identified their temptations and doubts as the effects of the 
devil’s malicious activity within their souls.80 Brock has labelled the process 
through which Scots reached this conclusion the ‘internalization of the 
demonic’, which consisted in a four-stage cycle.81 First, clergy taught their 
congregations that they were totally depraved and that they needed to 
engage in self-examination. Second, those who took up the practice of 
introspection examined their thoughts, words, and deeds. They identified the 
devil as the cause of their sins. Third, the godly would come to identify 
themselves as evil, which would result in feelings of terror and despair. 
Finally, through prayer there would be an intervention of divine grace, which 
would relieve the subject of their negative emotions. Thus, through this 
emotional process the devil was, like God, considered a supernatural cause 
of emotions in the spiritual journey, particularly of emotions identified as sins. 
 Significantly, however, Brock has noted that men and women were 
held no less responsible for their sins because of Satan’s machinations.82 
They considered themselves complicit in their transgressions. This was 
because, it could be argued, they assumed that Satan merely presented a 
formal object which moved the appetites, such as the prospect of suicide or 
doubts about Reformed doctrine. He did this in a similar manner to God. Like 
text-getting, one method Satan was thought to use was to ‘speak’ directly to 
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the soul, by which the formal object would be placed in the subject’s mind. 
Thus, Mistress Rutherford heard Satan tease her that there was no God, 
while Robert Bruce believed he heard the devil accuse him of his many sins 
inside his consciousness.83 The devil did not manipulate the faculties directly, 
but rather exploited their natural corruption: the judgements of the rational 
cognition and volition, and the motion of the appetite, were already error-
strewn and prone to evil. Thus all Satan had to do, to cause an internal sin, 
was to communicate a formal object to the apprehension of the subject; as 
the faculties would oblige and produce a depraved emotion in response. 
Hence the Scottish Protestant assumption that human nature was totally 
corrupt (analysed in chapter two) provided the rationale for a belief that sin 
was a cooperative venture between the devil and the subject.84 This marked 
a difference between how fervent Scottish Protestants assessed God’s and 
Satan’s action upon the passive subject. While emotions caused by God 
were attributed entirely to divine agency at every stage of the process which 
constituted a passion, Satan only presented the formal object which sparked 
sin. 
 Therefore, the Holy Spirit was identified as the external agent of the 
supernatural emotions which constituted the spiritual journey. Based on the 
theory of emotion that Scots presupposed, those who partook in public 
worship and produced personal writings judged that God was the sole agent 
who advanced the pilgrimage of their souls; the subject passive, and thus 
feminine, throughout the process. They claimed that God’s action upon the 
subject could be direct. Christ could fix the faculties so that they responded 
correctly to a formal object, such as when God ‘made’ Scottish Protestants 
pray. Moreover, the Holy Spirit could present the formal object of a passion to 
the consciousness of the subject, via text-getting, to indirectly move the 
passions. The Holy Spirit could also use instruments, like meditation and 
sermons, to communicate a formal object into the mind to stir supernatural 
emotions. All in all, then, Scottish Protestants judged that God was the cause 
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of the entire process which created desired emotion: the subject was entirely 
passive, and the formal object, its evaluation, and the motion of the appetite, 
were identified as the product of the God’s agency. Thus, the spiritual journey 
was considered the sole work of God, and no other.85 By implication, God 
was considered the unique cause of the sequence of emotion built into public 
worship and private piety (analysed in chapter three).86 
 
2. God as the Formal Object of Emotion 
 As the external agent who moved the emotions, God was also 
identified as the formal object of those emotions which constituted the 
spiritual journey. This idea assumed that the external agent and formal object 
of a passion were identical (engaged with in chapter one).87 Thus, if God was 
the cause of desired emotion, then God must be the formal object of emotion. 
This section analyses this implication of the linguistic-conceptual framework 
built into communal religious practice and the personal writings of pious 
Scots. It addresses the consequence of the assumption that God was the 
formal object of a passion: God was inside the subject’s consciousness. 
 Authors classified the formal objects of their supernatural emotions as 
God’s attributes. They did this by evaluating the ‘intention’ of the external 
agent which caused their passions. In chapter one, it was argued that 
Scottish Protestants, influenced by Aquinas, believed every formal object of a 
passion had an intention, which was the apprehension as to whether the 
object in question was good or evil in relation to the subject.88 Zealous Scots 
judged that an apprehension of God’s wrath was the cause of their worldly 
sorrow. Bessie Clarkson, her minister William Livingston recounted, claimed 
that her legal terror was stimulated by an apprehension of ‘the wrath of an 
angrie God, of a crabbed God’.89 Robert Bruce could ‘feele the wrathe of God 
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pressing me doun’.90 In the case of legal terror, the subject apprehended 
God’s anger for their sin, and thus God’s will that they should be damned. 
Thus the emotion of worldly sorrow was aroused by an apprehension of God 
as ‘evil’ to the subject, insofar as eternal damnation was a never-ending 
frustration of the deeply held desire for happiness. Considered evil for the 
soul, the appetite was moved to dread and despair.91 Put another way, the 
perceived evil intention of God forced the subject to incline away from and 
avoid the presence of the divine. Consequently, Scots like Mistress 
Rutherford and Bessie Clarkson were too afraid to approach God for help, as 
they apprehended God was angry with their sin.92 The formal object of legal 
terror, then, was God’s wrath against the subject, and thus the apprehension 
of God as evil for the subject. 
 By contrast, the three emotions of godly sorrow, a desire or hope for 
mercy, and a feeling of mercy all apprehended the formal object, God, as 
good. This was because God’s mercy was the attribute received into the 
imagination. When the subject understands that God’s love is good for the 
subject the appetite is inclined towards communion with God. However, the 
three emotions in question differed in how the subject relates to God. Godly 
sorrow was considered an apprehension of sin committed against the God 
whose intention is good for the soul. Thus, the presence of sin caused the 
appetite to rest in sadness, the subject acknowledging that what was done 
was a wrong against God. God was apprehended as good, and consequently 
the presence of sin as evil for the subject. Consequently, an apprehension of 
sinning against God moved Clarkson to exclaim ‘I care not my owne 
damnation, if God bee glorified’.93 Archibald Johnston of Wariston judged that 
he had been moved to ‘mourne for sinne’ as it was ‘relative unto God by 
offending, greiving, angring of so loving ane Fayther’, as opposed to it being 
caused by an experience of God’s wrath.94 Wariston was inspired, like 
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Clarkson, to tell God that ‘I sould preferre thy glory to my salvation’, which 
brought him great comfort and assurance of salvation. Rutherford was also 
‘led to mourn for sin in generall’, sometimes ‘in great bitternes for offending a 
mercifull and loving God’.95 
 A desire or hope of mercy was also evoked by an apprehension of a 
loving God. It was moved by the love of God not yet obtained. Rutherford 
concluded that she, with her godly sorrow, had an ‘exceeding longing for 
Christ on any condition, and it had been to have endured all the torture of the 
damned’.96 Jean Kincaid was moved to prayer by her apprehension that she 
could have forgiveness from God: ‘Lord, for mercy and grace at thy hand for 
thy dear Son, Jesus Christ his sake, to the glory of thy mercy and safety of 
my sill soul’.97 The desire for mercy differed only in degree with the feeling of 
God’s mercy, which had as its formal object the mercy of God possessed. 
John Forbes of Corse felt a ‘feeling of his great mercie’, motivated by a 
meditation on ‘his great love toward mankynde’, when he was ‘beholding him 
q[uho]m I w[i]t[h] my sins had pearced’.98 Similarly, Rutherford was 
overwhelmed with joy when she ‘gat bleeding Christ apprehended, and his 
merit applyed for pardon’.99 Kincaid, Balfour reported, judged herself to have 
gotten ‘great mercy’, which she claimed to have created in her ‘a feeling of 
his mercy’.100 Thus, the formal objects of these three emotions critical to the 
spiritual journey – godly sorrow, a desire for mercy, and a feeling of mercy – 
were identified by Scottish Protestants as God apprehended as a good in 
relation to the subject, albeit in different ways. 
 A specific way in which God’s attributes acted as a formal object, so 
thought Scottish Protestants, was in the deliverances of the conscience. 
Robert Bruce outlined a comprehensive theory of the conscience, which was 
representative of contemporaneous accounts in early modern Scotland and 
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England.101 In the main, the conscience was considered the faculty which 
evaluates the good and evil of a person’s actions. Bruce explained that the 
conscience was a: 
certain feeling in the heart, resembling the judgement of the living 
God, following upon a deed done by us, flowing from a knowledge in 
the mind, and accompanied by a certain motion of the heart, fear or 
joy, trembling or rejoicing.102 
 
Bruce argued that the conscience takes as its formal object a deed done by 
the subject. This action is judged in relation to the knowledge of the mind, 
which determines whether the thing done is good or evil. This evaluation 
would only be accurate if the conceptual framework which informs the mind’s 
judgements is the Word of God. If the conscience were guided by 
judgements which followed the will of God expressed in scripture, then the 
emotion evoked forthwith ‘resembles the judgement of God’. The feeling – 
fear if the deed done was interpreted as evil, joy if it was perceived as good – 
was understood to represent God’s own attitude or declaration in relation to 
the deeds done by the subject. Put another way, the intention of the formal 
object was considered God’s expressed judgement on the subject’s actions. 
Thus the conscience was in Bruce’s view an emotion evoked by a formal 
object which had an intention which was interpreted as God’s attitude – wrath 
or mercy – towards a subject in light of their deeds. 
 Consequently, Ryrie is right to argue that Protestants in sixteenth and 
seventeenth century Britain, including Scots, considered emotion to be a 
form of ‘revelation’, which they could use to determine the will of God in 
relation to their lives.103 In his view, Protestants could use their emotions as 
evidence for whether they had been elected or reprobated. Through this 
analysis of their emotions, Protestants examined how the teaching of 
scripture, God’s revealed will, applied to them.104 Emotion, thus, was God 
‘speaking’ directly to the subject. This paralleled the activity of Satan, who 
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could also use the emotions as a means of communicating with the subject 
for his own nefarious purposes.105 Ryrie has even claimed that Scottish 
Protestants were more brazen in their judgements that their emotions were 
the work of supernatural agency than their English counterparts.106 Even if 
Ryrie’s claim overstates the differences in how zealous Scottish and English 
Protestants interpreted their emotions, his analysis supports the argument of 
this thesis that in their personal writings fervent Scottish Protestants engaged 
with emotion as a felt expression of God’s will, which makes sense in relation 
to the idea that the formal object of these emotions was identified as God’s 
attitude towards the subject. Evoked by such a stimulant, these emotions 
were interpreted as if they resembled God’s judgements through the medium 
of experience. 
 However, the argument presented in this thesis goes beyond Ryrie’s 
claim that emotions were considered a form of revelation. This chapter 
argues that because God was identified as the formal object of an emotion 
God was deemed to be in the subject.107 This claim can be defended in 
relation to the theory of emotion presupposed by Scottish Protestants 
(outlined in chapter one).108 Its proponents contended that the formal object 
of a passion is the form of an object abstracted from its matter. The form 
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received into the imagination is judged identical with that possessed by the 
known object, and hence is the same reality that exists independently of the 
subject’s consciousness. Thus, the mercy or wrath of God received into the 
mind are, by implication, judged identical with God’s attributes of mercy and 
wrath. This meant that it was God, not a mere representation of God, which 
constituted the formal object of a passion. God, through those divine 
attributes which were apprehended by the subject (wrath and mercy), was in 
the faculties.  
 The language Scottish Protestants used to identify their emotions 
assumed God’s attributes were in the soul when apprehended as the formal 
object of an emotion. For example, John Forbes of Corse spoke of receiving 
‘Grace, mercie, & peace’ or ‘obtaining mercie & comfort’.109 He did not say he 
had an emotion in reaction to a representation of God’s mercy in his mind. 
Rather, Forbes judged that God’s mercy was his possession: God’s attributes 
were in his consciousness. The same is true for other zealous Scottish 
Protestants. They interpreted their emotions as moved by God’s wrath or 
mercy without qualification.110 Indeed, the idea of ‘feeling’ God’s mercy 
implied that one could feel, or have an emotion evoked by, God’s mercy, 
which was only possible if it could be a formal object of a passion. The plain 
reading of the source material indicates that Scottish Protestants assumed 
that the cause of their emotions, God, was in the soul as the formal object of 
a passion. 
 An objection that could be put forward against this hypothesis is the 
idea that significant Reformed Protestants who influenced Scottish piety did 
not believe God was in a subject when the Holy Spirit created supernatural 
emotions. Todd Billings has made this point in relation to Calvin’s 
interpretation of the Lord’s Supper.111 He has argued that for Calvin spatial 
terms are the wrong way to conceive of Christ’s presence in the Sacrament. 
It is not so much a process where the believer’s soul is united with a spatially 
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distant Christ in heaven. Rather, the distance is one of transcendence. 
Christ’s body is tasted insofar as believers receive the ‘life-giving power of 
heaven on earth’. Thus, to say that Christ is the formal object of an emotion 
and thus is in the subject’s consciousness could be construed as a category 
mistake. It is metaphorical language intended to express the access one has 
to Christ’s power through the Lord’s Supper. That Billing’s argument could 
apply to the understanding of the Sacrament by Scottish Protestants may be 
evidenced by John Davidson’s (c.1549-1604) comments on the Lord’s 
Supper, in which he was explicit that the heart is ‘convoyed and carried, to 
the lively consideration of his death and resurrection’.112 
 A similar argument, that God does not enter a person’s consciousness 
when the formal object an emotion, has been put forward by John Fesko in 
relation to the theology of the influential English puritan theologian William 
Perkins (1558-1602).113 In a short passage on union with Christ, Fesko 
argues that, for Perkins, Christ is not inside a subject when performing the 
work of sanctification. Rather, through the special operation of the Holy Spirit, 
Christ reforms the faculties. Fesko cites this quotation from Perkins to 
support his claims: 
The second is, vivification by the virtue of the resurrection of Christ 
(Phil 3.10). And this virtue is the power of the God-head of Christ, or 
the power of the Spirit, raising us to newness of life, as it raised Christ, 
from the death of sin. And by this power, Christ is said to live in them 
that believe.114 
 
Given that Perkins seems to have claimed that Christ is not ‘literally’ in the 
believer, but that his power is in them, Fesko infers that Perkins did not 
believe Christ was in a literal sense present in the soul during sanctification. 
As Calvin and Perkins were significant representatives of the Reformed 
tradition, and both had an important influence on Scottish Protestantism, it 
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could be construed from Billings’s and Fesko’s interpretation of their positions 
that it is a misinterpretation of Scottish Protestant language about emotions 
to conclude that they thought God was in their faculties as a formal object. 
Indeed, the dissimilarity between God and the forms – one the living, infinite, 
eternal creator, the other an inanimate, finite, temporal creature – could 
support these arguments against the idea that God was considered to be 
within a subject’s consciousness as the formal object of a supernatural 
emotion. 
 However, the communion theology of Robert Bruce emphatically 
demonstrates that the language of public worship (analysed in chapter three), 
and by extension personal writings, assumed that God was in the 
consciousness of a subject who was experiencing a supernatural emotion.115 
Bruce explained that Christ enters the soul during the Lord’s Supper in a 
lively passage which is worth quoting in full: 
For example, at the sight of a picture of the King, the King will come 
into your mind, and it will signify to you that that is the King’s picture. 
If, therefore, the sign of the Sacrament did no more than that, all 
pictures would be Lord’s Supper; but the Sacrament exhibits and 
delivers the thing that it signifies to the soul and heart, as soon as the 
sign is delivered to the mouth. It is for this reason, especially, that it is 
called a sign. No picture of the King will deliver the King to you; there 
is no other image that will exhibit the reality of which it is the image; 
therefore no image can be a Sacrament. Thus it is chiefly because the 
Lord has appointed the Lord’s Supper as hands to deliver and exhibit 
the things signified, that they are called signs.116 
 
In this excerpt, Bruce argued that God’s entrance into the soul was not like 
seeing a picture of the King, for all this does is create an image of the King in 
the mind. By contrast, the sacrament delivers the thing ‘that it signifies to the 
soul and heart’.117 It is the instrument appointed by God to ‘deliver to us 
Christ Jesus for our everlasting salvation’. Bruce justified this claim in relation 
to his conception of perception. He claimed that, whether inward or outward, 
to perceive something makes a thing present to the subject, regardless of 
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distance.118 He cited the example of the sun, which though it is far away, by 
the sense of sight is present to him. In the Lord’s Supper, the body of Christ 
is present to ‘the inward senses, which is faith wrought in the soul’. It makes 
Christ present in the soul.119 Thus, as Christ is apprehended in the soul, he 
is, for Bruce, in the subject’s consciousness as the formal object of the 
feeling of God’s mercy in the Lord’s Supper. 
 Furthermore, the Reformed Protestant affirmation of the doctrine of 
divine simplicity implies that the readings of Calvin and Perkins by Billings 
and Fesko are questionable. The idea that God’s attributes and essence are 
identical, only formally distinct, was widely believed by early modern 
Reformed Protestants, including in Scotland. If Calvin and Perkins believed 
that it is Christ’s power that is resident in the soul in the Lord’s Supper and 
sanctification respectively, given they considered Christ’s power is identical 
with his essence, it follows that they ought to have concluded that Christ 
must be in the soul too. That this is a reasonable interpretation of Calvin and 
Perkins is confirmed by their own words. Calvin only denied local presence in 
relation to Christ being in the elements of bread and wine: he was satisfied to 
argue that in the Lord’s Supper ‘The Spirit alone causes us to possess Christ 
completely and have him dwelling in us.’120 With regard to Perkins, he does 
not say that Christ’s dwelling in us by his power denies that Christ is within 
the soul. This is an interpretation offered by Fesko. Rather, Perkins merely 
claimed that by the power of the Spirit ‘Christ is said to live in them that 
believe’ in the process of sanctification. This could be construed as a claim 
that in the reformation of the faculties it is God’s mercy in Christ, not his 
wrath, that becomes the formal object of the emotions. At the very least, it is 
unclear that Calvin and Perkins denied that God was present in the subject’s 
consciousness as the formal object of an emotion. 
 Finally, it could be argued, in response to counterpoints, that Scottish 
Protestants differed from the Reformed community in England and abroad in 
 
118 Bruce, Lord’s Supper, 133-134. 
119 Yeoman, ‘Heart-work’, 180. 
120 Calvin, Institutes, 4.17.12. 
149 
 
their assumption that God was in the soul as the formal object of a 
supernatural emotion. As has been argued, the language of emotion used in 
public worship and private piety assumed that supernatural emotions were 
caused by the apprehension of God’s attributes, such as wrath and mercy, in 
the subject’s consciousness. That Scottish Protestants were more confident 
in judging that their emotions were the product of divine action has been 
claimed by Ryrie.121 Moreover, they presupposed that another supernatural 
agent, the devil, dwelt within the minds of those he emotionally manipulated: 
as Brock has argued, when Scottish Protestants internalised the demonic, 
they assumed that Satan was within them when he caused their sins, 
temptations, and doubts.122 Consequently, appeals to Reformed Protestant 
views outside of Scotland should not necessarily undermine the argument 
that fervent Scottish Protestants assumed God was in their consciousness as 
the formal object of emotion, as such evidence may not represent the 
position held in Scotland by zealous Protestants. Their theory of emotion, 
along with their adherence to the doctrine of divine simplicity, their parallel 
views of the devil’s agency, and the language they used to identify the formal 
objects of their emotions, provide a strong cumulative case for the plausibility 
of the view that Scottish Protestants believed God was in their souls, whether 
or not other Reformed communities took the same view. 
 Thus, Scottish Protestants judged that God was in their consciousness 
as the formal object which causes a passion. This was due, in part, to their 
presupposed theory of emotion and their support for the doctrine of divine 
simplicity. The natural interpretation of the language they used to articulate 
their experiences assumed that God, apprehended under a given aspect, 
was in the subject’s soul, which stimulated emotion. Moreover, their view of 
God’s presence in the subject mirrored their views about Satan’s location 
when causing emotion. Hence, it is plausible to believe that zealous Scottish 
Protestants judged, in their practice of radical emotional reflexivity, that God 
was within them as the external agent of their supernatural emotions. 
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3. Ecstatic Joy and the Experience of Happiness 
 Zealous Scottish Protestants claimed that God could also be in the 
soul another way besides as the formal object of a passion. They identified 
that their experiences of intense enjoyment were, in the right context, the 
subjective dimension of communion with God. Their psychosomatic feelings, 
then, could be a mode of perception, a felt apprehension of a reality, in this 
case happiness; just as touch is the sensory perception of an object. In the 
language they used, this meant that the emotion of extreme pleasure was 
apprehended as the formal object of a passion, evaluated as good for the 
subject insofar as it was interpreted as the effect of God’s communion with 
the subject. They drew this conclusion based on their theory of emotion 
(engaged with in chapter one).123 Scottish Protestants presupposed that joy 
was the rest of the appetite in the object of its love. This meant that they 
assumed that ecstatic joy was the felt dimension of the appetite’s rest in 
God.124 As such rest was only possible in a present object, it was implied that 
for one to enjoy God then God must be present to and in the soul. These 
presuppositions and what they entailed about the ontological nature of joy 
explain why Scottish Protestants claimed that their experiences of ecstatic 
joy were in fact apprehensions or perceptions of God in themselves. Thus, 
they were considered a spiritual sensation of communion with God produced 
by the material manifestation of the appetite’s rest in its supreme good. 
 William Struther argued that experiences of ecstatic joy evoked by 
communion with God were episodes of what he called ‘Spirituall Excesse’.125 
In his view, these emotions were not the ordinary experience of believers. 
Rather, they were considered by Struther a special act of God where God 
‘commincateth himselfe to the soule’, where the ‘spirit is pulled out of it selfe, 
and the body feebled’. It is a being ‘in heaven with God’, filling the soul with 
‘love and joy’ to a degree ‘not oft to be found’. Thus Struther argued that 
spiritual excess was a special gift of God whereby the soul apprehends 
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God’s presence as the saints do in heaven, where they see God ‘face to 
face’ without the instruments of the Word and Sacraments. It was a 
temporary experience of being ‘full of God’: a glimpse of happiness. In a 
similar vein, Robert Boyd of Trochrig (1578-1627), Principal of the university 
of Glasgow and later Edinburgh, counselled Robert Blair that the student’s 
experience of divine ravishment was ‘not the daily fare of the people of God’, 
but a gift sent to ‘strengthen my faith, to make my hope lively’ and to ‘prepare 
me to endure temptation and affliction’.126 The purpose of ‘spiritual excess’ 
was identical to the experience of communion with Christ in the Lord’s 
Supper: the Sacrament instituted ‘for the growth and increase of our faith, for 
the increase of our holiness and sanctification’.127 Episodic experiences of 
happiness in public worship and private piety, thus, were interpreted by 
ministers as gifts from God sent to propel the subject forward on their 
spiritual journey. 
 That zealous Scottish Protestants interpreted their ravishing pleasure 
as a perception of communion with God is evident from their personal 
writings. The vocabulary they used to characterise these experiences was 
similar to that used by Struther of what it was like to feel ‘spiritual excess’. 
For example, many zealous Scottish Protestants, like Struther, characterised 
their episodes of happiness as an experience of being ‘filled’ or ‘full’ of God. 
Robert Blair evaluated that he had ‘the love of God burning in my soul’, a 
feeling of being ‘full now of joy and pleasure in God’.128 Mistress Rutherford 
judged that on one occasion all of a ‘suddain the Lord filled the heart with 
such a sense of himself that cannot be expressed with assurance of his 
leading me’.129 Archibald Johnston of Wariston claimed that in an episode the 
Lord had ‘opened the eies of thy mynd to seie Gods faice schyning presently 
on thy saule with sutch amiable beams flouing from his reconiled 
countenance as almost transported the[e] out of thyselth’. This was a 
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‘sensible possession of God’ and ‘sight of my happiness’.130 In these and 
other instances, the powerful emotions of joy and peace the author evaluated 
were interpreted as a perception of God’s presence in the soul. Why such 
language denoted communion with God is analysed in the following 
discussion. 
 A common way authors characterised such an experience was to 
name it ‘inexpressible’.131 This language was borrowed from the writings of 
Paul. In Romans, he encouraged his readers that ‘the Spirit helps us in our 
weakness, for we do not know how we should pray, but the Spirit himself 
intercedes for us with inexpressible groanings.’132 In his own examination of 
his mystical vision, Paul saw, he claimed, ‘inexpressible things’.133 In the 
same way, Scottish Protestants emphasised the unspeakability of their 
experience of communion with God. It referenced the intensity of the peace 
and joy that they felt, so overwhelming that language was inadequate to 
express it. Moreover, it identified the subjective sphere, what was felt, with 
the ineffability of what was perceived through these emotions, just like Paul’s 
mystical vision: the transcendent. The apophatic quality of these experiences 
was an indicator, for fervent Scottish Protestants, that these were 
apprehensions of communion with God. Thus the emotion which was a 
subjective experience of God was inexpressible because the one whom 
perceived it apprehended that communion with God is beyond all 
categorisation. 
 Fervent Scottish Protestants also interpreted perceptions of 
communion with God as an experience of being ‘filled’. Mistress Rutherford 
was ‘filled’ with peace, while Archibald Johnston of Wariston was ‘filled with 
holy thoughts and divine imaginations’.134 James Mitchell of Dykes was ‘filled’ 
with the sense of God’s love.135 Such language is reminiscent of Acts 2, 
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where the Holy Spirit ‘filled’ the disciples, making them speak in tongues.136 It 
is also inspired by Paul’s imperative that followers of Christ should be ‘filled 
with the Spirit’.137 In the context of emotion, it probably reflected the all-
encompassing nature of the emotions experienced. There was no discord or 
dissonance within the affections: all that was experienced was peace and joy 
through the rest of the appetite in God. At the same time, the physiological 
manifestation of rest in God was ‘the heart inlarging the selfe sweetly, for to 
imbrace the object that is agreable to it’, (as discussed in chapter one).138 In 
this way, communion with God filled, or ‘enlarged’, the soul. 
 Committed Scottish Protestants identified their perception of God as 
enlargement, filling, and ravishment because its psychosomatic features 
were similar to those experienced in sexual orgasm.139 This was not unique 
to Scottish Protestantism: a similarly sexualised interpretation of experiencing 
God is apparent in Roman Catholic art of the period, most notably in ‘The 
Ecstasy of St Teresa’ (1647-1652) by Gian Lorenzo Bernini (1598-1680). The 
psychosomatic features of communion with God which Scottish Protestants 
thought were similar to those of sexual orgasm are further analysed in the 
next chapter.140 For the present purpose, what is important is that such 
language implied that, like sex, the pleasure the subject felt was aroused by 
intimacy with another. Given the implicitly feminine character of the subject 
acted upon by God in the Scottish Protestant linguistic-conceptual 
framework, the language used to identify perceptions of God via the medium 
of emotion conveyed that God was like a man who had pleasured his lover. 
Just as the joy of woman is increased by the enlargement of the male 
member to fill her, so too the growth of God’s presence in the soul satisfies 
the passive subject. Moreover, the idea that communion with God is an 
experience of ‘ravishment’, often associated with the use of force and sexual 
violence, reinforced the idea that the subject’s ecstatic joy was involuntary: it 
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was stimulated solely by the action of God upon the passive, and thus 
feminine, individual.141 The sexual imagery evoked by enlargement, filled, 
and ravished, indicated that, in the view of Scottish Protestants, their ecstatic 
joy was caused by the action of another inside them, and thus that such 
emotions were perceptions of God’s presence in the soul. 
 Related to the idea of intimacy was the evaluation made by pious 
Scottish Protestants that ecstatic joy was a perception of physical proximity 
to God. One way this judgement was expressed was through the 
identification of an emotion as the soul ‘seeing’ God’s face or countenance. 
In the depths of despair, William Cowper was made to see ‘the bright and 
lightsome countenance of God proclaiming peace, and confirming peace’, 
while James Mitchell of Dykes felt the ‘Sun of righteousness by his spirit, to 
shine so clearly, and powerfully in the soul of so filthy and polluted a 
sinner’.142 Archibald Johnston of Wariston recorded that the Lord had 
‘opened the eies of thy mynd to seie Gods faice schyning presently on thy 
saule with sutch amiable beams flouing from his reconciled countenance’.143 
While he was still a Jesuit priest, Thomas Abernethy (c.1600-fl.1639) usually 
read a chapter of the bible each day.144 He had doubts about the validity of 
the Papacy when, on one occasion, he read Colossians 2:8: ‘Beware least 
any man spoile you thorow philosophie, and vaine deceat, after the traditions 
of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ’.145 Abernethy 
was suddenly seized with anxiety about the role of the Pope and, at the same 
time, was ‘illuminate with an extraordinary light… whereby comparing the 
words of the Apostle with their doctrines and actions, I was convicted in my 
minde to define Poperie to be a superstitious masse of policie, under the 
pretext of religion’.146 Such language was reminiscent of Numbers 6:25 ‘may 
the Lord make his face to shine upon you’. Given that the sight of God’s face 
 
141 See DOST, https://www.dsl.ac.uk. Date accessed 14/03/2020; OED, 
https://www.oed.com. Date accessed 14/03/2020. 
142 Cowper, Life, B3r; Dykes, Memoirs, 31.  
143 Wariston, Diary, 218-219. 
144 Alasdair Roberts, ‘Thomas Abernethy, Jesuit and Covenanter’, in Scottish Church History 
Society (1991), 141-160. 
145 Thomas Abernethy, The Abjuration of Poperie (Edinburgh, 1638), 26, 22. 
146 Abernethy, Abjuration, 22. 
155 
 
was considered a state of communion with God, it was a metaphor for the 
state of happiness. This is why Wariston described the experience of seeing 
God as a ‘sensible possession of God’ and ‘sight of my happiness’.147  
 Simultaneously, many zealous Scottish Protestants identified that 
communion with God was experienced as a kind of ‘elevation’. Cowper felt as 
if he was ‘raised up to Heaven, to have joyfull fellowship with God in Christ 
Jesus’, while Dykes, in perhaps his most ecstatic experience, had ‘such a 
sense of joy filling the hole man, that in truth, I thought myself carried on 
eagle’s wings, and possesst of this kindgom’.148 Blair was, when full of the 
pleasure of God, ‘in this banqueting house, the banner of his love over me’, 
as his soul was ‘elevated and enlarged’, while Wariston, in his possession of 
God, felt as if he was ‘almost transported the[e] out of thyselth’.149 Dykes 
used similar language when he declared that the Lord gave him a ‘great 
peace and calmness of mind’ so that he was ‘almost transported out of 
myself’.150 Again, Paul’s mystical vision, where he was present in the ‘third 
heaven’, Jesus’s allusions to the Kingdom of God as being like a great 
banquet, and the promise in Isaiah that God will enable the elect to soar ‘on 
wings like eagles’, were probable influences on the identification of ecstatic 
joy as an elevation towards God’s presence, along with the Song of 
Songs.151 In any case, the language was used to indicate the perceived 
proximity of God to the soul.152   
 In sum, this section has shown how some Scottish Protestants 
identified that their experiences were, on occasion, intense perceptions of 
communion with God. Based on their theory of emotion, they presupposed 
that their ecstatic joy was the felt dimension of the rest of their appetite in the 
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supreme good. They used a rich vocabulary, inspired by scripture and well-
known cultural terms, to convey that these emotions were experiences of 
God’s presence in the soul. They learned this vocabulary from ministers like 
Struther, whose examination of ‘spiritual excess’ indicates, in conjunction 
with the evidence from other ministers and personal writings, that the 
perception of God’s presence in the soul was built into the language of 
emotion integral to Scottish Protestant worship and piety. In particular, it 
characterised the experience of the sixth stage of the spiritual journey 
(explored in chapter three).153 In other words, the identification of rapturous 
pleasure as a perception of communion with God was a socially learned 
interpretation utilised by fervent Scottish Protestants in their practice of 
radical emotional reflexivity. This provided another way– along with being 
considered the formal object of an emotion – that the presence of God was 
perceived in the soul. 
 
 
 This chapter has analysed Scottish Protestant judgements about the 
relationship between God and the supernatural emotions in the spiritual 
journey towards happiness. It has argued that they identified God as the 
cause of the emotions which propelled the soul towards communion with 
Christ. The implication of this view, that God resided in the subject as the 
formal object of a passion, was examined. Moreover, the chapter has 
explained how fervent Scots believed they could perceive communion with 
God through their experiences of ecstatic joy. This thesis was supported by 
considering the language they used to identify these emotions and possible 
counterarguments to this position. The assumptions in the Scottish 
Protestant mindset which made coherent the evaluations analysed in this 
chapter were outlined with reference to previous portions of the thesis. 
 In this and the previous chapter, the narrative framework and 
language of the spiritual journey has been analysed: both the structure they 
 
153 Chapter Three, 115-120. 
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assigned to their emotions, and the character who propelled the plot, God. In 
this way chapters three and four have explored the way in which Scottish 
Protestants identified the significance of their emotions, insofar as they 
related to their goal: communion with God. Put another way, these chapters 
have explored how Scottish Protestants, in public worship and personal 
writings, used language about their emotions. It has examined the basic story 
they tried to tell about their emotions, through shifts in their vocabulary, and 
what they meant by their words.  
 Two further questions remain. First, why did Scots, in public worship 
and private piety, decide certain words better denoted their emotions than 
others? Put another way, why did they make the judgements they did about 
their emotions? Answering these queries will show why the extant personal 
writings present Scottish Protestantism as highly emotional. Second, why did 
Scottish Protestants, in corporate religious practice and personal writings, 
consciously evaluate their emotions? Addressing this question shall explain 
why the spiritual journey was the emotional spine of public worship and 
private devotion. By extension, the reason why zealous Scots practiced 
radical emotional reflexivity and produced narratives of the spiritual journey 
will be explicated. It is to address these questions that the thesis now turns.
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Chapter Five: The Mobilisation of Supernatural Emotions 
 
This chapter examines the process and purpose of radical emotional 
reflexivity in Scottish Protestant worship and piety. It argues that the 
examination of emotion was built into corporate religious activity and private 
devotion because Scots were taught that this practice was the means 
appointed by God to mobilise in them supernatural emotions. Put another 
way, the categorisation of emotion was a part of corporate religious practice 
and private devotion because it was thought that the process could evoke 
those desired feelings which facilitate communion with God. The naming and 
identification of emotion had this effect because the process could show a 
person where they were on the spiritual journey towards happiness, which 
would stimulate an appropriate emotional response. Consequently, testing 
the ‘sincerity’ of one’s emotions, and as such one’s spiritual state, was an 
activity which was central to public worship and private spirituality in early 
modern Scotland. Through analysis of this practice, the thesis moves beyond 
what Scottish Protestants said about their emotions, explored in chapters 
three and four, to how and why they used this language to categorise their 
experiences. Moreover, it explains why radical emotional reflexivity was 
practiced in corporate ritual and through the production and reading of 
personal writings by zealous Scottish Protestants. 
The course of the argument is developed in three sections. The first 
segment engages with the processes Scots used in public worship and 
private piety to test the sincerity of a subject’s emotions. ‘Sincerity’ was a key 
concept in Scottish Protestantism, and how it grounded the practice of radical 
emotional reflexivity in corporate ritual and private spirituality is explored. 
This paves the way for an analysis of how Scots evaluated the authenticity of 
an individual’s emotions. It is argued that this was carried out by inferring the 
nature of an emotion by its causes and effects. Based on such inferences, 
Scots could determine whether they, or another, had genuinely experienced 
supernatural emotions.  
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Inevitably, the assessment of one’s emotions to determine their 
sincerity meant that in some cases Scots concluded a subject did not have 
supernatural affections. This is the focus of the second section. It navigates 
the ways in which Scots inferred that their emotions were not of divine origin, 
due to the causes and effects of these experiences. In so doing, the 
discussion addresses the problem of doubt which afflicted many of the most 
fervent Scottish Protestants. The anxiousness that arose from such 
conclusions was, it is claimed, produced by a tension intrinsic to the 
language and concepts of emotion that Scots were taught and used in their 
practice of radical emotional reflexivity.  
The final section explores why Scots used public worship and personal 
writings to examine their emotions. It argues that Scots used radical 
emotional reflexivity – the test of sincerity – to mobilise desired, supernatural 
emotions. To show that this was the function of self-examination, the section 
examines how the identification and naming of emotion in corporate ritual 
and private devotion evoked those emotions which constituted the spiritual 
journey (outlined in chapter three).1 Put another way, this chapter 
demonstrates that communal religious practice and the personal writings 
produced by zealous Scots functioned as ways and means by which they 
could stimulate supernatural emotions. Moreover, because radical emotional 
reflexivity was God-caused it was considered an activity in which a person 
not only evoked desired emotions, but experienced the spiritual journey. 
Thus this chapter explores why Scottish Protestants consciously examined 
their emotions and why this was a core feature of their public worship and 
private piety. By extension, it explains why fervent Scots wrote narratives 
about a subject’s spiritual journey: they used these texts to mobilise God-
caused emotions and to engage in the pilgrimage of their souls. 
Consequently, the final section explores the function of the language used 
about emotion in public worship and private piety in early modern Scottish 
Protestantism.  
 
1 Chapter Three, 89-120. 
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1. The Procedure of Radical Emotional Reflexivity 
a. Testing the Sincerity of a Subject’s Emotions 
On the 7 August 1590, King James VI delivered a speech at the 
General Assembly. His words were met by a fifteen-minute standing ovation 
from his audience. The following excerpt from James’s oration indicates why 
it met with such approval. 
...his Majesty praiseth God that he was born in such a time, as in the 
time of the light of the Gospell, to such a place to be King, in such a 
Kirk, the sincerest Kirk in the world. The Kirk of Geneva, said he, 
keepeth Pasche and Yuile. What have they for them? They have no 
institution. As for our neighbour Kirk in England, it is ane evill said 
messe in English, wanting nothing but the liftings. I charge you my 
good people, Ministers, Doctors, Elders, Nobles, Gentlemen, and 
Barrons to stand to your purity, and to exhort the people to do the 
same.2 
 
James claimed that the church in Scotland was ‘sincere’. It had a ‘purity’ the 
gathered assembly should defend and maintain. This imperative 
presupposed what Jane Dawson has called the ‘regulative principle’.3 The 
idea was articulated in the Scots Confession. The authors of the text, and by 
extension its subscribers, asked those who believed that their confession 
was ‘repugnand to Gods halie word’, to show them their error, so that religion 
in Scotland would have fidelity to ‘his haly scriptures’.4 In the so-called 
‘Negative Confession’ of 1581 the regulative principle was reaffirmed, 
subscribers attesting that only that which is grounded ‘upon his written word’ 
is ‘the trew Christian Faith and Religion’.5 True religion was manifested at two 
levels: the institutional and the individual.6 First, Scotland’s religion was 
sincere insofar as it had purity in theology, practice, and structure. The Scots 
Confession argued that a church was sincere insofar as it facilitated the right 
 
2 Acts and Proceedings of the General Assemblies of the Kirk of Scotland, From the Year 
MDLX, ed. Thomas Thomson (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club Publications, 1839–45), II, 771. 
3 Dawson, Knox, 36. 
4 Scots Confession, 41. 
5 Scots Confession, 103. 
6 The way ‘sincerity’ characterised religious practice at an institutional and personal level in 
Scottish Protestantism was similar to how ‘moderation’ was the governing principle of polity 
and piety in the Elizabethan church. See Ethan Shagan, The Rule of Moderation: Violence, 
Religion and the Politics of Restraint in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 8. 
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preaching of the Word, correctly administered the sacraments of baptism and 
the Lord’s Supper, and exercised ecclesiastical discipline through which vice 
is suppressed and virtue is nourished.7 This was the sense of ‘sincere’ 
James used when he compared the Scottish church to its Genevan and 
English counterparts. Scotland’s church was the ‘sincerest’ because it 
adhered to the Word of God, while the church in Geneva was less pure, 
insofar as it celebrated the feast days of Christmas and Easter, while 
England was insincere through its celebration of what James decried as the 
Mass in English. It was in this institutional sense that Scotland’s religion was 
judged by James, and to the delight of his audience, as the ‘sincerest’ in all 
the world.8  
At the same time, a church could only be sincere if its people adhered 
to the precepts of the bible. Each person had to meet the biblical standards 
for cognition, emotion, and action.9 This idea was the outworking of the 
widespread assumption, embedded into Scottish Protestantism, that 
Scotland was a ‘covenanted’ nation.10 This meant that the people of Scotland 
had, as a corporate body, a special connection with God. They had the same 
kind of relationship to the Lord as Israel did in the Old Testament.11 It meant 
that, like in the story of Abraham, God promised ‘to be God unto’ the people 
of Scotland, but also that the people of Scotland were bound to ‘keep my 
covenant, thou, and thy seed after thee in their generations’.12 Just as 
circumcision was a sign that the covenant applied to the new-born child, so 
infant baptism was the means by which the entire population of Scotland was 
ingrafted into this covenant with the Lord, and so were obliged to obey the 
precepts of God laid out in the scriptures.13 The clearest expression of this 
 
7 Jane Dawson, ‘The sincerest kirk in all the world’: Scotland and the Reformed community’, 
Lecture, Society for Reformation Studies (Cambridge, April 2018); Scots Confession, XVIII; 
See DOST, https://www.dsl.ac.uk. Date accessed 20/05/2020. 
8 This was also a claim made by the ‘Negative Confession’. See Scots Confession, 103. 
9 Dawson, ‘The sincerest kirk in all the world’. 
10 Spurlock, ‘Boundaries’, 359; Mullan, Scottish Puritanism, 179. 
11 R. Kyle, ‘The Nature of the Church in the Thought of John Knox’ in Scottish Journal of 
Theology, 37 (1984), 486. 
12 Genesis 17:7-9. 
13 Spurlock, ‘Boundaries’, 360-361; Dawson, ‘Discipline’, 124. 
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demand upon the people of Scotland was in the aptly named National 
Covenant of 1638. Issued in resistance to Caroline liturgical implementations, 
its subscribers committed themselves to the defence of true religion and, 
hence, to a rejection of all innovations. They pledged that, with an ‘unfeigned 
desire’, they would ‘maintain the true worship of God, the majesty of our 
King, and the peace of the kingdom, for the common happiness of ourselves 
and posterity’. This was followed with one final clause: 
And because we cannot look for a blessing from God upon our 
proceedings, except with our profession and subscription, we join such 
a life and conversation as beseemeth Christians who have renewed 
their covenant with God; we therefore faithfully promise, for ourselves, 
our followers, and all other under us, both in public, in our particular 
families and personal carriage, to endeavour to keep ourselves within 
the bounds of Christian liberty, and to be good examples to others of 
all godliness, soberness and righteousness, and of every duty we owe 
to God and man…14 
 
In this passage, the subscriber committed to obey God’s will in their personal 
conduct. They recognised that true religion could only be maintained at an 
institutional level if the thoughts, feelings, and actions of the people of 
Scotland, in private and public, conformed to the standard laid out in the 
bible. Otherwise, God would not bless their endeavour to reform the 
institutional church, as their professed desire would be insincere. Put another 
way, a subscriber could claim their defence and maintenance of true religion 
was genuine if, and only if, this was joined with a zealous pursuit of personal 
purity.15 Thus, when James charged his subjects to ‘stand to your purity’, he 
was commanding them to maintain the sincerity of the Kirk in Scotland not 
 
14 The National Covenant and Other Papers c.1637-c.41, National Library of Scotland, 
MS.1939. 
15 That the sincerity of the institutional and personal were considered interconnected is 
evidenced by the confession of personal sins in the ritual of public fasting. See Struther, 
Warning, 17-34; Spurlock, ‘Boundaries’, 361; Alec Ryrie, ‘The Rise and Fall of Fasting in the 
British Reformations’ in Worship, and the Parish Church in Early Modern Britain, eds. Natalie 
Mears and Alec Ryrie (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013, 97; W. Ian P. 
Hazlett, ‘Playing God’s Card: Knox and Fasting, 1565-66’, in John Knox and the British 
Reformations, ed. Roger A. Mason (Aldershot, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1998), 
185-186, 189, 192. 
163 
 
only at an institutional level, but also in relation to each person’s thoughts, 
emotions, and actions.16 
Consequently, testing the sincerity of emotion was an intrinsic 
dimension of corporate ritual, especially the practice of public repentance. In 
chapter three, the language of emotion used in the ritual was laid out.17 The 
present discussion moves the analysis forward by examining this vocabulary 
and grammar as it was used to evaluate the sincerity of a penitent’s 
contrition. An offender could only be admitted to the ceremony if the kirk 
session deemed that they had an authentic ‘feare and terrour of God’s 
judgementes’, ‘haitrent of sinne and doloure for the same’, and a ‘sense and 
feilling… of Gods merceys’.18 If judged to have these emotions, the penitent 
was allowed to ‘witnes and declair his unfained repentance’ before the 
congregation. When allowed to participate in the ritual, the penitent was 
under intense scrutiny. Only with the consent of the congregation could the 
minister declare that the offender had been absolved of their sin. As ‘we can 
only se that which is without’, the minister and congregation would evaluate 
the sinner’s behaviour to determine whether their profession of unfeigned 
contrition was genuine. The penitent’s posture, clothing, props, 
choreography, dialogue, and demeanour (as discussed in chapter three) 
were all evaluated by the onlookers.19 This inspection would culminate in a 
‘trial of repentance’, a dialogue in which the minister would interrogate the 
sinner before the entire assembly.20 If satisfied, the minister asked the 
congregation to communicate whether they believed the penitent’s 
repentance was sincere.21 If the congregation showed a ‘sign of their 
consent’, the penitent would be absolved; if not, they would be forced to 
make further satisfaction for their sins. The minister would declare that the 
penitent’s sins ‘are forgevin not only in earth, but also in the heaven’, while 
 
16 Italics added for emphasis. 
17 Chapter Three, 75-89.  
18 Knox, Repentance, B1v. 
19 Chapter Three, 77-82.  
20 Todd, Culture, 156; Dawson, ‘Discipline’, 128; Macdonald, ‘Reconciling’, 206-207. 
21 Knox, Repentance, B6r. 
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the elders and deacons would embrace, kiss, and lead the reconciled 
individual to sit with the community.22 
A process of evaluating emotion, thus, ran through the heart of public 
repentance. The congregation evaluated the sincerity of the penitent’s 
claims: that they felt godly sorrow, a hatred for what they had done, and were 
assured they had received God’s mercy. They did so by comparing the 
offender’s behaviour with what they would expect someone to exhibit if they 
had those emotions. In this way, they were able to determine whether the 
individual was genuinely contrite or had feigned their penitence. Importantly, 
this meant that the ceremony constituted an examination of whether a sinner 
had been reconciled to God. It was not, as Nikki Macdonald and Scott 
Spurlock have argued, a ritual which effected reconciliation between God and 
the penitent.23 Rather, they were examinations used to determine whether 
the offender could be reintegrated back into the community based on 
whether the penitent had already and continued to experience the 
supernatural emotions required for sincere repentance. This is evidenced by 
the fact that the offender was not admitted to the trial of repentance if they 
had not already convinced the kirk session that they had genuine contrition. 
Public repentance, thus, tested whether a penitent was truly sorry for their 
sin, and as such whether they had already been a recipient of God’s grace. 
In other words, the ritual examined whether a subject had experienced the 
sequence of emotions which constituted the spiritual journey of the soul 
(discussed in chapter three).24 
Ministers urged their communities to evaluate the sincerity of their 
lives, and by extension their emotions, beyond the context of corporate 
worship.25 A clear example is found in The Anatomie of a Christian Man by 
 
22 FBD, VII; Knox, Repentance, B6v. 
23 Macdonald, ‘Reconciling’, 235-236; Spurlock, ‘Boundaries’, 361. 
24 Chapter Three, 77-82. 
25 William Struther, Christian Observations and Resolutions, I (Edinburgh, 1628), A2r-A4v; 
Dickson, Writings, 25, 47, 82; Bruce, Lord’s Supper, 168-169, 178; Boyd, Sermons, 211; 
Campbell, Treatise, A7r. Puritan ministers in England and North American also encouraged 
their congregations to engage in self-examination. See Cohen, God’s Caress, 86; Bozeman, 
Precisianist Strain, 106-120; Watkins, Puritan Experience, 9-12. 
165 
 
William Cowper, Bishop of Galloway.26 Cowper’s stated motivation for the 
project was to help Scots determine their spiritual status. Many, he argued, 
were deluded into thinking they were on a path towards fellowship with God. 
The behaviour of the majority of Scots indicated that they were in fact 
‘counterfeit Christians’: atheists, apostates, adulterers, murderers, and 
blasphemers.27 Due to this widespread self-deception, Cowper urged his 
reader to test their lives against the template presented in The Anatomie, as 
it contained an account of what a person looks like when their lives are 
conformed to the Word of God. His analysis included a detailed discussion of 
the emotions a person ought to experience if they are a Christian.28 Where 
an individual found similarity between their behaviour and the biblical 
standard, the reader should ‘give thankes to God for beginning of the worke 
of his grace in thee’. Where they found discrepancy, the individual should 
‘pray to God further to quicken thee, that thou mayest grow in holy similitude 
and conformitie with him’ for ‘thy everlasting comfort in Christ Jesus’. 
Consequently, Cowper produced The Anatomie to help and encourage 
Scottish Protestants to evaluate whether they were sincere or insincere 
Christians, with the examination of the emotions an integral part of this 
process. 
Many zealous Scottish Protestants followed this advice and examined 
their lives, including their emotions, in an effort to establish the sincerity of 
their religious profession. At various points in Mistress Rutherford’s narrative 
she actively examined her sins and the sincerity of her faith.29 Lady Hundaly 
and Bessie Clarkson, their dialogue partners claimed, had examined the 
sincerity of their emotions and had found them wanting.30 The Episcopalian 
John Forbes of Corse and the Presbyterians Archibald Johnston of Wariston 
and Robert Blair kept spiritual diaries, used to examine both their spiritual 
 
26 William Cowper, The Anatomie of a Christian Man (London, 1611), C1r-C4r. 
27 Similar attitudes were expressed by puritan pastors. See Lake, Moderate Puritans, 158-
159. 
28 Cowper, The Anatomie, 99-189. 
29 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 174-176, 180. 
30 Porteous, Exercise, 9, 11; Livingston, Conflict, 9. 
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experiences on a regular basis.31 In a similar vein, the Ayrshire farmer James 
Mitchell of Dykes wrote a memoir to reflect upon ‘the Lord’s mercies and 
dealings with my soul, and some deep exercises of mind’.32 In a polemical 
context, William Cowper’s Life examined his emotions to show those who 
that thought he was of dubious moral character, given that he had accepted a 
bishopric despite opposing Episcopalian ecclesiology, that his profession of 
faith was sincere.33 Thus, these and other pious Scots, like their puritan 
counterparts, tested the authenticity of their supernatural emotions.34 Their 
private spirituality became an exercise in radical emotional reflexivity, a 
search for and test of emotional sincerity. Put another way, fervent Scottish 
Protestants used radical emotional reflexivity to determine whether they were 
on the spiritual journey and, if so, to evaluate how far they had advanced 
towards communion with God. 
 
b. The Process of Emotional Identification 
To assess the sincerity of their emotions, Scottish Protestants named 
and identified their experiences. They classified their feelings, and so 
determined whether their emotions matched the biblical standard or needed 
revision. Based on a feeling’s perceived causes and effects, Scots were able 
to infer which vocabulary best represented the subject’s experiences. Put 
another way, what was judged to have evoked an emotion, and how that 
emotion manifested itself in somatic change, were a language Scots were 
taught to interpret in public worship. Some of those more fervent in the faith 
used this knowledge adeptly to assess and establish whether there was a 
presence of genuine supernatural emotion in their own lives, preserved in 
their extant writings. These thought-processes explain why Scottish 
Protestants expressed their emotions using the language they did. They 
provided the tacit rationale for an interpretation of a subject’s experience. 
 
31 Forbes, Diary; Wariston, Diary, 1; Blair, Life, 31-32. 
32 Dykes, Memoirs, 1. 
33 Cowper, Life, B3r-B4r; William Cowper, The Bishop of Gallovvay his Dikaiologie (London, 
1616). 
34 Watkins, Puritan Experience, 11; Cohen, God’s Caress, 86; Hambrick-Stowe, Practice of 
Piety, 168-175; Bozeman, Precisianist Strain, 106-107, 110-113. 
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Thus, inferences based on the perceived causes and effects of an 
experience were the fundamental cognitive process Scots engaged in when 
evaluating the sincerity of a subject’s supernatural emotions. They were the 
essence of their radical emotional reflexivity. 
In public worship, emotions were named and identified, in part, 
through what was perceived to have caused them. In the introduction, it was 
explained that emotions can be classified by what was thought to have 
caused these experiences.35 The Lord’s Supper was a prime example. Prior 
to participation in the Sacrament, ministers taught their congregations that in 
the ritual Christ was received into their souls.36 They had framed the event so 
that any positive emotions experienced during the eating of the bread and 
wine could be interpreted as an experience of what William Struther called 
‘spiritual excess’ (analysed in chapter four).37 Put another way, the identified 
cause of experiences evoked in the Lord’s Supper (communion with Christ) 
justified the categorisation of aroused feelings as the enjoyment of God, as 
this was an expected experience. In public repentance and corporate fasting, 
tears were legitimised because of their perceived cause. Within secular 
contexts in early modern England, it was considered embarrassing and 
immoral to cry in public.38 This was symptomatic of the widespread belief that 
it was a faux pax to display excessive emotion, as such outbursts were a loss 
of rational control. It was particularly shameful for elite men to cry, as their 
actions lowered them to the level of women and the lower classes – those 
less able to control their emotions.39 However, in the context of worship, 
tears were not only acceptable, they were desired and expected.40 This was 
because they were considered the effect of God-caused repentance. While 
English and Scottish cultures did differ, the similarity of physiological theory 
and attitudes towards the emotionality of women in both contexts (explored in 
chapters one and four) suggest that similar views to public expressions of 
 
35 Rosenburg, ‘Reflexivity and Emotions’; 5-6; Introduction, 2-3. 
36 Chapter Three, 82-83. 
37 Chapter Four, 150-156. 
38 Capp, ‘Jesus Wept’, 76. 
39 Chapter One, 44-45.  
40 Capp, ‘Jesus Wept’, 95. 
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emotion were typical in Scotland.41 It was because tears in corporate 
penitence were considered the effect of God-caused emotions that Scots 
used them as evidence that the penitent, if they wept, was sincere in their 
repentance. Thus, the perceived cause of an emotion was a kind of 
justification Scots could use to interpret their experiences as divinely caused 
feelings. 
Those zealous Scottish Protestants who practiced written forms of 
radical emotional reflexivity also used the supposed cause of an experience 
to identify the appropriate emotional language to characterise their feelings. 
Prayer was a prime example, exemplified in the episodic writings of John 
Forbes of Corse.42 Forbes’s experiences usually began with some unease or 
anxiety, grieved by doubt, temptation, and sin. This would then proceed to 
prayers for relief, grace, and mercy, often manifested in tears and groans. 
Then, he would experience feelings of peace and joy. As argued in chapter 
four, Forbes typically identified these emotions as God-caused supernatural 
emotions, such as a ‘feeling of mercy’.43 He judged that these feelings were 
the experience of God’s love and grace in his soul. Such a categorisation 
was plausible because of the sequence of events leading up to his 
experience of peace. Forbes had prayed to God for a feeling of mercy. Then 
he had an emotion with similar phenomenological characteristics to a feeling 
of mercy. It was reasonable for Forbes to conclude that God had caused his 
peace and joy, given that he had just requested these emotions from God. 
The practice of prayer indicated the cause of those experiences which 
followed it, and as a result informed Forbes that his feelings were a kind of 
supernatural emotion.  
That prayer could be used to identify the cause of an emotion, and 
thus an experience’s categorisation, was evidenced by the specificity Scots 
could assign to their feelings when they seemed to be evoked through this 
activity. An important event in the life of James Melville, a Presbyterian 
 
41 Chapter One, 44-45; Chapter Four, 127-132. 
42 Forbes, Diary, 127-132. 
43 Forbes, Diary, 130-131; Chapter 4, 142. 
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minister, illustrates the point. At about the age of fourteen, Melville was sent 
one day to the smithy for sickles, and on the way he stopped off at a local 
church. Being ‘soar of my lyff’, Melville addressed God in his heart. Suddenly, 
the Lord steirit upe an extraordinair motion in my hart, quhilk maid me 
atteans, being alean, to fall on gruiff to the ground, and pour out a 
schort petition to God, that it wald please his guidnes to offer occasion 
to continow me at the scholles, and incline my father’s hart till use the 
saming; with promise and vow, that whatever missour of knawlage 
and letters he wold bestow on me, I sould, by his grace, imploy the 
saming for his glorie in the calling of the ministrie; and rising from the 
ground with joy and grait contentment in hart, again fell downe and 
worschipped, as sa past on and did the earand, retourning and 
praising my God, singing sum Psalmes.44 
 
The prayer Melville put up to God informed his identification of his feelings. 
He confessed to God that he was depressed with his farming life. He then felt 
compelled to ask God to let him continue in his studies and was moved to joy 
and contentment. Because Melville’s subsequent emotions appeared as a 
response to his conversation with God, he could reason that God had caused 
his feelings. They were a set of experiences Melville could expect if God 
deemed to answer the specific prayer he had prayed, which Melville believed 
God had. The specificity of his prayer, when apparently answered, allowed 
him to reason that his feelings were God-caused, a supernatural emotion 
which addressed his particular situation. The supposed cause, indicated by 
the sequence of the events, was used by Melville, and other Scots, to 
categorise the emotions they felt.45 
Emotions were also identified by their effects. In public repentance, it 
was impossible for the congregation to know ‘secreites of the hart’, and so 
the congregation evaluated the sincerity of a penitent’s emotions by that 
‘which is without’.46 To this end, they looked for somatic signs which 
manifested supernatural emotions. This was because bodily change was 
considered involuntary, and thus constituted a naked expression of a 
person’s real feelings. One could feign contrition while wearing the proper 
 
44 Melville, Diary, 24. 
45 Calderwood, History, IV, 635-637; Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 181-182. 
46 Knox, Repentance, B3r. 
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costume, adopting the right postures, and confessing they had experienced 
God-caused emotions. Physiological alteration, however, was out-with a 
person’s control and so revealed the sincere emotions of the individual. This 
is also why authors drew upon the shared and stable use of language about 
bodily alteration as a manifestation of authentic emotion in corporate ritual to 
convey to their readers the nature of a subject’s experiences. Consequently, 
the search for certain somatic signs was crucial in public and private 
examination of a subject’s emotions.  
The most significant signs of a penitent’s sincere experiences of 
contrition were tears. This idea was embedded in the Scots Confession, 
subscribers affirming that they would ‘sob and murne’ when ‘tempted in 
iniquitie’.47 It trickled down into the processes of ecclesiastical discipline, 
apparent in the fact that kirk sessions repeatedly cited the penitent’s tears in 
their accounts of an offender’s contrition, a kind of encoded justification for 
the individual’s absolution within their records.48 Ministers like Archibald 
Simson (1566-1628) drilled into their congregations that it was impossible for 
an offender to be genuinely sorry for their sin and ‘not watred with many 
teares’.49 He acknowledged that not all can cry ‘showers’, but he maintained 
that the ‘smallest sobs of sorrow and teares of compunction’ give the 
congregation ‘some signes of a penitent heart’.50 William Cowper also taught 
that true repentance manifests itself in ‘sighing and crying continually’, while 
Struther urged those involved in a public fast to ‘draw waters out of his broke 
heart and powre out the teares of true repentance’.51 That tears were so 
strongly identified as a somatic manifestation of authentic repentance was 
most clearly demonstrated in the admittance to the Lord’s Supper of Andrew 
Brown, a parishioner in the Scottish Presbyterian church of Larne, Northern 
Ireland. An individual was only allowed to participate in the ritual if they could 
 
47 Scots Confession, XIII. 
48 Todd, Culture, 160-161; Macdonald, ‘Reconciling’, 93. See also Blair, Life, 68-69. 
49 Simson, Sacred Septenarie, 67; See ODNB, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 
20/05/2020. 
50 Simson, Sacred Septenarie, 64. 




demonstrate that they had faith by their knowledge of doctrine and godly 
behaviour.52 This would have excluded Brown, who was born deaf and 
unable to speak, and thus was unable to articulate an answer to a minister’s 
questions. However, following his conversion ‘a very sensible change was 
observed in him’, the man partaking in ‘God’s worship in public and private’.53 
Crucially, he ‘would weep at sermons’, and it was ‘by such signs, these who 
were acquainted with him understood, he would express many things of the 
work of God upon his heart’. The ministers of Antrim agreed that Brown’s 
tears expressed his ‘earnest desire’, and so he was admitted to the Lord’s 
Supper. Put another way, the ministers deemed that, even without the 
accompaniment of words, Brown’s tears were a physiological manifestation 
of godly sorrow and as such they revealed his sincere faith and desire for 
communion with Christ. 
The interpretation of tears that was integral to public worship 
presupposed the physiology of emotion discussed in chapter one.54 Scottish 
Protestants were taught that when they experienced godly sorrow, the Holy 
Spirit would ‘soften’ or ‘melt’ their hearts so that it could be ‘poured’ as ‘water’ 
to God.55 This was not figurative language. Sorrow (as explained in chapter 
one) was considered the retraction of blood to the heart, which cooled the 
body.56 Some theorists argued that when this happened the vital spirits, the 
life force of an individual, were liquified and excreted.57 Even if this exact 
explanation was not widely known, the idea that tears were the vital spirits in 
liquid form was implicit in the language Scots used about their tears. They 
were literally ‘pouring’ their ‘melted’ selves out when weeping.58 Given that in 
the presupposed physiological paradigm the excretion of tears was a 
necessary consequence of sadness, it was plausible to conclude that if a 
person cried this was a sign that their contrition was sincere. 
 
52 Scots Confession, XXIII. 
53 Livingston, Brief, 24-25. 
54 Chapter One, 39-46.  
55 Struther, Warning, 51, 66-66, 71, 73-74; Wariston, Diary, 328, 331. 
56 Chapter One, 39-41. 
57 Horstmanshoff, ‘Tears’, 315-316; Capp, ‘Jesus Wept’, 76-77; Chapter One, 41-42. 
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172 
 
Inspired by their meaning in corporate religious practice, many fervent 
Scottish Protestants consistently claimed that their tears were signs of 
supernatural emotion. On one occasion, John Forbes of Corse claimed that 
when he was in spiritual and emotional distress, he ‘cryed unto the Lord 
w[i]t[h] mournfull voice & sorrowfull sighs & tears that he would mercifullie 
help me’.59 In this context Forbes’s tears were interpreted by him as a 
physical form of repentance. Likewise, Archibald Johnston of Wariston 
recounted that at one time the Lord ‘mad the[e]’ pray for ‘repentance, 
remission, praevention’ with ‘floods of tears’.60 For the Edinburgh lawyer, his 
tears were not just caused by his contrition: they were his sorrow for sin. 
Wariston called this kind of crying ‘deprecatorie’, tears that were ‘wonderfully 
grievous and plunged me unto the very hels’.61 However, he also recognised 
the existence of what he called ‘impetratorie’ tears, those which were shed 
for ‘the averting of Gods anger and judgements and Gods converting his love 
and blissings’ with ‘joyful, hoopful, conjuring tears’. They were a somatic form 
of petition, exemplified by Forbes’s claim that some of his tears were ‘humble 
supplicatiouns’ for mercy.62 Thus, tears had no essential meaning in Scottish 
Protestant piety: they could be identified as a manifestation of multiple kinds 
of supernatural emotions. This ambiguity is highlighted by an experience 
James Mitchell of Dykes underwent when, in response to a sermon preached 
by David Dickson, he wept tears which were a ‘melting of heart, both of a 
godly sorrow, and sweet consolation mixt together’.63 Tears were generally 
considered an embodiment of supernatural emotion, but what exactly they 
expressed was open to interpretation. 
Groans were also viewed as a sign of sincere emotion. It was a     
non-verbal noise typically identified with a desire or prayer for God’s mercy 
and a relief from sin. The subscribers of the Scots Confession declared that 
the Spirit of God had made them ‘groane in Gods presence, for deliverance 
 
59 Forbes, Diary, 127-130. 
60 Wariston, Diary, 223-225. 
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63 Dykes, Memoirs, 29-31. 
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fra this bondage of corruption’.64 It was an expected behaviour of a penitent 
in public repentance, though what it expressed was not explicitly defined.65 
However, as the penitent had to hate their sin and desire God’s forgiveness, 
it is plausible that groans were perceived as a manifestation of these 
supernatural emotions, given what had been affirmed about groaning in the 
Scots Confession. William Struther reinforced this interpretation when he 
argued that in public fasting the Holy Spirit caused people to pray ‘with 
groanes that cannot be expressed’.66 In the literature produced by some of 
the more zealous Scottish Protestants, groans were also a form of desire. 
However, the nature of that desire could vary. The groan could be, like in 
public repentance, an expression of lament and a desire for better. These 
were the kinds of groan Forbes emitted when in distress.67 However, they 
could also be interpreted as hope-filled desires for communion with Christ. 
Wariston found that on one occasion the ‘Lord maid me put up petitions to 
him’ in the form of ‘strong cryes and groans’, all while he felt abundant 
pleasure.68 Whether more sorrowful or joyful, authors assumed that these 
involuntary groans, in the words of Wariston, ‘spak to God’.69 This was a view 
inspired by Romans 8:26-27, already discussed in chapter four.70 This 
present chapter moves beyond the analysis in chapter four because it 
recognises that because Scots thought groans were a form of prayer or 
speaking to God caused by the Holy Spirit, they played a pivotal role in their 
examinations of emotional sincerity in public repentance and personal 
writings.  
Scottish Protestants believed groans were an involuntary 
manifestation of desire because of their assumptions about physiology. 
Prayer, frequently a petition for God’s mercy, was thought to involve an 
increase in temperature. John Knox argued that the purpose of prayer is that 
 
64 Scots Confession, XIII. 
65 Macdonald, ‘Reconciling’, 93. 
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69 Wariston, Diary, 218-219. 
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174 
 
‘our hartis may be inflamit with continewall feir, honour, and love of God’.71 
The front cover of Lewis Bayly’s The Practice of Pietie had an image of a 
burning heart on an altar named ‘prayer’, while Protestant emblem books by 
Georgette de Montenay and George Wither contained burning hearts which 
symbolised a desire for God.72 These images were inspired by David’s desire 
for mercy in Psalm 51: he pleaded with God to forgive him, because ‘the 
sacrifices’ (burnt offerings) of ‘God are a contrite spirit: a contrite and a 
broken heart, O God, thou wilt not despise’.73 Yet the burning heart was not 
just a metaphor. Puritans, like George Foxley (fl.1639), believed that the 
sense of the Spirit in prayer was maintained by ‘holy breathings’ which 
‘keepe and cleare the fire upon the hearth, whereby the sense is kindled, 
when thou settest upon the worke’.74 Foxley identified the groans emitted in 
prayer as that which maintains the heat of the body, and in so doing sustains 
the phenomenological experience of the Holy Spirit.75 Put another way, 
groans and heavy breathing maintain and regulate the feeling of joy, the 
subjective dimension of heat. On this model, groans were a corporeal 
manifestation of a desire to satisfy the longings of the appetite, and thus 
sustain pleasurable emotion. In these terms, Robert Rollock’s idea that 
groans instigate prayer make sense. 
And we find that in experience in our selves, that we no sooner sigh 
unto God, but our souls are watered over with a certain unspeakable 
joy: so that we truly feel that thing, to wit, that the presence of God, 
through the Spirit of heaviness and inutterable sighes, causeth the 
presence of God through the Spirit of joy and unspeakable gladness.76 
 
That Scots thought groans maintained the experience of prayer through the 
regulation of the body’s temperature was akin to their views on orgasm. As 
analysed in chapter one, early moderns believed orgasm was the emission of 
 
71 John Knox, The Works of John Knox, ed. David Laing, 6 vols. (Edinburgh: Wodrow 
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excess heat, experienced as rapturous joy.77 What was not mentioned in that 
discussion was that an increase in temperature during copulation was 
associated with groaning. This can be seen in the plays of William 
Shakespeare (1564-1616), who used the mention of groaning as an 
innuendo for sexual activity.78 Given many of the most fervent Scots implied 
that their experiences of spiritual excess has a similar physiological basis to 
that of orgasm (a theme analysed in chapter four) it may be reasonable to 
conclude that they thought groans were the result of similar somatic changes 
in prayer and copulation.79 If that is so, it reinforces the idea that groans were 
considered a kind of desire which maintains the heat of the body, given that 
in both orgasm and spiritual excess pleasurable feelings are sustained by a 
high bodily temperature. In turn, this physiological connection would explain 
why groans were interpreted as a sign of sincere desire in public worship and 
private writings.  
In addition, the manner in which somatic change manifested itself lent 
credence to the idea that it was an involuntary alteration of the body, and 
thus an authentic revelation of supernatural emotions. The suddenness and 
momentousness of a physiological change could be interpreted as evidence 
that it was God-caused.80 This was exemplified by the experiences of 
congregations when swearing the National Covenant. Wariston recorded his 
experience at Currie Kirk. Prior to the act of swearing, the congregation 
displayed no emotion. However, when the congregation lifted their hands to 
swear the Covenant, in a moment, 
tuinkling of ane eye their fell sutch ane extraordinarie influence of 
Gods Sprit upon the whol congregation, melting their frozen hearts, 
waltering their dry cheeks… it was a wonder to seie so visible, 
sensible, momentaneal a chainge upon al, man and woman, lasse and 
ladde.81  
 
77 Chapter One, 40-41. 
78 William Shakespeare, The Works of William Shakespeare: The Globe Edition, eds. William 
George Clark and William Aldis Wright (London: Macmillan and Co., 1878), Hamlet, 
III.2.2142; Romeo and Juliet, II.4.1243. 
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Langley (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2020). 




Wariston observed a similar outpouring of emotion at the swearing in Trinity 
Kirk, Edinburgh. The people were emotionless prior to the act of swearing, 
but when they lifted their hand they raised ‘sik a yelloch, sik aboundance of 
tears, sik a heavenly harmony of sighs and sobbes, universally through al the 
corners of the churche, as the lyk was never seien nor heard of.’82 In both 
cases, Wariston identified that these were God-caused experiences because 
the tears and groans of the congregation were sudden and without restraint. 
The abruptness and volume of these somatic signs indicated that they were 
not premeditated but the experiences of a passive subject. Given that the 
subject’s absolute passivity was considered a defining quality of God-caused 
emotion (examined in chapter four), momentous and sudden tears and 
groans in the context of communal religious practice had to be, in Wariston’s 
view, the work of a supernatural agent acting upon the souls of the gathered 
people.83 
While the National Covenant was exceptional, those more zealous 
Scots who wrote about their supernatural emotions similarly portrayed them 
as sudden and momentous. On the 20th of September 1636, John Forbes of 
Corse was ‘troubled and fearfullie terrified’.84 This had been brought about 
contemplation of his ‘former grievous sinnes’. He discovered ‘in my self ane 
hypocriticall evil eye, and at the same tyme I weeped to God for pardon of it 
& for grace’. He was somewhat comforted, but was ‘hindered from the 
consolation q[ui]ch I had formerlie received, by a new deceitfulness of sin in 
me’. Forbes wrestled for twenty-four hours with these feelings, when out of 
nowhere ‘the Lord had mercie upon me, he tuched my heart, & opened my 
mouth, so that upon the forsaid day in the morning in the fields, and again in 
the evening… I fell upon my face, & humblie and plainlie w[i]t[h] […] tears 
confessed my sins unto God’. The Lord ‘answere me w[i]t[h] the answer of 
mercie, peace & Grace, blissed be his H.[holy] name’. Forbes’s feeling was 
so elevated that he burst into song about the ‘Covenant of mercie & peace’. 
 
82 Wariston, Diary, 330-331. 
83 Chapter One, 22-30; Chapter Four, 123-140. 
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In this episode, Forbes’s supernatural emotions did not emerge gradually, but 
exploded into his consciousness with rapidity and force. Similarly, when 
William Cowper was on the brink of despair, ‘suddenly did there shine (in the 
very twinckling of an eye)’ the countenance of God.85 His soul was ‘instantly 
raised up’ from the brink of the pit to Heaven, from anguish to ‘joyfull 
fellowship with God in Christ Jesus’. The sudden and dramatic change in his 
emotions was interpreted by Cowper as a sign that it was caused by the 
‘joyfull Deliverer of my soule’. The supernatural emotions of other Scottish 
Protestants were also characterised as having a sudden and momentous 
quality, perhaps most dramatically with the deathbed conversion of Bessie 
Clarkson.86 As the immediateness and forcefulness of somatic signs and 
feeling were prevalent in the literature fervent Scots produced, it is plausible 
that the same was true for communal worship. It was not enough, as 
Macdonald has claimed, to have the ‘ability to cry on cue’ in public 
repentance.87 Tears and groans which were sudden and without restraint 
would convince a congregation that they were sincere. Put another way, they 
had to look involuntary and thus passively experienced.88 
While somatic signs had to be sudden, at the same time the constancy 
of an emotional disposition was considered an indicator of sincere 
repentance. If an excommunicant desired to repent, ‘fourty dayis at the least’ 
was required ‘to try whither the signes of repentance appear in offendar or 
not’, a length of time inspired by Jesus’s temptations in the wilderness for 
forty days.89 The logic of this position was explained by Archibald Simson, 
who argued that the truly penitent person will be ‘ever mourning and boyling 
our teares’, while counterfeit penitence ‘dries up sodainly’.90 This is because, 
Simson believed, God only creates passions which are ‘constant’.91 Thus, 
evidence that a person has godly sorrow and a desire for mercy over an 
 
85 Cowper, Life, B2v-B3r. 
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extended period of time indicate the sincerity of their penitence. A similar 
emotional logic compelled Robert Bruce to regard Francis Stewart’s 
repentance in public as authentic. Bruce observed that Stewart’s desire to 
repent had not come about ‘suddenly’, but that he had informed James 
Gibson of his resolution ‘a long time before’.92 The authenticity of Stewart’s 
repentance was shown, Bruce judged, in the duration of his desire to make 
satisfaction. Behaviour after public repentance could also evidence the 
sincerity of a penitent’s contrition. Robert Blair reported that the repentance 
of an adulterer was judged authentic insofar as he was ‘a reformed man in 
the rest of his life’.93 Similarly, Hugh Campbell, who had fled from Scotland to 
Ireland having killed a man, was substantially changed, so that he would 
regularly host meetings for those who wanted to pray and meditate for years 
to come.94 Even the enemies of the Scottish Presbyterians in Ireland noticed 
such changes; Henry Leslie stating that many were changed so that ‘they are 
never seen to laugh, and never talk of anything but God’.95 Lasting change 
was a quality which evidenced the supernatural origin of an emotion, and as 
such was an external sign Scots used to categorise a subject’s experiences. 
In sum, Scottish Protestants in public worship and personal writings 
identified a subject’s emotions, and consequently their emotional sincerity, 
through analysis of the causes and effects of an individual’s feelings. 
Emotional sincerity was displayed in public worship and private devotionality 
through somatic change and external behaviour. Due to the shared linguistic 
and conceptual framework which was sustained by corporate religious 
practice, Scots were taught to identify sudden and momentous tears and 
groans that resulted in lasting behavioural changes as signs of supernatural 
emotion. This is not an exhaustive list: there were occasions where other 
physiological changes were judged to have revealed divinely inspired 
feelings. Nevertheless, the marks examined were the main signs of God-
caused feeling. They had this status because they indicated that the 
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experience which produced them was not premeditated. While in public 
repentance they were assigned a more definite meaning, in the literature 
zealous Scots produced, tears and groans were open to a variety of 
interpretations. All authors, however, implicitly agreed in the extant material 
that they were the somatic dimension of God-caused emotions. This was, in 
part, due to inferences based on the perceived causes of these 
psychosomatic phenomena. Exhibited in public ritual or in prayer, they were 
the expected effect of any divine action in that context. Thus, the process by 
which Scots categorised emotions, using the language built into public 
worship, consisted in both an inference based on the emotion’s cause and its 
observed effects. Interpretation of the emotion’s cause and effects revealed 
how it should be classified, and as such was the basis for evaluating whether 
a subject’s emotions were sincere. In other words, this process of emotional 
identification provided the rationale for the judgements authors made about a 
subject’s emotions in their personal writings. 
A consequence of examining the authenticity of a claim to 
supernatural emotions was that people could fail the test. In public 
repentance, the congregation could judge that the penitent was not sincerely 
sorry for what they had done. In their writings, authors might conclude that 
their subject did not have God-caused emotions. If one failed to show the 
signs of godly sorrow, a feeling of mercy, or spiritual excess in contexts they 
were to be expected, it gave reason to suspect that these emotions were not 
present. By extension, it provided justification to question one’s spiritual 
status. The search for sincerity, thus, facilitated doubt. 
 
2. The Problem of Doubt 
Many of those Scots who engaged in radical emotional reflexivity, at 
times, judged that they were not sincere Christians. They believed they were 
members of the reprobate. They arrived at this conclusion because when 
they evaluated their emotions, they determined that they were not the 
product of divine agency. Such views were tacitly justified by inferences 
made about an emotion’s causes and its effects. Through this process, many 
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Scottish Protestants were driven into suicidal despair. As seen with the case 
of Mistress Rutherford in chapter three, battling the doubt caused by radical 
emotional reflexivity could be a substantial portion of the spiritual journey.96 
Some Scottish Protestants were made to question whether they had 
experienced a supernatural emotion because there was a viable 
physiological explanation of their feelings. The first time James Mitchell of 
Dykes believed he had experienced the presence of God, he was tempted to 
believe that his emotion ‘might flow from natural grounds and reasons’.97 He 
thought it could be a ‘fantasie’ or a ‘delusion’, caused by an excess of black 
bile, ‘melancholy’, in his blood. However, he deduced that this was not so, 
and so concluded he had experienced God-caused emotions. Similarly, when 
Mistress Rutherford first evaluated her suicidal inclinations, she judged that 
these thoughts and feelings were caused by a ‘naturall desert in the blood’.98 
She had, by implication, concluded that her desire to die was the result of a 
humoural imbalance in her body. Consequently, she did not believe her 
inclinations to self-harm had a supernatural origin. It was only later she 
thought that her will to die was caused by Satan. Pastoral advice could also 
assume that the cause of an emotion was illness, not the supernatural. On 
one occasion Archibald Johnston of Wariston fasted so that God would 
relieve him of his worldly sorrow. His friend Lady Curryhill advised him that 
this was the wrong approach. Rather than fast, the distraught Wariston 
should eat food, because in her view his lack of nourishment had facilitated 
‘hot bilious and dust melancholic humeours’, the source of his anguish. Her 
advice was sound, as after he had some dinner Wariston experienced ‘on[e] 
of the happiest houres of al my luftyme and the freest accesse that ever I had 
to the Throsne of Graice’.99 Implicitly, this kind of pastoral advice assumed 
that the cause, and thus remedy, of the subject’s emotional distress was not 
supernatural but bodily in nature. 
 
96 Chapter Three, 97-99, 109-111. 
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Additionally, in polemical contexts physiological explanations were 
used to undermine claims to supernatural emotion. In the early seventeenth 
century scholars, like Robert Burton (1577-1640), attacked puritanism 
because they believed the tradition exploited the psychological distress of its 
adherents.100 These critiques were taken up in the late-seventeenth century 
by Scottish Episcopalians, who argued that Presbyterian ministers 
exacerbated the melancholic dispositions of their congregations.101 In this 
way, Episcopalians in Scotland attacked Presbyterian approaches to pastoral 
care and their claims that their religious profession was corroborated by 
experiences of God-caused emotions, as these feelings were nothing more 
than the product of humoural imbalances. While no evidence has been found 
of Scots facing this attack on their spirituality between 1590 and 1640, that 
many of the extant personal writings were written in the latter half of the 
seventeenth century suggests that authors would have been aware of such 
critiques. That Mistress Rutherford felt the need to explain that her suicidal 
inclinations were caused by Satan indicates that she may have been 
preempting Episcopalian tendencies to explain away her Presbyterian 
religious experiences as primarily physiological in nature.  
What lent some credence to the idea that a supernatural emotion was 
really the product of bodily processes was that many of the experiences 
Scots claimed were God-caused were accompanied by physiological 
abnormality. After the consumption of some powerful alcohol, Robert Blair 
experienced a burning fever so horrendous that he thought he was about to 
die.102 At the same time, he also claimed to have experienced God’s love 
burning within his soul. On more than one occasion, James Mitchell of Dykes 
experienced communion with God while suffering from a fever.103 William 
Cowper first experienced legal terror when he was subject to ‘great bodily 
 
100 Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy (Oxford, 1621), 362-363, 957; Thomas L. 
Canavan, ‘Robert Burton, Jonathan Swift, and the Tradition of Anti-Puritan Invective’ in 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 34, no.2 (1973), 234-235; ODNB, 
https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020. 
101 Raffe, Controversy, 129-134. 
102 Blair, Life, 18-19. 
103 Dykes, Memoirs, 38-39. 
182 
 
infirmities’ due to the ‘weakness’ of the soil and ‘unwholesome’ waters he 
had been consuming.104 The three years Clarkson was wracked with dread 
and despair her minister and friends were concerned about her ‘bitter’ 
physick, of which she eventually died.105 Lady Hundaly’s torment was 
experienced while she suffered from, and died of, plague.106 Given Scottish 
Protestants presupposed that humoural imbalance could cause emotional 
change (an idea discussed in chapter one) the apparent correlation between 
bodily alteration and those emotions authors identified as supernatural could 
reasonably be interpreted as causal.107 At least, physiological abnormality 
provided a somewhat plausible explanation as to the origin of an experience, 
and as such could threaten the identification of an emotion as God-caused. 
This is why, on some occasions, a physiological explanation of an experience 
could cause a Scot to question whether they had sincerely experienced a 
supernatural emotion.  
In some cases, zealous Scots doubted that an experience was 
divinely inspired when they judged that it had been caused by Satan. In 
chapters three and four, it was argued that the devil could act upon the soul, 
injecting it with temptations in order to stimulate the corrupted faculties so 
that they would produce internal, and as a consequence external, sins.108 
The discussion here moves beyond to the idea that Satan was considered 
capable of causing people to behave in ways which mimicked the effects 
caused by God’s agency in the soul. The clearest example was in the parish 
of Broadisland in the county of Antrim, Ireland, during the Six Mile Water 
revival. On numerous occasions, as the sermon was delivered, many in the 
congregation exhibited sudden and momentous somatic change.109 During 
every sermon, about forty people, mainly women, would ‘fall down in the 
church in a trance and are (as it is supposed) senseless, but in their fits they 
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are grievously afflicted with convulsions, tremblings, unnatural motions’.110 
These gestures were joined with a mixture of heavy breathing and panting, 
and they were probably crying too.111 This behaviour, though extreme, 
initially seemed like ‘the work of the Lord’ to the minister and his 
congregation.112 As already intimated, tears and groans were an expected 
effect of sincere repentance.113 Additionally, trembling and falling over were 
considered signs of intense fear and sorrow evoked by the minister’s 
preaching of the law in public worship.114 It also happened elsewhere during 
the Six Mile Water revival, a young Andrew Stewart (d.1671) witnessing 
many Scots ‘stricken, and swoon with the Word – yea, a dozen in one day 
carried out of the doors as dead, so marvellous was the power of God 
smiting their hearts for sin, condemning and killing’.115 Thus, the initial 
assessment that this behaviour was God-caused was a plausible 
interpretation within the linguistic-conceptual framework of Scottish public 
worship. 
However, in time most of the local clergy judged that this behaviour 
was a work of Satan, intended to ‘counterfeit the work of the Lord’.116 
Through conversation it was clear that the group who exhibited this 
behaviour did so without ‘any sense of their sinfulness’ or ‘any panting after a 
Saviour’. Moreover, they displayed these gestures regardless of what the 
minister preached.117 Ministers like Robert Blair and John Livingston 
reasoned that if this was truly God-caused repentance then the people would 
have had, along with their sudden and momentous somatic changes, feelings 
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of godly sorrow and a desire for mercy which were evoked by the sermon. 
Failing that, their behaviour was not caused by God, and as such was not a 
sincere manifestation of penitence. However, acknowledging that their 
actions were involuntary, given its abruptness and lack of restraint, they 
concluded that it must be the work of some other supernatural agent. As it 
disrupted the worship of God with insincere repentance, the ministers thought 
these somatic changes were ‘a mere delusion and cheat of Satan to slander 
and disgrace the work of the Lord’.118 Thus, when Blair preached the next 
Sunday service and was interrupted by such behaviour, he rebuked the ‘lying 
spirit’ that had ‘disturbed the worship of God’. Thus, the belief that the 
behaviour exhibited could only be produced by the demonic led the ministers 
to doubt the authenticity of the people’s repentance. It provided justification, 
in their view, to alter their former judgement that these were God-caused 
emotions.119 
Doubts about whether a subject’s emotions were God-caused arose 
when an individual did not experience the expected effects of such a feeling. 
After her conversion, Mistress Rutherford believed she ‘had no repentance’ 
because she ‘had not constantly tears’.120 She later thought that she was a 
‘hypocrit’ because she did not have ‘such a sense of God and greif for sin as 
I would measure to myself’.121 Because she continued to sin, Rutherford was 
tempted to believe her faith was a ‘temporary faith’, doubting whether she 
was ‘the child of God or not’.122 Her experience was not unique. Porteous 
conveyed to his reader that although initially Lady Hundaly had thought 
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herself ‘effectually called and converted’, through her practice of radical 
emotional reflexivity she had concluded that she was damned.123 This was 
because she had ‘rushed again into divers sins and fearful thoughts, and that 
willingly and deliberately’. Thus, she believed she was a ‘hypocrite’, her 
emotions insincere. Many Scots faced such doubts, which inspired a 
proliferation of texts, written mainly by ministers, dedicated to the soothing of 
troubled souls.124 A similar literary market flourished in England, through 
which Protestant divines such as William Perkins addressed the doubts many 
had about the sincerity of their faith.125 The prevalence of these texts 
indicates that many Protestants, in Scotland and elsewhere, judged that they 
did not experience the effects they would expect if God had caused their 
emotions. 
Even when a subject observed in themselves the signs of supernatural 
emotion, they could doubt that they were God-caused because of their 
theological commitment to the doctrine of predestination. The predominant 
view taught by ministers was that God had, before the creation of the world, 
decreed who was elect and who was reprobate.126 Yet Protestant divines 
agreed that the lives of the elect and the reprobate could be fairly 
indistinguishable. Perkins’s chart of the order of salvation illustrated this 
interpretation, as it indicated that the reprobate (although not united to Christ) 
were able to experience some signs of the spiritual journey.127 Consequently, 
emotions could not be identified as God-caused with absolute certainty, given 
that both the elect and reprobate could, in theory, have similar feelings and 
exhibit the same somatic changes. John Stachniewski and Anite Pacheco 
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have argued that this ‘doubleness of predestination’ produced a ‘doubleness 
of vision’, so that Protestants were able to identify their emotions as signs of 
either election or reprobation.128  
The problem of doubleness was often worked through in the literary 
genre of dialogues. As already established, Lady Hundaly believed she was 
a hypocrite because she did not observe in herself the emotional and 
behavioural effects of sincere faith. However, her pastoral support, Archibald 
Porteous, argued that Hundaly did exhibit the signs of authentic supernatural 
emotion. At one point in the dialogue, Hundaly judged that she did not have a 
genuine desire for communion with Christ, as if it was sincere it would be 
stronger than her current feelings.129 Porteous disagreed. He argued that 
God is the cause of any desire for Christ, no matter how weak, and as such 
Hundaly’s weak desire was of supernatural origin. William Livingston had 
similar exchanges with Bessie Clarkson. Clarkson lamented that she did not 
have faith in God, while Livingston argued that her desire for faith was 
reputed by God as faith.130 The minister claimed that Clarkson’s emotions 
were an affliction sent by the Lord to mobilise in her a sorrow for sin, but was 
unable to convince the tormented woman that her feelings were not an 
apprehension of the wrath of God.131 These exchanges highlight the 
ambiguity the doctrine of double predestination introduced into the 
identification of emotion. The theological consequences of the dogma 
entailed that it was just as plausible to interpret an emotion as God-caused 
as not; as evidence of election as of reprobation. It undercut the inferences, 
based on the supposed causes and effects of an experience, used to justify 
its categorisation as a particular kind of supernatural emotion, and as such 
left every judgement made about feeling open to question. 
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The transience of the emotions exacerbated the doubt caused by the 
problem of doubleness. As noted in the introduction, sociologists have 
argued that feeling influences the interpretations subject’s reach about their 
emotions.132 This principle was reflected in the practice of radical emotional 
reflexivity undertaken by Scottish Protestants. In many cases, a change in 
feeling precipitated an alteration in how a subject viewed their past emotions. 
Porteous told his reader that Hundaly initially believed that she had been 
‘effectually called and converted’.133 However, her view had changed, so that 
she now thought her previous experiences ‘false conceptions’ of supernatural 
emotions.134 Hundaly arrived at this conclusion because, in her present state, 
she was ‘void of Sense and Feeling’ and filled with ‘wreathful Fears and 
Terrors’.135 Yet, at the end of the dialogue she once more changed her 
position on her prior experiences. Former experiences were now 
characterised as ‘real access to God’ and ‘true joys’.136 Such a reversal in 
position was motivated by her becoming a ‘ravished creature with joy’. Thus, 
every time Hundaly changed her interpretation about the sincerity of her prior 
experiences it was caused by her present emotional change. No new factors 
came into play with regard to those past experiences. It was just that at the 
time of examination Hundaly felt differently.   
A change in feeling also influenced how other zealous Scottish 
Protestants evaluated their emotions. Rutherford first believed her suicidal 
tendencies were caused by a humoural imbalance, but after her conversion 
and experience of communion with God she was convinced it was the work 
of Satan.137 Clarkson had originally enjoyed prayer, but her experience of 
legal terror convinced her that it was futile.138 Every Scottish Protestant who 
had progressed along the spiritual journey, by definition, experienced the 
impact emotions could have on the evaluation of their past emotions. The 
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person who was in a state of legal terror believed all their emotions were 
signs of reprobation, whereas the individual who had faith and assurance 
was convinced that they had experienced supernatural emotions. It was the 
weakness of the narrative form: the present subject, which was subject to 
change, fashioned the past self in relation to the thoughts and feelings that 
were currently experienced.139 Present feeling and notions of self-identity 
similarly influenced the judgements of English puritans.140 However, emotion 
need not have had such a dominant effect upon the results of radical 
emotional reflexivity. Its power was rooted in the problem of doubleness. The 
doctrine of double predestination meant it was arbitrary whether one 
characterised an emotion as supernatural or not, given that no evidence 
could indicate one way or another. As a result, there was no inference strong 
enough that could compel a subject to maintain their prior beliefs about their 
past emotions, as they could be plausibly reinterpreted as evidence of an 
alternative position. Thus, whatever interpretation one derived from the 
experience of present feelings it was just as reasonable an analysis of the 
evidence as any other. With nothing else to check a subject’s practice of 
radical emotional reflexivity, changes in feeling pulled with it the 
categorisation of the emotions. Consequently, the constant state of flux which 
afflicts the emotions, combined with the double vision produced by Scottish 
Protestant theological beliefs, created a perfect storm from which doubt could 
be born.141 
Many of the most zealous Scottish Protestants were driven to 
experience acute anxiety because of the doubt produced by their practice of 
radical emotional reflexivity. Believing they were damned, subjects could be 
trapped in a pit of dread and despair.142 Bessie Clarkson was emblematic of 
this condition. A woman who was overwhelmed by hopelessness, she was in 
a perpetual state of emotional distress. She likened her anguish and misery 
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to ‘hell’ itself.143 Another who embodied this angst was Mistress Rutherford, 
who was tormented by the prospect that her faith was insincere.144 Robert 
Bruce was anxious over his particular calling for nearly ten years, while 
William Cowper frequently experienced ‘terrors’ in his daily piety.145 Robert 
Blair lamented that many ‘gracious sound believers, who have received 
Jesus Christ, and rested on him as he is offered to them in the Word, have 
been much puzzled, as if they were not believers at all’.146 The anxiety 
produced when testing the sincerity of the emotions was so widespread that 
Bruce reassured his congregation that doubt ‘may lodge in the soul with 
faith’, even afflicting the ‘best servants God has ever had’.147 
 
3. Ways and Means to Mobilise Supernatural Emotions 
The final section of this chapter argues that the function of the test of 
sincerity was to evoke desired, supernatural emotions. Radical emotional 
reflexivity was considered an instrument God could use to advance a 
person’s spiritual journey by creating in them the emotions which facilitated 
communion with God (identified in chapter two as faith and love).148 In other 
words, the examination of the emotions was integral to communal religious 
practice and the private piety of zealous Scots because it could mobilise the 
sequence of emotion which constitutes the pilgrimage of the soul (outlined in 
chapter three).149 Consequently, the discussion here argues that Scottish 
Protestants integrated the examination of emotion into public worship and 
personal writings to stimulate supernatural emotions. This thesis is defended 
by exploring how corporate ceremonies and narratives created by fervent 
Scots functioned as ‘mobilising practices’.150 In so doing, the final part of this 
chapter moves beyond what Scots said about their experiences (chapters 
three and four) and the process through which they decided how to 
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categorise their feelings (the first two sections of this chapter) to analyse the 
purpose of the language they used about their emotions. Put another way, 
the close of this chapter explains why Scots examined and tested the 
sincerity of their emotions in public worship and personal writings.   
Ecclesiastical censure could be used to provoke a subject to practice 
radical emotional reflexivity and so stimulate supernatural emotions. Warding 
and excommunication were used by kirk sessions to force an offender to 
apprehend their sins and as such experience worldly sorrow, two important 
stages in the spiritual journey.151 Offenders were sometimes ‘warded’ as a 
form of punishment.152 This meant that the guilty person was placed in an 
often dark, filthy, and vermin infested room in the church building, living on a 
diet of bread and water. Alone with their thoughts, warding provided a space 
in which offenders could examine themselves and what they had done to 
merit their predicament. When it worked the unpleasantness of warding could 
make an offender sorrowful for what they done, insofar as it had caused their 
current misery. Excommunication was supposed to produce similar results.153 
This was the most severe ecclesiastical punishment an individual could 
receive. It meant that the excommunicant had ‘no societie with us’, the 
community treating the offender like an ‘ethnik’.154 The First Book of 
Discipline instructed that, apart from the sinner’s family and the minister, no 
one was allowed to have any ‘conversation’ with the excommunicant, which 
included not ‘eating and drinking, buying or selling, yea, in saluting or talking 
with him’.155 Excommunicants were also excluded from public worship and 
their children were refused baptism.156 The isolation of the offender was 
meant to evoke worldly sorrow by forcing them, through self-examination, to 
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apprehend their sinfulness. Ministers would ask the Holy Spirit to use this 
punishment to ‘peirs thow his hart, [so that] he may feil in his breast the 
terrours of thy Judgementis, that by thy grace he fructfullie may be converted 
to thee’.157 The dire consequences of excommunication were supposed to 
motivate an offender to practice radical emotional reflexivity, thereby evoking 
legal terror and advancing the sinner forward on their spiritual journey. In 
other words, warding and excommunication were supposed to force a person 
into a self-examination which would mobilise the sequence of emotions that 
were essential for a penitent to have in public repentance: legal terror, godly 
sorrow, and a feeling of mercy (analysed in chapter three).158 
Radical emotional reflexivity was also used as a means in public 
fasting to stir up contrition. After the reading of Deuteronomy 27 and 28, the 
minister and congregation were to prostrate themselves for at least fifteen 
minutes. This was done so that each person present could ‘discend secretly 
into himself to examine his owen conscience, whereinto he findeth him selfe 
giltie before God’.159 The exercise was a means by which the congregation 
could apprehend their sin, a stage in the spiritual journey, and so be moved 
to repentance.160 The idea that the practice of private meditation in public 
fasting was meant to stimulate supernatural emotions may be supported by 
the renewal of the covenant of grace at the Synod of Fife in 1596, during 
which a period of self-examination channelled a sudden and momentous 
outpouring of repentance. James Melville recounted that after a powerful 
exhortation by the moderator of the synod that: 
the Lord steirit upe sic a motioun of hart, that all war forcit to fall down 
befor the Lord, with sobbes and tears in aboundance, everie man 
mightelie commovit with the affections of their conscience in the 
presence of their God, in privat meditatioun, rypping out thair ways, 
confessing and acknawledging thair unworthines, and cravin 
earnestlie grace for amendiment, and that a lang space.161 
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In this case, the exercise of private meditation while kneeling was used to 
evoke a sorrow for sin and a desire for mercy which was manifested in 
excessive crying and groaning. Similarly, at one point in the swearing of the 
National Covenant at Currie Kirk the congregation responded to the 
‘extraordinarie influence of Gods Sprit’ by: 
falling doune on thair knees to mourne and pray… for ane quarter of 
ane houre [they] prayed verry sensibly with many sobs, tears, 
promises, and voues to be thankful and fruitful in tymcoming.162 
 
The swearing ceremony had taken place during a public fast and had 
replaced the period of private meditation in the order of the liturgy. That for 
fifteen minutes the congregation knelt, sorrowed for their sin, and resolved to 
amend their lives in the context of a public fast (albeit in exceptional 
circumstances), implies that they were engaged in something akin to the 
private meditation usually reserved for that segment of the liturgy. If the 1596 
and 1638 events are comparable to the examination of the self and emotions 
in a corporate fast, it would indicate that the practice of private meditation – 
radical emotional reflexivity – in public fasting was an instrument used to elicit 
a momentous emotional response: specifically, those God-caused feelings 
which constituted repentance and conversion.  
Listening to sermons was also used to engage a listener in self-
examination in Scottish Protestantism and international puritanism, and as 
such mobilise in them supernatural emotions.163 The preaching of the law 
(analysed in chapter three) was used to identify a sin, and was effectual 
when a person, through radical reflexivity, applied its teaching to their 
lives.164 It was best exemplified in the sermons of James Glendinning 
(fl.1617-1662), which started the Six Mile Water revival.165 He believed that 
the majority of the Scots settlers in Ireland were insincere in their religious 
belief, and so he preached primarily on the law of God. He identified the sins 
which his congregation had committed and, with a powerful voice and robust 
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style, pronounced that they were damned.166 His preaching pierced many 
hearts, so much so that many of his listeners were in a state of dread and 
despair, falling over as if they were dead. John Knox’s preaching made 
James Melville ‘grew and tremble’, his condemnation of pride and the love of 
money terrifying the university student.167 Bessie Clarkson blamed William 
Livingston’s preaching for making her fear the wrath of God.168 The powerful 
effect of preaching the law was most dramatically expressed in the writings of 
Archibald Johnston of Wariston who, as his minister spoke, recognised the 
estate of his life (and emotions). He said in his heart: 
Lord, I haive playd the idiot foole by sleaping over al the dayes of my 
prosperitie without dreaming of the[e] as I ought to haive done or yet 
of my selth: I haive been the pratling fool, idocile, delighting year 
tormenting myselth with schadoues wordlie, and building on false 
grounds of outward shaues; I haive played the mad foole by abusing 
thy blissings, contemning thy threatnings, and misregarding thy 
comandements…169 
 
When the gospel or evangelical syllogism (analysed in chapter three) was 
preached it was meant to evoke feelings of assurance and joy in the 
congregation.170 James Mitchell of Dykes was moved by David Dickson to 
ravishing feelings of God’s mercy.171 Countless times Wariston was greatly 
comforted by sermons, on one occasion his heart in a ‘continual spiritual 
rysing’, at every point ‘bringing tears unto my eies and cryes, strong cryes, 
unto my mouth’.172 John Livingston delivered a famous sermon at the Kirk of 
Shotts on 21st June 1630, which generated such a ‘liberty and melting of 
heart’ that over five hundred people claimed that it was the instrument God 
used to convert them.173 In these and other cases, the subject was convinced 
by the sermon that mercy applied to them and thus they were ecstatically 
assured of their salvation. Put another way, preaching could compel a 
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listener to reevaluate their lives and emotions in a way that could evoke God-
caused feelings.174 
Psalm-singing was another way Scots engaged in the examination of 
the emotions in public worship as a means to evoke supernatural emotions. 
As already discussed in chapter three, its musical nature meant that it was a 
mode of experiencing David’s radical emotional reflexivity.175 It was, when 
sung in a heartfelt way, interpreted as an authentic experience of God-
caused emotion.176 To represent the emotionality of the experience, Wariston 
claimed it was his ‘heart’ which sang Psalm 119.177 He was later 
‘extraordinarily moved at the singing’ of Psalm 42 in public worship.178 
Participating in the Lord’s Supper, Mistress Rutherford and her fellow 
participants sang Psalm 34:6, and this ‘did me good’.179 As boys, James 
Melville and Robert Blair enjoyed learning and singing the psalms in public 
worship.180 The proliferation of poems and godly songs among zealous 
Scottish Protestants, many of which were cited in chapter two, indicates that 
there was a demand for this music because of its power to mobilise 
supernatural emotion.181 
In addition to its function in public worship, radical emotional reflexivity 
was used as an instrument to evoke God-caused emotions in private piety. 
That it had this function in personal devotion was nowhere more evident than 
in the main strategy ministers recommended and employed for dealing with 
doubt. In much of the literature that was produced to combat and harness the 
widespread anxiety analysed in the second section of this chapter, readers 
were urged to examine themselves and attempt to identify the ‘marks of 
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election’.182 These were thoughts, feelings, and behaviours which were 
supposed to evidence that the subject was one of the chosen few.183 Once 
identified, the marks could be used to infer whether one was a member of 
elect. The logical structure of this inference, or ‘practical syllogism’, took the 
following form:  
1) Whoever has x is elect. 
2) I have x. 
3) Therefore, I am elect.184 
This line of reasoning was a form of modus ponens, a deductive form of 
argument which states that if the conditional proposition ‘if p then q’ is true, 
and the antecedent ‘p’ is true, then the consequent ‘q’ must be inferred. 
Thus, if someone judges that they have a mark of election, then by this rule 
of inference it is valid and sound for them to conclude that they are elect. 
Consequently, if an individual is convinced that whoever has x is elect and 
that they had x, they could have justification, and as such assurance, that 
they were a member of the elect. Put another way, identifying a mark of 
election could evoke a persuasion and assurance that God loves and has 
forgiven the sinner, otherwise known as a feeling of mercy.185 
Many of the marks of election could only be identified through radical 
emotional reflexivity. Robert Bruce provided an overview of several feelings 
which could be considered signs of salvation. He argued that if one had a 
‘desire to ask God’s mercy for your sins’, then what one has is ‘assuredly the 
true effect of genuine faith’.186 As iterated above, William Livingston and 
Archibald Porteous used this line when counselling Bessie Clarkson and 
Lady Hundaly respectively.187 Another mark was ‘accusing your 
dissoluteness, and finding fault with your behaviour’.188 Thus, even if one 
continues to sin, as long as one feels ‘remorse and sorrow’ for what they had 
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done, they are a member of the elect. Some Scottish Protestants followed 
Bruce and identified lament for sin as a mark of election. Livingston 
attempted to comfort Clarkson using this reasoning. When Clarkson declared 
that she would happily be damned if it would glorify God, Livingston assured 
her that ‘these are not the wishes and words of a castaway’.189 Archibald 
Johnston of Wariston judged that though at the time he felt as if God had 
‘forsaken’ him, subsequently he viewed his confession of sin as a sign of 
God’s work in his life.190 Love of neighbour was also a mark of election. 
Bruce argued that it is a ‘gift of God’ to love, ‘especially those who are of the 
family of faith’.191 Thus, an ability to forgive or have compassion on others 
was a sign of sincere supernatural emotion.192 Mistress Rutherford used her 
apprehension that she loved the godly to convince herself that she was 
saved, which gave her a degree of peace.193 The most significant ‘pillar, and 
the surest refuge’ from ‘the brink of desperation’ was, in Bruce’s view, 
identifying that one had experienced a feeling of God’s mercy.194 Bruce 
recommended that a subject in anguish over the sincerity of their faith and 
emotions should examine whether at any time they had ‘felt the love and 
favour of God in your heart and conscience’. If this had ever been the case, 
Bruce argued, it means that the ‘heart that has once felt this love of God will 
feel it again’. Thus, Bruce claimed, it should be ‘the first point in which every 
one of you ought to try and examine your own conscience’ because it can 
mobilise a feeling of God’s mercy.  
Even when a subject failed to identify the marks of election in their 
own lives, their radical emotional reflexivity could still be used to mobilise 
desired, supernatural emotions. Near the beginning of this chapter it was 
observed that William Cowper believed most Scots were ‘counterfeit 
Christians’, and he believed that through self-examination they could 
 
189 Livingston, Conflict, 14-15. 
190 Wariston, Diary, 59. 
191 Bruce, Lord’s Supper, 194-198. 
192 Bruce, Lord’s Supper, 185-186. 
193 Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 153, 175. 
194 Bruce, Lord’s Supper, 193-194. 
197 
 
determine if they were sincere believers or hypocrites.195 If a person found 
dissimilarity between themselves and the portrait of a Christian’s thoughts, 
emotions, and actions, he argued that they should ‘pray to God further to 
quicken thee, that thou mayest grow in holy similitude and conformitie with 
him’ for ‘thy everlasting comfort in Christ Jesus’. David Dickson was clear 
that he wanted his congregation to be thrown into doubt by their practice of 
radical emotional reflexivity. He asked them to: 
Speir at thy prayer, what devotion is in thee, and it will say, that thy 
prayers are so coldrife, that they cannot pierce up to heaven. Speir at 
thy conversation among men, what is thy estate, and it will tell thee it 
is coldrife, stubborn, implacable, cankered, unmerciful, and has a 
heart that cannot repent. Speir what love thou hast to God, and it will 
be told thee, thou can hear his name dishonoured, and care little for it; 
and thou cares not much how thy children and servants grown in 
knowledge, or fear of God. And if thy deeds speak thus, why art thou 
so secure?196 
 
He wanted his congregation to ‘suspect’ themselves of insincere faith and 
feigned supernatural emotion, so that they would repent of their sin and 
desire mercy.197 William Livingston explained to Bessie Clarkson that this 
was the purpose of her emotional distress. God facilitated such doubt so that 
the elect would not be: 
casten up in a dead sleepe of fleshly securitie; and so perish with the 
wicked of the world, in that great wrath that is to bee revealed; and to 
bring them to an hatred of sinne and sorrow for it: and to teach them 
how farre they are obliged to the Sonne of God… this sort of dealing 
drives atheisme best out of the heart.198  
 
Thus it was not an unfortunate accident that the practice of radical emotional 
reflexivity could evoke doubt. It was considered a vital part of the spiritual 
journey because it was a means by which a subject could apprehend their sin 
and so be moved to experience legal terror, godly sorrow, and a desire for 
mercy. Put another way, radical emotional reflexivity – the test of sincerity –  
was supposed to awaken the conscience to the true spiritual state of the 
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individual to evoke either personal amendment (repentance) or assurance (a 
feeling of mercy).199.  
With these ends in mind, zealous Scottish Protestants produced 
written forms of radical emotional reflexivity to evoke in their readers 
supernatural emotions. Some authors explained this in their texts. Archibald 
Johnston of Wariston’s aim in writing his diary was to let God ‘opine my eies 
for seie and sanctifeie my memorie’ so that he would remember all the times 
he had experienced ‘faytherly wrayth’ and God’s ‘deyvering me from it’.200 
This was so that ‘this experience of they favour may strenthen myn fayth in 
the day of neu troubles’. Robert Blair kept a diary for sixteen years, probably 
the basis for much of his autobiography, which charted both the ‘failings and 
escapes they were overtaken with’ so that they could be ‘considered and laid 
to heart’.201 Through this process he was able to identify and overcome any 
‘obstruction’ to his progress on the spiritual journey. In his memoir, James 
Mitchell of Dykes focused on ‘the Lord’s mercies and dealings with my soul, 
and some deep exercises of mind’.202 He asked God to work into his heart 
the lessons he had learned from these experiences.203 Each author wrote 
about their spiritual journey and tested the sincerity of their emotions so that 
when they read their text it would evoke in them either repentance or 
assurance. 
Dialogues were also presented by authors as a means by which their 
reader could be motivated to engage in radical emotional reflexivity and thus 
mobilise supernatural emotions. James Balfour wrote down his dialogue with 
Jean Kincaid for the ‘good and benefit of others’ so that they may ‘follow the 
example of her repentance’.204 The spiritual journey of Bessie Clarkson was 
presented by William Livingston as a warning against complacency. At the 
end of the text, he urged his reader that the moral of Clarkson’s story was to 
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avoid ‘a bare show of an outward profession’ and pursue ‘a lively and 
effectuall faith, in the deepe of our soules’.205 The examples of Kincaid and 
Clarkson, who practiced radical emotional reflexivity and advanced far on 
their spiritual journeys within these dialogues, were supposed to inspire 
readers to engage in their own self-examination so that they would also 
achieve communion with God. At least, that is how the authors of these texts 
chose to present the function of Clarkson’s and Kincaid’s stories for their 
readers. 
The practice of radical emotional reflexivity, whether in public worship, 
private devotion, or written form, was an instrument able to evoke 
supernatural emotions because it presented the subject with the right stimuli. 
As mentioned in the introduction, one way to evoke an emotion is to control 
the exposure a subject has to those things which cause emotions.206 This 
can be achieved either through increasing the contact a person has with a 
set of stimuli or by reducing the level of interaction an individual has with that 
which causes emotion. Given that thoughts can cause emotional 
experiences, a way to mobilise desired emotions is to control the thoughts 
one has. For example, if one feels down, a strategy for changing this emotion 
is to replace the sad thoughts which evoke this emotion with those that are 
positive. In this vein, radical emotional reflexivity mobilises desired feelings 
by determining the object of a person’s cognition. Evaluated against the goal 
of communion with God (explored in chapter two) the emotions were 
categorised within the linguistic-conceptual framework of the spiritual 
journey.207 Thus the standard by which the emotions were judged limited how 
they could be presented to the subject; they were either examples of sin or 
the effect of divine agency; insincere or sincere. This meant that the 
examination of emotion conducted in public worship or private devotion 
restricted the thoughts of an individual to those about the authenticity of their 
emotions in relation to the pilgrimage of the soul. In turn, this manipulation of 
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a person’s thoughts could cause them to experience repentance or 
assurance, depending upon the results of their self-examination. As a 
consequence, the practice of radical emotional reflexivity was a means by 
which one could manipulate the thoughts of an individual as a means to 
evoke in them desired emotions. Put in a language recognisable to early 
modern Scots (outlined in chapter one), the examination of one’s passions 
made the affections a formal object that was judged by the understanding 
and will as to whether it is good or bad for the subject’s pursuit of happiness, 
which in turn moves the sensitive appetite.208 This process worked because it 
limited the subject’s exposure to select stimuli – the subject’s sincere 
supernatural emotions or lack thereof – that could mobilise repentance or 
assurance. 
Self-examination in form of a written narrative had an additional 
advantage in its evocation of emotion, particularly joyous consolation, insofar 
as the structure of its plot typically presupposed that the story was one of 
struggle with a happy ending. To write about the journey of their soul (or 
somebody else’s) presupposed that the person in question had been on a 
spiritual journey. This was implied by the language authors used about their 
subject’s emotions: they categorised their feelings using the language of the 
spiritual journey present in public worship (examined in chapter three).209 
This would only be appropriate if the subject had in fact experienced an 
emotional sequence which could constitute advancement towards 
communion with God. Thus the narratives fervent Scots produced took as a 
given that it was a story of the subject’s transition from misery to happiness. 
Consequently, every plot had either an implicit or explicit happy resolution: 
the subject had either attained or was on the path towards communion with 
God.210 Crucially, it was how the story reached its happy ending which 
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enabled the writings about a subject’s spiritual journey to evoke supernatural 
emotions.211 Every pilgrimage of the soul had what J. R. R. Tolkien called (in 
relation to fairy stories) a ‘eucatastrophe’ – a ‘sudden joyous “turn”’.212 It is a 
‘sudden and miraculous grace’ which reverses and denies the failure, sorrow, 
and ‘universal final defeat’ in a manner ‘never to be counted on to recur’. In 
so doing, it gives a ‘fleeting glimpse of Joy, Joy beyond the walls of the world, 
poignant as grief’.  
The narratives produced by fervent Scots were filled with good 
catastrophes. The story of John Forbes of Corse was typical insofar as each 
time he experienced misery it was a dramatic and sudden instant of divine 
action which rescued him (examined in chapter four).213 It was only when 
William Cowper was in the ‘greatest extremitie of horror’ and looked for 
nothing else ‘but to be swallowed up’ in a pit of despair, that ‘suddenly did 
there shine… God proclaiming peace’.214 Similarly, it was when Robert Bruce 
was so ‘fearfullie and extremelie tormented’ that he would have rather been 
in a cauldron of molten lead, that God ‘restrained these fureis’ and showed 
him mercy.215 The reader was told that after three years of dread, anguish, 
and torment, Bessie Clarkson had a sudden conversion on her deathbed.216 
Similarly, Lady Hundaly wrestled with doubts about her salvation for many 
days before she had a vision of Christ which turned her fear to joy. This 
change was a day before she died.217 Mistress Rutherford was only given an 
absolute love for God by the Lord when she was grieving her son’s death.218 
Eucatastrophe was even, in a limited way, incorporated into public worship; 
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the momentous and sudden onset of tears and groans were considered a 
sign that God had reversed the fortunes of the subject (as discussed 
above).219 Fundamentally, the spiritual journeys were stories in which the 
natural corruption of humanity and the machinations of Satan were overcome 
by divine agency. Thus by its very nature the pilgrimage of the soul was a 
plot propelled by a series of eucatastrophes, climaxing in a final victorious 
reversal from the jaws of ultimate defeat.220 Consequently, when zealous 
Scots read texts depicting a person’s spiritual journey the narrative structure 
of the plot had the potential to evoke in them a consoling and powerful joy. 
This was the great advantage of written forms of radical emotional reflexivity, 
and so may help to explain their existence and function in Scottish Protestant 
piety. 
Because the practice of radical emotional reflexivity could mobilise 
God-caused emotions, it was considered a part of the spiritual journey 
towards communion with God. Given that God was the only one capable of 
creating supernatural feelings, to engage in self-examination had to be the 
result of divine agency.221 As such, David Dickson claimed that it was God 
who had caused him ‘to examine myself’.222 Similarly, Archibald Johnston 
Wariston believed it was God who moved him to ‘mor humbly and attentively 
to passe over every on[e] of my sins’.223 Implicit in these claims was the idea 
(discussed in chapter four) that God was the cause of supernatural 
emotions.224 It was an example of God’s indirect action upon the soul, 
presenting a the self as the formal object of a passion. An author could not, 
therefore, produce an account of their spiritual journey in a neutral, 
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dispassionate manner. Nor could a reader engage with a spiritual narrative 
from a disinterested standpoint. To engage in and with a written form of 
radical emotional reflexivity was to take a step towards communion with God. 
In other words, the practice of self-examination and testing the sincerity of 
the emotions, the context in which Scots used the language of emotion 
analysed in chapters three and four, was not only used as an instrument to 
mobilise supernatural emotions in public worship and private piety; it was an 
activity which constituted a conscious experience of the divinely inspired 
pilgrimage of the soul. Put another way, when a person wrote or read a 
narrative of a spiritual journey, or engaged in radical emotional reflexivity in 
public worship, they were engaged in their own advancement towards 
communion with God. 
 
 
This chapter has argued that radical emotional reflexivity was central 
to early modern Scottish Protestantism. It was embedded in its religious 
practices and fervently practiced by some of the more zealous adherents of 
the faith. It was used to test the sincerity of a subject’s supernatural 
emotions. This was done by evaluating the causes and effects of an 
experience, which from it could be inferred whether it was God-caused or 
not. Sudden and momentous tears and groans, joined with long-lasting 
change, were considered the primary somatic signs of supernatural emotion. 
Many Scots, in their assessment, failed the test. They doubted whether their 
emotions were divine in origin based on the perceived causes and effects of 
their experiences. Yet even if they did have evidence that they had divinely 
caused emotions, the problem of doubleness and the transience of emotion 
undercut the justification for thinking one was on the spiritual journey. Thus, 
doctrinal commitments and an overreliance on feeling in the practice of self-
examination stoked the flames of doubt. However, this was all part of the 
plan. The purpose of examining feeling in public worship and personal 
writings was to mobilise supernatural emotions. Radical emotional reflexivity 
was able to evoke desired emotions because it presented to the cognition the 
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subject’s spiritual journey, moving the appetite to repentance or assurance. 
Moreover, written narratives could stimulate in their readers consoling joy 
because their plot consisted in a series of eucatastrophes. Because self-
examination was a God-caused activity, writing and reading an account of 
the soul’s pilgrimage was an experience of its subject-matter. Put another 
way, it was a step towards communion with God. 
Consequently, Scots examined their emotions to mobilise supernatural 
emotions. By extension, they wrote and read narratives to evoke those 
feelings which constitute the spiritual journey and to engage in an activity – 
the test of emotional sincerity – which was itself a part of the pilgrimage of 
the soul. These functions of radical emotional reflexivity clarify why it, and the 
language of emotion examined in chapters three and four, were a central 







 This thesis has analysed the intense emotionality of Scottish 
Protestantism between 1590 and 1640. It did so through an original approach 
to the source material which breaks new ground in the study of the history of 
emotions: the examination of the Scottish Protestant practice of radical 
emotional reflexivity. Such a methodology recognised that the extant texts 
relevant to the study of emotion were produced through engagement in an 
interpretative process whereby zealous Protestants in Scotland classified 
their experiences in order to mobilise desired emotions. Consequently, the 
thesis undertook an analysis of the judgements Scottish Protestants made 
about their emotions and why they examined their emotions at all.  
 The first four chapters explained the meaning of the language Scottish 
Protestants used about their emotions in public worship and personal 
writings. The argument was, thus, able to make explicit the tacit beliefs about 
emotion that those who wrote and read these texts in early modern Scotland 
took for granted. The first chapter achieved this through an examination of 
the Scottish Protestant theory of emotion, which claimed that it was assumed 
that passions were psychosomatic effects caused by an external agent’s 
action upon a passive subject’s faculties. This was followed by an analysis of 
the emotional core of Scottish Protestantism: communion with God. Chapter 
two explained why Scots believed fellowship with Christ was the goal of 
human existence, how they thought it could be obtained, and why they 
believed human nature obstructed the acquisition of happiness. Chapter 
three examined the language of emotion built into corporate worship and 
personal writings. It argued that the vocabulary of communal religious 
practice and those texts produced by fervent Scots categorised the sequence 
of a subject’s emotions in the form of a narrative: the spiritual journey of the 
soul towards communion with God. Analysing a conversion narrative written 
by Mistress Rutherford, the chapter schematised the shifts in her emotional 
language into six-stages, which together represented a shared linguistic-
conceptual framework authors used and adapted from public worship in their 
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spiritual writings: love for devotion, apprehension of sin, legal terror, 
repentance, a feeling of mercy, communion with God. The fourth chapter 
examined the role of God in the spiritual journey, and argued that Protestants 
in Scotland identified God as the absolute cause of ‘supernatural emotions’ – 
those that make up the spiritual journey – and that sometimes they 
interpreted experiences of ecstatic joy as the subjective dimension of 
communion with God.  
 The final chapter explored how and why Scottish Protestants engaged 
in radical emotional reflexivity. The first section examined how Scots 
categorised their emotions in public worship and private piety. It argued that 
through an analysis of an experience’s causes and effects a person was able 
to determine what kind of emotion they had experienced and as such what 
language they should use about their feelings. The segment explained that 
Scots engaged in this intentional practice of classification to test the sincerity 
of their emotions. This was followed by a discussion of how this process 
could cause an individual to doubt the authenticity of their emotions. It was 
found that because of the problem of doubleness – caused by belief in 
double predestination – and the transience of the emotions, scepticism and 
acute anxiety were an inevitable result for many Scottish Protestants who 
practiced radical emotional reflexivity. The final section addressed why the 
examination of emotion was an important part of public worship and private 
piety. It argued that the purpose of the test of sincerity was to mobilise 
desired emotions. Thus it was claimed that zealous Scottish Protestants 
examined their emotions with rigour because they thought that this would 
help them attain communion with God. This was why they wrote about their 
emotions. They used radical emotional reflexivity in public worship and 
private devotion to fix the subject’s cognition on either their internal sins or 
God’s mercies. In so doing, they hoped that the subject would be moved to 
either repentance or assurance. Written forms of radical emotional reflexivity 
had an additional advantage as instruments of mobilisation insofar as their 
narrative structure, consisting in ‘eucatastrophes’, made them capable of 
stimulating in a reader consoling joys. As means and ways of mobilising 
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supernatural emotions, writing and reading narratives of the spiritual journey 
were activities that were considered the effect of divine agency. 
Consequently, reading such texts was meant to both evoke desired emotions 
and be an experience of the soul’s pilgrimage towards communion with God. 
 The thesis, hence, has presented many original insights into the 
emotionality Scottish Protestantism. It has provided, for the first time, a 
comprehensive analysis of the assumptions Protestants in Scotland carried 
about their emotions. Key findings include: the fundamentally passive nature 
of emotion; that happiness was an integral ambition of Scottish Protestants, 
contrary to popular stereotypes; that a narrative of emotion, conveyed 
through linguistic shifts, was built into corporate worship and personal 
writings; how God caused emotion from within the subject’s consciousness; 
the role that the causes and effects of an experience has in how Scots 
classified their feelings; the reasons why Scottish Protestants practiced 
radical emotional reflexivity. Additionally, the thesis has been innovative in its 
use and analysis of the source material. It included sources, such as poetry, 
which have been largely excluded from the study of emotionality in Scottish 
Protestantism. In this regard, its most important contribution was to examine 
the language of emotion built into liturgical practices like public repentance, 
public fasting, preaching, the Lord’s Supper, psalm-singing, and the swearing 
of covenants. The thesis has also treated the extant sources as the result of 
an interpretative process, which integrated into its analysis of their content 
the origin and purpose of these texts for those who created and read them. 
Hence, this project has offered inventive ideas about the content of Scottish 
Protestant emotion and the methodology that should be used to analyse it. 
 The most important outcome of this study is that it has found Scottish 
Protestants were intensely and intentionally aware of their emotionality. Many 
scholars have argued that early modern Protestants, in Scotland and 
elsewhere, had an experiential brand of piety which cultivated strong 
feelings. However, what they have not analysed is that the evidence for these 
claims was produced by a purposeful and rigorous examination of a subject’s 
experiences. The sources required that an author be motivated to evaluate 
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their subject’s emotions. Moreover, the content of the extant material was 
informed by a linguistic-conceptual framework which influenced the 
judgements the author made about their subject’s emotions. The creation of 
such texts and what they conveyed to their readers reveal that Scottish 
Protestants inhabited a community which was conscious of its emotionality 
and actively sought to mould its experiences in public worship and private 
devotion. Thus, the thesis argued that the extant source material must not be 
examined as if it delivers immediate access into the experiences of Scottish 
Protestants. Instead, it has claimed that the texts provide the historian with a 
window onto how Protestants in Scotland interpreted their emotions as a 
means to stimulate supernatural emotions. Put another way, the thesis has 
defended the idea that the meaning personal writings had for authors and 
readers can only be understood in light of their content and function. 
Consequently, the project has shown that Scottish Protestants identified their 
emotions in order to mobilise desired emotions, a process built into public 
worship which encouraged zealous Scots to create a religious literature 
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